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The purpose of this thesis is to assess the interests
of the United States towards Vietnam from FDR to Carter; to
trace the development of U.S. policies towards Vietnam
under these presidencies; to define the issues in the
current relationship between the two nations; and to set
forth a strategy based on the political, economic and
military needs of all the regional actors; the United
States, Vietnam, China, ASEAN (Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore, Indonesia, and the Republic of the Philippines)
,
Japan and the Soviet Union.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION- ----------------- 9
A. CRITICISMS- ---------------- 10
B. THE NATIONAL INTEREST ----------- 12
C. CONCLUSIONS ---------------- 22
II. ROOSEVELT AND TRUMAN- ------------- 24
A. ROOSEVELT ----------------- 24
3. TRUMAN- ------------------ 27
C. CONCLUSIONS ---------------- 33
III. THE EISENHOWER YEARS- ------------- 35
A. 1953 TO GENEVA- -------------- 36
B. THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ----------- 42
C. SEATO AND U.S. INTERESTS- --------- 47
D. THE 1956 ELECTIONS- ------------ 50
E. THE DIEM REGIME -------------- 52
F
. i9 6 o 58
G. CONCLUSIONS ---------------- 61
IV. KENNEDY'S THOUSAND DAYS - - -
A. THE EARLY JOHN F. KENNEDY
64
64
3. THE INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGE -------- 66
C. KENNEDY'S VIETNAM POLICY: COUNTER-
INSURGENCY- ---------------- 68
D. DIEM, THE BUDDHIST CRISIS AND THE COUP- - - 74
E. CONCLUSIONS ---------------- 7Q

V. JOHNSON: OPEN-ENDED COMMITMENT AND RETREAT- - 83
A. THE BEGINNING- -------------- g3
B. THE TONKIN GULF INCIDENT --------- 9Q
C. DECISION TO BOMB THE NORTH -------- 92
D. COMMITMENT OF U.S. GROUND TROOPS ----- 99
E. PEACE INITIATIVES- ------------ 1Q5
F
. TET 10g
G. TET: POSTSCRIPT ------------- 1Qg
H. PARIS PEACE TALKS- ------------
^.H
I. CONCLUSIONS- --------------- 113
VI. NIXON'S WAR AND PEACE- ------------ 118
A. NIXON AT THE HELM- ------------ 118
B. VIETNAMIZATION -------------- 124
C. CAMBODIAN INCURSION AND LAM SON 719- - - - 127
D. MARCH 1972 OFFENSIVE ----------- 133
E. PEACE? WAR? PEACE? ----------- 137
F. THE BEGINNING OF THE END --------- 141
G. CONCLUSIONS- --------------- 142
VII. FORD'S PRESIDENCY- -------------- 14g
A. THE FIRST SIX MONTHS ----------- 148
B. EXIT SAIGON, ENTER HO CHI MINH CITY- - - - 154
C. POSTWAR EVENTS -------------- 150
1. The admission of Vietnam to the United
Nations- ----------------- ]_g]_
2. Americans missing in action in
Indochina- ---------------- ]_g 2

3. Normalization of relations- ----- 153
4. Reconstruction aid to Indochina - - - I65
D. CONCLUSIONS --------------- 16 7
VIII. THE CARTER TERM --------------- 173
A. THE FIRST YEAR- ------------- 173
B. THE SECOND YEAR ------------- 179
C. THE FINAL TWO YEARS ----------- 135
D. CONCLUSIONS --------------- 188
IX. A STRATEGY FOR INDOCHINA- ---------- 193
A. THE OBJECTIVES- ------------- 193
B. THE PLAN- ---------------- 199
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION- ----------- 202
APPENDIX A. TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION- -------- 2 07
APPENDIX B. FORD'S PACIFIC DOCTRINE -------- 2 09
APPENDIX C. CHRONOLOGY: OCTOBER 17, 1972-
JANUARY 23, 1973- ----------- 219
FOOTNOTES- --------------------- 222
BIBLIOGRAPHY -------------------- 2 35




1.1 National Interest Matrix- ----------- 17
1.2 Essential Factors for Determining Vital
Interests ------------------- 20
1.3 Questionnaire: Determination of Vital
Interests ------------------- 21
2.1 National Interest Matrix - Truman ------- 35
3.1 National Interest Matrix - Eisenhower ----- 62
4.1 National Interest Matrix - Kennedy- ------ 82
5.1 Map of Indochina- --------------- 84
5.2 National Interest Matrix - Johnson- ------ 115
5.3 National Interest Matrix - U.S. and North
Vietnam -------------------- 117
6.1 Map of Southeast Asia ------------- 130
6.2 Map of Vietnam- ---------------- 136
6.3 National Interest Matrix - Nixon- ------- 146
7.1 Government Military Regions ---------- 153
7.2 National Interest Matrix - Ford -------- 170
8.1 National Interest Matrix - Carter ------- 191

I. INTRODUCTION
The study of a nation's foreign policy is usually
concerned with its goals and interests as they relate to
other states in the international system. Each state is
expected to formulate and implement its foreign policy in
a way that reflects that nation's national interest.
The major problem facing the student of international
relations is the lack of a model or conceptual framework
for analyzing the plethora of information that oft times
is available. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is
to develop an operational framework and definition for the
concept of the national interest— a concept of primary
importance in the study and analysis of foreign policy.
Although the concept of the national interest is
central to the study of a nation's foreign policy, it is
a term that is replete with multiple uses and definitions.
Since its meaning is often vague and imprecise, the term
many times proves more confusing than not. Much of this
confusion and criticism of the concept stems from the
expectation of its usefulness as an analytical tool. Be
that as it may, states do have interests, and they do
pursue them. When properly understood the concept of the
national interest not only aids in the understanding of a
nation's foreign policy but is indeed necessary.

A. CRITICISMS
Some of the criticisms of the concept of national
interest are that it is imprecise, rationally undefinable
,
static, and always subject to more than one interpretation.
An example of the criticisms leveled against the concept of
the national interest is presented by James Rosenau.
Writing in the International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences , he notes that this concept has been used as an
analytical tool and as a prescription for political action.
As an analytical tool, it is employed to describe,
explain, or evaluate the sources or the adequacy of
a nation's foreign policy. As an instrument of
political action, it serves as a means of justifying,
denouncing, or proposing policies. Both usages, in
other words, refer to what is best for a national
society. They also share a tendency to confine the
intended meaning to what is best for a nation in
foreign affairs.!
Rosenau notes that the national interest is rooted in
values. When it is utilized to describe political action
it "lacks structure and content," and it "confounds the
efforts of its users" when it is used as an analytical
instrument. Although the concept lacks preciseness which
confounds the political analyst, it does prove useful to
the political actor when thinking about foreign policy
2goals and in rallying popular support for his policies.
According to Rosenau, some of the reasons for the
failure of the concept as an analytical tool are related
to four areas: (1) the problem of what constitutes a
10

nation; (2) the interests that should be considered; (3)
the difficulty in determining the existence of interests;
and (4) the lack of procedure for cumulating the interests
once they are known. There is also the uncertainty of
knowing whether the national interest is simply the sum of
the various individually expressed interests, or whether it
is greater than the sum of its parts.
In the opinion of James Rosenau, both the objectivists
and the subjectivists are unable to provide any objectively
verifiable content to the national interest. The political
realists (objectivists) , led by Hans Morgenthau, define a
nation's interests in terms of power. They see power as
an end in international relations. Rosenau argues that one
cannot, think, in terms of power alone, with no regard for
values, in determining a nation's foreign policy goals. In
Rosenau 's opinion power is a concept as elusive as interest
Values are not only involved in cumulating power but they
4
are also involved when deciding how to use that power.
On the other hand the subjectivists, those who deny
that the quest for power alone can determine the national
interest, are faced with the task of identifying the
various interests in a society, relating specific interests
to specific policies, and of aggregating the specific
interests into a meaningful whole. They tend to assume
that these tasks are performed within the decision-making
11

process. The subjectivists are, therefore, accepting a
procedural definition of the national interest with all
of its inherent weaknesses.
In conclusion Rosenau notes that the national interest
"has little future as an analytical concept." He does not
believe that enough preciseness can be attained to make the
term a useful research tool. The concept will require
further study, though, because it will continue to be used
by political actors and scholars.
Rosenau and many other scholars have approached the
concept of the national interest from a limited perspective
or have asked too much of the concept. He and other
authors have overlooked how the idea of the national
interest does aid in understanding the development and
execution of foreign policy.
With this in mind the remainder of the chapter will be
devoted to the ideas of Donald E. Neuchterlein to develop
an operationally meaningful framework and definition for
the national interest.
B. THE NATIONAL INTEREST
Donald E. Neuchterlein in his book, National Interests
and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities
presents the most credible and analytically meaningful




Neuchterlein makes certain qualifications about the
usage of certain terms prior to his attempt to define the
national interest. First, he assumes that "the leaders of
nation - states act rationally in the pursuit of state
objectives." By this he means that the policies the
leaders follow are believed to work towards the greater
well-being of their people, "whatever the constitutional
system." The problems of cost-effectiveness, wiseness or
morality not withstanding, it is simply assumed that some
degree of reasoning is used in making foreign policy
decisions. Second, he assumes that "the number of persons
involved in deciding national interests will vary from
state to state, depending on the type of government." In
societies that are generally free and democratic, a large
body of people from both the private and public sector of
society exert degrees of influence on issues that could
become vital interests. In states that are totalitarian
in nature the number of people who can exert such
7influence are far fewer in number.
Once these qualifications have been considered the
next step is defining the national interest. "The
national interest is the perceived needs and desires of one
sovereign state in relation to the sovereign states
g
comprising its external environment." Neuchterlein




First, we are talking about the perception of state
needs, which suggests that decisions about the
national interest are the result of a political
process in which a country's leaders ultimately
arrive at a decision about the importance of a given
external event or crisis to the country's well-being.
It is also clear that this definition pertains only
to fully sovereign states, not to international
organizations or dependent territories ... This
definition also draws a distinction between the
external and the internal environments of states; the
way in which a government deals with the internal
environment of the state is usually referred to as the
public interest. Finally, this definition implies
that we are talking about the interests of the nation-
state in its entirety, not the interests of private
groups, bureaucratic entities, or political organiza-
tions within the state.
*
A simple definition of the national interest is
important, however, by itself it does not offer the
policymaker or the scholar the operationally meaningful
framework required in the determination of national
interests. Neuchterlein recognizes this important fact
and provides "additional definitions of the basic
interests of nation-states—those national needs that form
the underpinnings of their (the policymakers) foreign
policies." The other definitions Neuchterlein provides
are as follows:
1. defense interests : the protection of the
nation-state and its citizens against the threat
of physical violence directed from another state




economic interests : the enhancement of the




3. world order interests : the maintenance of
an international political and economic system
in which the nation-state may feel secure and
in which its citizens and commerce may operate
peacefully outside its borders
4. ideological interests : the protection and
furtherance of a set of values that the citizens
of a nation-state share and believe to be
universally good.H
Several comments need to be addressed in reference to
these basic national interests. First of all, the order in
which they are represented does not conote a sense of
priority or hierarchy, however, it seems obvious that
without a proper defense of the nation-state and the people
that make up the nation-state, the other basic interests
are not of much use. A second point is that the four basic
interests "are not mutually exclusive" and require that
tradeoffs between them be made by policymakers. Examples
of this abound such as the nationalization of American
industries by host countries. Generally in these cases the
American government has sacrificed these interests in an
12
effort to strengthen our world order interests. In terms
of international raw materials, United States policymakers
have willingly allowed foreign states to nationalize
American owned industries, provided just compensation were
received, if they felt the stability of said regime was in
13the world order interest of the United States. " A third
point is that "a nation's ideology is an important part of
15

its national interest." A final point to be made when
discussing the four basic interests deals with defense
interests. As envisioned by Neuchterlein it "entails
only the protection of the homeland, the citizens and the
political system" of the country and does not include
14
alliance systems with other countries.
Neuchterlein has devised a very utilitarian
categorization of the intensity of the four basic
interests. Those categories are:
1. Survival issues : when the very existence
of a nation-state is in jeopardy, as a result
of overt military attack on its own territory,
or from the threat of attack if an enemy's
demands are rejected .... By this definition,
probably no economic, world order, or ideolgical
issues qualify; only defense interests, as
defined above, would reach this level of
intensity ....
2. Vital issues : VJhen serious harm will very
likely result to the state unless strong measures,
including the use of conventional military forces,
are employed to counter an adverse action by
another state or to deter it from undertaking a
serious provocation .... Unlike survival
issues, a vital matter may involve not only
defense interests but also economic, world order,
and in some cases ideological interests ....
3. Major issues : When a state's political,
economic, and ideological well-being may be
adversely affected by events and trends in the
international environment and thus requires
corrective action in order to prevent them from
becoming serious threats (vital issues) . Most
issues in international relations fall into this




4. Peripheral issues: When a state's well-
be inq~~Ts~~ncyE~.adversely affected by events or trends
abroad, but when the interests of private citizens
and companies operating in other countries might be
endangered . . . .
Now that we have looked at the four basic interests and
have devised an intensity scale, the next step in the
formulation of an operationally meaningful framework of the
national interests must be addressed. A set of value
factors and cost/risk factors must be applied that are
useful for all four basic interests and that provide a
means of assessing the intensity of those interests, i.e.,
whether the interest is survival, vital, major or peri-
pheral. However, prior to proceeding with a look at these
value factors and cost/risk factors an illustration of how
policymakers can use the four basic interests and the





Basic Interest at stake Intensity of interest







It is recognized that the highly utilitarian matrix
shown on page 17 and the operationally meaningful frame-
work thus far discussed is not a very scientific method of
analyzing behavior in international politics. It is,
however, designed to provide the decisionmaker with a much
better method of analyzing those things that motivate
states. This framework is not only useful for one's own
country but it is also very useful for analyzing those
nations that comprise its external environment.
With this in mind we will turn our attention to the
value factors and cost/risk factors mentioned previously.
Historically there have been many instances where
nation - states have found their vital interests threatened
If neither side feels there is any room for compromise
then a conflict becomes a distinct possiblity. Due to the
nature and capabilities of many nations to rain total
devastation on one another it becomes imperative for
policymakers to carefully calculate not only their own
country's stake on a given issue or set of issues but also
the stake of their antagonist. A failure to do just that
could eventually lead to gross miscalculation and armed
conflict. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 is a good
example of such miscalculation that brought the world to
the brink of war.
18

Both the State Department and the Defense Department
seek to be systematic in their analysis of potential
crises, and their recommendations attempt to take into
account all the relevant information which impact on a
given crisis. However, in light of the serious miscalcu-
lations by the planners of these departments in such cases
as the Vietnam war and the Cambodian incursion, serious
questions must be raised about their analysis.
Professor-Neuchterlein has listed sixteen factors he
considers essential to a clear and in depth analysis of the
national interest. Most of the factors listed on page 20
apply to the four basic national interests: defense of
homeland, economic well-being, favorable world order, and
ideological.
The fourth and final step to be taken in the develop-
ment of an operationally meaningful framework of the
national interest is to make the values and costs listed
in chart 1.2 significant to the policymaker. When
discussing important foreign policy issues, policymakers
need a method of assessing the values versus the costs.
Such a method is provided by Professor Neuchterlein in the
form of a questionnaire. The questionnaire's system is set
up on a numbering system ranging from one to ten with one
representing a low value or cost and ten representing a




Essential Factors for Determining Vital Interests
Value Factors
Proximity of the danger




Effect on balance of power
National prestige at stake
Policies of key allies
Cost/Risk Factors
Economic costs of hostility
Estimated casualties
Risk of protracted conflict
Risk of enlarged conflict
Cost of defeat or stalemate
Risk of public opposition
Risk of U.N. opposition





Determination of Vital Interests
Values
Proximity to danger




Effect on balance of power
National prestige at stake
Policies of key allies
Costs/Risks
Economic costs of hostilities
Estimated casualties
Risk of protracted conflict
Risk of enlarged conflict
Cost of defeat or stalemate
Risk of public opposition
Risk of U.N. opposition
Risk of congressional opposition





This questionnaire is primarily concerned with
determining whether an interest is vital or major in its
intensity. If the cost/risk factors outweigh the value
factor then in all likelihood the interest is major and
diplomatic negotiations should be pursued. However, if the
value factors exceed the cost/risk factors then the
21

interest is vital in nature and may very likely require
the employment of conventional military force. In the
case where the cost/risk factors approximate the value
factors then serious diplomatic negotiations should be
pursued. Pending the outcome of these negotiations, the
issue at hand should be continuously updated and re-
analyzed in an effort to determine whetner the issue is a
vital interest or a major interest.
As stated earlier, the method presented in this
chapter is not a scientifically precise method of computing
the national interest of a nation-state. It is, though, a
systematic approach to evaluating the values and costs
that policymakers ought to consider in order to produce
better policies and to avoid the possibility of
miscalculation. The art of foreign policy remains just
that: an art, however, the method of analysis presented in
this chapter will enable the policymaker to better perform
his task.
C. CONCLUSIONS
The importance of the national interest concept in
analyzing state behavior makes it necessary to develop
both an operational framework and a definition for the
concept itself. The ideas of Professor Neuchterlein make
it possible to do this. The importance of this approach to
22

the concept of the national interest is in recognizing
that there is no one, over-all national interest for any
state. The national interest of a state must be evaluated
and determined in each individual situation by weighing
the values and costs.
By using Neuchterlein ' s conceptual framework, as
presented in this chapter, American policy in Vietnam will
be analyzed starting with the Presidencies of Franklin
D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman and culminating with a
look at the Carter Presidency. The last chapter will
present a recommended policy for the future.
23

II. ROOSEVELT AND TRUMAN
A. ROOSEVELT
Power politics is what first caused President Roosevelt
to become involved with the subject of Indochina.
In the 1930s when Japan seized Manchuria and northern
China, and thus closed the "open door" of equal rights for
all foreigners in terms of commercial exploitation, the
United States continued its traditional policy of verbal
defense of China's territorial integrity.
In 1939 and 1940 the President began to turn the
economic screws on Japan through a policy of denying them
oil and scrap metal wherever possible. At the same time
Roosevelt saw a threat to the Philippines emerging as
Japan continued its conquests southward into Indochina and
the Spratly Islands.
Throughout this period President Roosevelt had to be
extremely cautious that he not get too far ahead of
American public opinion on the subject of involvement in
the "gathering storm." However, on December 7, 1941 Japan
struck the American Naval base at Pearl Harbor thrusting
the United States into World War II. Over the next
several weeks Japan launched a rapid drive that consumed
most of Southeast Asia.
24

During the first year-and-a-half the President was
dedicated to the gearing up of America for war while
trying to check Japanese, Italian and German advances
wherever possible. However, in the back of his mind he
was developing a new plan for France's colonial possessions
in Asia—trusteeship.
President Roosevelt first broached the idea of
trusteeship for the governance of Indochina in March 1943
during a visit to Washington by the British Foreign
Secretary Anthony Eden.
At the Teheran Conference in November 1943 the future
of Indochina was discussed by Churchill, Stalin, and
Roosevelt. In an effort to gain Stalin's support on other
important issues, Roosevelt took the position that
Indochina should not be restored to the French in the post
war era. Stalin agreed with Roosevelt's position, he did
not feel that the allies should shed tneir blood to
19
restore French colonial rule in Indochina. Both
Roosevelt and Stalin were of the opinion that the native
Indochinese were far worse off as a result of decades
under French colonial rule and that anything would be
better than continued French dominance.
Churchill quickly came to the aid of the French on
this issue. He sought the quick restoration of France's
former status as a world power.
25

As a result of this British opposition coupled with
that of the French on the issue of trusteeship for
Indochina, Roosevelt did not fight to have this idea
incorporated into any official documents, and by mid-1944,
Roosevelt's official policy was that Indochina should be
20placed under a trusteeship only with French concurrence.
This modified position was reinforced when, with the
approval of Roosevelt, Secretary of State Stettinius on
April 3, 1945 issued a statement based on the results of
the Yalta Conference. According to this statement,
trusteeship would be an acceptable arrangement to the
United States only for "territories taken from the enemy,"
and for "territories as might voluntarily be placed under
21trusteeship.
"
Roosevelt died a scant two months after the Yalta
Conference and for the next four and one-half years
Indochina would be of secondary importance to the United
States. Would the American position have been different
if Roosevelt had lived? This is surely a matter of
conjecture, however, given his distrust of the French, "it
is conceivable that he might have decided to back Ho Chi
Minh, who in the spring of 1945 was maneuvering his Viet
Minh forces into a position where they could claim to be




When Truman ascended to the Presidency on April 12,
1945 he was faced with many difficult decisions. Although
he favored independence for Indochina, this matter was of
secondary importance to him. His primary concerns in the
early months of his Presidency dealt with finishing the
war against Japan and Germany and he was faced with the
enormously difficult decision on the use of the atomic
bomb against Japan.
As it had throughout World War II, the United States
in the immediate postwar era continued to pay primary
attention toward Europe. It was in the European area
where Washington began to feel that the expansion of
Soviet power was most dangerous. It was also in Europe,
which had a highly developed economic and industrial base,
that Washington felt its aid could be readily absorbed. On
the other hand, Asia with its mainly agrarian base seemed
23
almost helplessly backwards.
When the priorities on Asia were determined at the end
of World War II, Southeast Asia was given the next to
lowest priority. The reasoning behind this lay in the
fact that, with the exception of Thailand, the nations
making up Southeast Asia were politically tied to one or
another of the European powers. Thus, by the fall of 194 5,
the Truman Administration decided that it could not afford
27

to add Indochina to its growing list of Far Eastern
problems. However on October 27, 194 5, President Truman
delivered a speech in which he dealt with the problem of
independence for colonial peoples. Truman stated:
We believe in the eventual return of sovereign rights
and self-government to all peoples who have been
deprived of them by force....
We believe that all peoples who are prepared for self-
government should be permitted to choose their own
form of government by their own freely expressed choice
without interference from any foreign source. That is
true in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, as well as in the
Western Hemisphere....
We shall refuse to recognize any government imposed
upon any nation by the force of any foreign
power. . . .24
The significance of this statement by President Truman
lay in the fact that he does not speak of immediate
indpendence but only of the "eventual" return of
sovereignty and "self-government, " thus he did not rule out
the possiblity of a French protectorate over Vietnam.
It is clear that in the immediate postwar time-frame
Washington was sympathetic to the cause of Vietnamese
independence, however, it considered the economic
rehabilitation and political independence of France far
more important.
America's attitude towards Vietnam between 1945 and
1949 is perhaps best summed up by George M. Kahin and
John W. Lewis in their book The United State in Vietnam.
28

Until the end of 1949 the United States displayed
little, if any, real interest in Indochina. It
occasionally urged the French to take steps towards
granting independence to these areas, but its urging
was mild and restrained. Washington was apprehen-
sive lest any pressure it exerted in this regard
might adversely affect France's attitude toward co-
operating with it in the formation of European
defense alliances, which in the postwar years
received the highest priority among the United
States' strategic objectives . 25
Two major events in 1949 and one major event in 1950
marked a principal shift in American policy towards
Indochina. The events of 194 9 were the formation of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the fourth of
April and the proclamation of the People's Republic of
China (PRC) on October first. The significant event of
1950, of course, was the outbreak of the Korean War in
which Communist Chinese volunteers were introduced.
The shift in American foreign policy began to unfold
when it became evident that the fall of China was imminent
A National Security Council study in June 1949 states in
part:
The extension of communist authority in China
represents a grievous political defeat for us; if
Southeast Asia also is swept by communism we shall
have suffered a major political rout the repercus-
sions of which will be felt throughout the rest of
the world, especially in the Middle East and in a
then critically exposed Australia. 26
After the fall of China the United States began to
press the French to grant independence to the Associated
States. On February 2, 1950 the French government
29

ratified Vietnamese independence in the French Union.
This event was quickly followed by American recognition of
the Bao Dai government on February 4, 1950. Thus, the
stage was set for the beginning of the American aid
program.
The objective of American foreign policy, as it began
to unfold in 1949, was the containment of communism by
encircling it with a series of anti-communist military
alliances
.
A National Security Council study in June of 1949
singled out the Soviet Union as the main enemy.
For the foreseeable future, therefore, our
immediate objective must be to contain and where
feasible to reduce the power and influence of the
USSR in Asia to such a degree that the Soviet Union
is not capable of threatening the security of the
United States from that area and that the Soviet
Union would encounter serious obstacles should it
attempt to threaten the peace, national independence
or stability of the Asiatic nations. 27
Southeast Asia was the perceived target of Soviet
subversion. In consonance with its policy of containment,
the United States wanted the nations of Asia, particularly
India, the Philippines, and Pakistan, to take the lead in
facing this problem. The United States recognized that as
a Western power it would be disadvantaged if it tried to
assume the lead.
While the objective of American foreign policy was the
containment of "communism, " the perceived threat was
30

embodied in the domino theory. Even before the outbreak
of the Korean War the domino theory dominated American
thinking. A National Security Council memorandum stated:
It is important to United States security interests
that all practicable measures be taken to prevent
further communist expansion in Southeast Asia.
Indochina is the key area of Southeast Asia and is
under immediate threat.
The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could
be expected to fall under Communist domination if
Indochina were controlled by a Communist-dominated
government. The balance of Southeast Asia would then
be in grave hazard. 2 8
With the outbreak of the Korean War, however, China
replaced the Soviet Union as the major threat to Southeast
As i a
.
The loss of any of the countries of Southeast Asia
to communist control as a consequence of overt or
covert Chinese Communist aggression would have
critical psychological, political and economic
consequences . 29
The French were quick to react to this significant
shift in American foreign policy. Paris endeavored with
considerable success to convince Washington that the French
campaign in Vietnam was in effect sustaining the American
policy of containing communism. Thus, with Washington's
new priorities, France's position in Vietnam was now
presented in terms of the Free World's stand against
communist expansion rather than being perceived primarily
as a local colonial conflict.
With America's recognition of the Bao Dai government
Ho Chi Minh sought and received diplomatic recognition from
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China, Russia, and the Eastern bloc countries and thus
Vietnam was linked to the cold war and regarded as an area
of strategic importance to the United States.
With this in mind, in February 1950 President Truman
approved a program of military and economic aid that by the
time of the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu was to exceed
80% of the French war effort. This military and economic
aid program was followed by a Mutual Defense Agreement that
was signed in December 1950 by representatives of the
French, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Lao, and American
governments
.
An important point needs to be addressed at this
juncture. The American involvement in Indochina was not
begun on solid footing. Bao Dai was not a strong capable
leader. In essence he was a puppet of the French will.
France continuously refused to grant Vietnam total and
unconditional independence which was, according to American
officials, absolutely necessary as an incentive for them to
fight. Whereas Eao Dai was weak with little popular
support, Ho Chi Minh on the other hand was perceived, by a
large segment of the Vietnamese population, as
nationalistic and patriotic, and the French policy in
Vietnam did nothing to counter Ho's appeal.
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In addition to this,
The United States and France were pursuing objectives
that were not wholly compatible. The United States
was primarily interested in the containment of
Communism while the French were trying to preserve
their colonial position. The United States did not
enter the conflict in Indochina. . .because we
approved of what they (the French) were doing, but
because we need their support for our policies in
regard to NATO and Germany. Truman and Acheson
wanted French ratification of the European Defense
Community. In Indochina itself, the U.S. wanted the
French to fight the war until victory was achieved,
and then we wanted the French to leave. France, on
the other hand, certainly was not fighting just to
leave once victory was attained. 30
C. CONCLUSIONS
In assessing President Roosevelt's policy on Indochina
one would have to see it in terms of the global setting.
President Roosevelt felt that the French, as a colonial
power had done more harm than good to Indochina. During
the war the President had been known to feel that the
United States had gotten involved in the Pacific War
because of the shortsighted greed of the French, the
British and the Dutch. This sentiment coupled with his
reserve towards DeGaulle and America's stated policy of
self-determination for all peoples led him to propose an
international trusteeship for Indochina. This position,
although still a personal belief of President Roosevelt,
was modified after a relatively favorable visit to
Washington by General Charles DeGaulle in July, 1944 and
also as a result of the then present invasion of allied
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forces onto the continent of Europe. The allied invasion
of France had enabled DeGaulle's Committee of National
Liberation to transform itself into a Provisional
government of France. Thus in terms of Indochina world
events played into France's hands.
In the first four and one-half years of the Truman
Administration the American policy towards Vietnam was
essentially one of neutrality. Although he favored
independence for Vietnam, the President was too pre-
occupied with events in Europe, Japan and the Philippines
However, the events of 1949 and 1950 quickly changed the
focus of American attention. The Communist victory in
China's civil war and the Korean War precipitated a major
shift in American foreign policy. This shift in American
foreign policy was embodied in the policy of containment
predicated on the evolution of the domino theory.
In looking at our model, Trumans's new policy would
probably look like the chart on page 35.
As stated in chapter one, a vital interest requires
strong measures that could include conventional military
force. In Korea we did use conventional military force
under the auspices of the United Nations. In Indochina
the conventional military forces were already in place
under the French banner. From mid-1950 to the French
debacle at Dien Bien Phu America provided 80% of the





Country: U.S. Issue: Vietnam
Basic Interest at stake Intensity of Interest
Defense of homeland
Survival Vital Major Peripheral
X
Economic well-being X
Favorable world order X
Ideological X
America's national interest from mid-1950 to the end
of President Truman's term in the White House can best be
summarized as follows:
The American national interest, as defined by the
Truman Administration, was threatened by Communism.
Communism was an expansive ideology, and if the
countries which espoused it were not contained,
American policy-makers feared it would spread like
a cancerous growth until the United States itself
was directly threatened. Communism was a threat,
both objectively and psychologically, to American
security interests. Objectively, the Soviets were
second only to the United States in military power,
and their ideology made the United States their
most important enemy. Psychologically, there was
the danger of people in the free world feeling that
Communism was the wave of the future. This could
lead to either war or accommodation, both of which
were unacceptable to the United States. 31
Thus, the outcome of the Chinese civil war and the war
in Korea caused a complete reversal of United States
priorities in Indochina, a reversal which would affect
American foreign policy for over two decades.
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III. THE EISENHOWER YEARS
A. 1953 TO GENEVA
When President Dwight D. Eisenhower came into office
on January 20, 1953, his administration reviewed the
political situation in Southeast Asia and the former
administration's policy. The basic guidelines of United
States policy, formulated by President Truman and
Secretary of State Acheson, were accepted by President
Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.
During the Presidential campaign in 1952 the Truman
Administration's Asian policies had been subjected to
fierce political attacks for having lost China to the
Communists. Also during the campaign, Eisenhower had
promised to end the Korean War. Cognizant of these facts,
Secretary of State Dulles was determined to avoid such
kind of attacks from being leveled at the new
administration
.
Once the armistice was signed in Korea in June, 1953,
both Eisenhower and Dulles turned their attention to the
situation in Indochina. Both men feared that the Korean
armistice would lead to an expansion of the Chinese role




there were reports that the Chinese were transferring
large quantities of arms to southern China and
Vietnam and expediting their training and reequipment
of the Viet-Minh forces. 32
In light of this the Eisenhower Administration took the
position that it was more important than ever for the
French to carry on the struggle against the Viet Minh.
In August 1953, in one of the first expressions of the
domino theory, President Eisenhower predicted that Burma,
India, and Indonesia would be in immediate danger if the
communists were triumphant in Indochina. There were strong
domestic pressures favoring American involvement in
Indochina led by those Republicans who had carried the
attack against Truman for losing China and joined by those
who had supported McCarthy's anti-communist witch hunt in
congress. However, Eisenhower, fully aware of public
opinion, was not in favor of yet another land war in Asia.
As the political situation in Indochina continued to
deteriorate in 1953 and 1954,
the President was increasingly faced with the
dilemma of not wanting to become militarily
involved yet continuing to support programs
predicated upon the oft-stated strategic importance
of Vietnam as a keystone in the defense of the free
world. 3 3
The President opposed replacing the French role with
American forces and was also opposed to a French pullout.
Ke devised a policy that would (1) increase support for the
French; (2) increase the efforts to build a Vietnamese
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National Army; and (3) exert efforts to form a collective
security arrangement for Southeast Asia. Within the
framework of this policy, the President increased aid to
the French in their war effort, attempted to induce them
to grant a greater degree of independence to the
Associated States, and he sought allied support in the
building of a security arrangement. This policy proved
unsuccessful because despite increased aid, the French were
being defeated, they were reluctant to grant greater
independence to the Associated States, and those states
envisioned as allies in a security arrangement were either
unwilling or unable to participate in the struggle for
Indochina. Thus, the Eisenhower Administration was faced
with the difficult decision of American unilateral
intervention.
The document that essentially described American
perceptions of its interests in Southeast Asia was NSC 177,
"U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to
Southeast Asia," of January 16, 1954. NSC 177 left no
doubt that Communist control of Vietnam would critically
endanger American security interests in Southeast Asia.
It stated:
The successful defense of Tonkin is the keystone of
the defense of mainland Southeast Asia, except
possibly Malaya. In addition to the profound
political and psychological factors involved, the
retention of Tonkin in friendly hands cuts off the
most feasible routes for any massive advance to-
wards central and Southern Indochina and Thailand. 34
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NSC 177 also went on to say that not only will South-
east Asia be threatened by the alignment of Tonkin in the
Communist camp but also that if Southeast Asia goes
Communist this "would threaten the U.S. position in the
Pacific offshore island chain and would seriously
jeopardize fundamental U.S. security interests in the Far
East." " In expounding on the importance of Vietnam for
U.S. policy in Asia, NSC 177 stated:
The loss of Southeast Asia would have serious economic
consequences for many nations of the free world and
conversely would add significant resources to the
Soviet bloc. Southeast Asia, especially Malaya and
Indonesia, is the principal world source of natural
rubber and tin, and a producer of petroleum and other
strategically important commodities. The rice
exports of Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand are criti-
cally important to Malaya, Ceylon, and Hong Kong and
are of considerable significance to Japan and India,
all important areas of Free Asia. Furthermore, this
area had an important potential as a market for the
industrialized countries of the free world. The loss
of Southeast Asia, especially of Malaya and
Indonesia, could result in such economic and politi-
cal pressures in Japan as to make it extremely
difficult to prevent Japan's eventual accommodation
to Communism. 3 6
NSC 177 not only saw Vietnam as a domino it also
attached importance to it in the context of the Cold War:
In the conflict in Indochina, the Communist and non-
Communist worlds clearly confront one another on the
field of battle. The loss of the struggle in
Indochina.
. .would therefore have the most serious
repercussions on U.S. and free world interests in
Europe and elsewhere. 37
Thus, we see that NSC 177 lists Vietnam not only as
important in the form of a domino affecting Southeast Asia
39

and beyond but also as a significant factor in the Cold
War confrontation between East and West. Because of this
importance, the document provided the following objective
of American policy:
Objective: To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia
from passing into the Communist orbit; to persuade
them that their best interests lie in greater co-
operation and stronger affiliations with the rest of
the free world; and to assist them to develop toward
stable, free governments with the will and ability
to resist communism from within and without and to
contribute to the strengthening of the free world. 38
After producing this document, the National Security
Council formed a special working group headed by General
Erskine to assess conditions and ramifications of American
intervention in the ground war in Vietnam. The report
essentially concluded that it agreed with the position of
NSC 177 but that the costs and risks of U.S. ground forces
in Vietnam were nearly unacceptable.
With these factors in mind, the President and the
Secretary of State mulled over the possiblity of using
force in Indochina. On March 20, 1954 French General Paul
Ely stunned American officials when he warned that without
a substantial aid increase the French would lose at Dien
Bien Phu before the opening of the Geneva Convention.
Strong and intensive debate ensued in United States
Administration circles. Admiral Radford proposed a plan
that called for massive air strikes around Tuan Giao in
order to save the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu. This
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matter was heatedly debated in the National Security
Council and then presented to Eisenhower. After discus-
sions with Congressional leaders it was determined that
intervention would have to be done in consonance with
allied support, particularly Great Britain, the French
would have to accelerate the independence of the
Associated States, and Congress would have to provide a
39declaration of war. None of the conditions laid out by
the President were met.
In early April 1954, Secretary Dulles proposed the
formation of an anti-communist alliance in hopes of
internationalizing the Indochinese War and persuading the
French to stay on until victory could be achieved. This
position infuriated British Foreign Secretary Eden, who
felt that Dulles was trying to torpedo the upcoming Geneva
Conference on Korea, Indochina, and so on.
On April 21 the situation at Dien Bien Phu was
desperate and the French asked the United States to
reconsider the Radford plan, but to no avail. Thus, at
1730 on May 7, 1954, General Navarre ordered a cease fire
at Dien Bien Phu.
Throughout this period the Administration struggled
with the situation in Indochina. The conflict between
ends and means became more acute:
The ends of American policy in Asia, as iterated
by State, Defense, the NSC, and the White House,
clearly would be threatened by a Communist victory
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in Vietnam. But the means required to attain those
ends were perceived as entailing costs and risks
approaching unacceptability . 40
B. THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
While the battle for Dien Bien Phu raged on, the
Geneva Conference opened. Originally the conference was
only scheduled to discuss a settlement of the Korean War,
etc., however, at the February 1954 meeting of the Eig
Four in Berlin, it was decided to include Indochina on the
agenda. Due to a lack of any agreement with the
Communists during the Korean part of the conference,
Secretary Dulles was convinced no agreement would be
reached on the Indochina question.
Before the opening of the conference the United States
opposed any action that would weaken the French will to
continue the war through to military victory.
Under pressure from the right wing of the Republican
party, the Eisenhower Administration made an effort to
disassociate itself from any agreement that did not live
up to American objectives. A National Security Council
Meeting on May 8 produced the following statement of
United States policy.
The United States will not associate itself with any
proposal from any source directed toward a cease-
fire in advance of an acceptable armistice agreement,
including international controls. The United States
could concur in the initiation of negotiations for
such an armistice agreement . During the course of
such negotiations, the French and the Associated
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States should continue to oppose the forces of the
Viet Minh with all the means at their disposal. In
the meantime, as a means of strengthening the hands
of the French and the Associated States during the
course of such negotiations, the United States will
continue its program of aid and its efforts to
organize and promptly activate a Southeast Asia
regional grouping for the purpose of preventing
further expansion of Communist power in Southeast
Asia. 41
As the conference opened, the United States sought to
develop a united negotiating position with its allies. In
a meeting in Washington between 2 4 June and 2 9 June,
Churchill, Eden, Eisenhower and Dulles hammered out the
"Seven Anglo-American Points." The points, listed below,
were forwarded to the French for acceptance, which was
given.
1. Preserve the integrity and independence of
Laos and Cambodia assures the withdrawal of
Vietminh forces therefrom.
2. Preserve at least the southern half of
Vietnam, and if possible an enclave in the
delta; in this connection we would be un-
willing to see the line of division of
responsibility drawn further south than a line
running generally west from Dung Hoi.
3. Does not impose on Laos, Cambodia, or
retained Vietnam any restriction materially
impairing their capacity to maintain stable
non-communist regimes; and especially restric-
tions impairing their right to maintain
adequate forces for internal security, to
import arms and to employ foreign advisors.
4. Does not contain political provisions
which would risk loss of the retained area to
Communist control.
5. Does not exclude the possibility of the





6. Provides for the peaceful and humane transfer,
under international supervision of those people
desiring to be moved from one zone to another.
7. Provides effective machinery for international
supervision of the agreement. 4 2
These seven points gave tacit recognition of the possi-
bility of the partition of Vietnam.
Throughout the conference the Russians and the
Chinese exerted a restraining influence that enabled the
reaching of a successful agreement. The Russians wanted ;to
"induce the French to stay out" of the European Defense
Community by moderating Vietminh demands. The Chinese
wanted peace for "her domestic program for economic
development" and her new foreign policy approach that
reached full bloom at the Bandung Conference in 1955.
China also wanted to "avoid giving the U.S. any pretext
for introducing forces on her southern flank. " The
Vietminh wanted to negotiate a settlement that could
43
"avoid further deaths and material destruction." The
French, under the new Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-France
,
sought a way to extricate themselves from the war as
gracefully as possible, particularly after the defeat at
Dien Bien Phu.
As the conference was drawing to a close, Eden tried
to persuade the United States, particularly Dulles, to be
present at the signing. The United States adamantly
refused but did allow Bedell Smith to attend the closing
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session where only verbal adherence would take place.
Secretary Dulles succinctly stated the American position
when he said that even "if the settlement conformed to the
Anglo-American principles which had been agreed to in
44Washington, the United States still could not sign it."
Thus, neither the United States nor the State of Vietnam
adhered to the Final Declaration.
Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith made a
unilateral declaration on behalf of the United States. Mr.
Smith stated that the United States would,
refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb
them (the agreements) ... .view any renewal of the
aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements
with grave concern and as seriously threatening
international peace and security. 45
The most important feature of the agreement was
embodied in the Final Declaration, paragraph 7. It stated
that "...general elections shall be held in July 1956,
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under the supervision of an international commission...."
It was this provision that convinced the Vietminh to agree
to the rest of the agreement. They felt that when the
elections were carried out they would win and thus unify
Vietnam under communist rule. (The impact of paragraph 7
will be looked at in section D of this chapter)
.
Even though the final accords closely replicated the
seven points agreed to by the United States, in private
American officials saw the conference as a "major defeat
for United States diplomacy." Another piece of territory
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had been lost to the Communists, (Vietnam north of the
17th parallel) and to the National Security Council this
was
a serious loss for the free world, the psychological
and political effects of which will be felt through-
out the Far East and around the globe. 4 "?
Secretary Dulles, on July 23, told a news conference
that "military developments in Indochina and the
disinclination of the French people to prolong the war led
to a settlement containing many features we do not like."
But the important thing, he said, "was not to mourn the
past but to seize the future opportunity to prevent the
loss of Northern Vietnam from leading to the extension of
Communism throughout Southeast Asia and the Southwest
48Pacific." This statement was not only a reiteration of
the domino theory but also it implicitly recognized the
need for a Southeast Asian security arrangement.
President Eisenhower issued a statement in which he
stressed that the United States had not been a belligerent
and that the "nations" which did the fighting had the
"primary responsibility for the settlement." Ke noted that
"the United States has not itself been party to or bound by
the decisions taken by the Conference." On the other hand,
the President called attention to the formal declaration of
Bedell Smith at Geneva, hoped that the settlement would
lead to peace "consistent with the rights and the needs of
the countries concerned," and frankly asserted that much
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49depended on how the settlement worked in practice. As
it stood, if the agreement did not work out, the United
States had not committed itself to anything which would
prevent it from coming to the aid of the Saigon government.
The significance of the Geneva Accords of 1954 was
great indeed. Their impact on world affairs was to
reverberate for the next two decades. This impact is best
described in the following statement:
The Geneva Accords of 1954 marked both the end and the
beginning of an historic series of events shaping U.S.
policy toward Vietnam. It marked the end of French
primacy in the politics of Vietnam, and the beginning
of direct U.S. participation in the struggle to keep
the emergent Republic of Vietnam alive. 50
C. SEATO AND U.S. INTERESTS
With the outbreak of the Korean war the United States
first envisioned a broad collective security arrangement
for the Far East. At this point in history the United
States had to settle for a series of treaties which
included Japan, Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines,
and later Korea. Just prior to the opening of the Geneva
Convention, the United States once again attempted to
create a collective security arrangement in hopes of
strengthening France's position at the bargaining table.
This attempt, like its predecessor, failed.
The main reason the United States was pursuing a
collective security organization was to defend against
47

Communist aggression and expansion. This position was
eloquently stated in NSC 5429, "Review of U.S. Policy in
the Far East," on August 20, 1954. The preface of this
document stated:
The loss of prestige in Asia suffered by the U.S. as
a backer of the French and the Bao Dai Government will
raise further doubts in Asia concerning U.S. leader-
ship and the ability of the U.S. to check further
expansion of Communism in Asia. Furthermore, U.S.
prestige will inescapably be associated with subse-
quent developments in Southeast Asia. 51
NSC 5429 went on to encourage a Southeast Asian security
treaty with the United Kingdom, France, Pakistan,
Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, and the
United States. NSC 5429 noted that the overall national
interest of United States policy remained the maintenance
of world peace and order in which United States national
security would not be jeopardized by successive Communist
gains in Asia which could strategically and economically
isolate the United States.
The results of the Geneva Convention had taught
Secretary of State Dulles two valuable lessons. First,
collective defense should be organized before aggression
was in progress, and second, popular support was
52imperative in fighting Communist subversion.
On September 6, 1954, a meeting was held in Manila by
the nations listed above. Two days later the Southeast




The treaty entailed some distinctive aspects that bear
mentioning. First of all the protocol to the treaty
designated Laos, Cambodia, and "the free territory under
the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam" as areas which
fall under the protection of the treaty. This was written
in this manner because inclusion of these states, as
signatories, would have been a violation of the Geneva
Agreements. Secondly the treaty deals with aggression "in
a way other than armed attack." Under this condition the
signatories agree to consult to determine which measures
should be taken for the common defense. The significance
of this is that it is not an obligation for action but
only an obligation for consulation. Even in the event of
armed attack, the treaty simply calls for each state to
"act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional processes."
America's interest in SEATO was,
...to offset the weakened position of the V7est in
Indochina and to serve as a major barrier against
any further spread of Communist political power.
(Dulles) saw it as an international agreement
providing a cloak of protection for Cambodia and
Laos against aggression by Communist powers and
for insuring that the Viet Minh be inhibited from
establishing control over the rest of Vietnam, with
its authority permanently confined north of the
17th parallel. 54
In effect the United States used SEATO to offset the
results of the Geneva Accords, and viewed it as a link in
a system of alliances along the Sino-Soviet periphery
designed to contain Communism.
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As the United States became more heavily committed in
Southeast Asia in 1954, what did it see of value in this
area of the globe? (1) "The United States had to bear in
mind the effect of Southeast Asia on American friends with
deep interests in the area; " (2) The strategically
significant Straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok were the
gateways from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean; (3) South-
east Asia was a "stepping stone" from China to Australia;
(4) The commercial seaport and "significant naval base" of
Singapore; (5) "Indochina, as the record of Japanese
military penetration indicated, was an important key to
Southeast Asia"; (6) The military bases of the
Philippines; (7) Economically Southeast Asia produced 60%
of the world's tin and around 90% of its natural rubber,
also "it produced 2.5% of the world's total" petroleum
output, mostly from Indonesia and Brunei; and (8) "Burma,
Thailand and Indonesia have traditionally been the rice
bowl of Asia...." Thus, the value of Southeast Asia to
the United States in 1954 reflected various interests,
particularly the denial of its resources, military value
and its people from the Communist block.
D. THE 1956 ELECTIONS
In section B of this chapter we mentioned paragraph 7
of the Final Declaration which called for elections in
July 1956. Since these elections were not held, one must
address the question, why?
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Although there is a great deal of evidence that the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) did expect the
elections to be held, they were not held because of the
resistance of the South Vietnamese government supported by
the United States. We should remember that the
Government of Vietnam did not sign the Accords, in fact
they disassociated themselves from them. According to The
Pentagon Papers the Geneva Accords bind France's successor
to the provisions of the military agreement, not to the
Final Declaration which contained the provisions for the
, . . 57
election.
Diem's position was that the elections could not be
held because he believed a free vote was impossible in
both the north and the south. In the north because of the
nature of the regime and in the south because the presence
of armed guerrillas would thwart the true choice of the
people.
Washington's position was much more realistic in its
assessment as to why the elections could not be held.
Under the Geneva Agreements the Administration could
foresee the toppling of the first domino in the
forthcoming Vietnamese elections. 58
The reasons for this are as obvious today as they were in
1956. Whereas Ho Chi Minh was looked upon as patriotic and
nationalistic with a great deal of popular support, Ngo
Dinh Diem was not perceived as such. He knew that even in
a relatively free and honest election he would lose
51

decisively. Secondly, as a result of the signing of the
SEATO treaty the United States had stated its intent to
preserve the southern part of Vietnam (to be referred to as
South Vietnam) from coming under the Communist control.
E. THE DIEM REGIME
Ngo Dinh Diem was appointed Prime Minister midway
through the Geneva Conference by Chief of State Bao Dai.
The Commander in Chief of Bao Dai's army was General
Nguyen Van Hinh. About six months after Diem's appointment/
the French transferred full sovereignty to the Bao Dai-Ngo
Dinh Diem Administration.
In September, 1954 the United States began dealing
directly with Diem and in February of the following year
began training a South Vietnamese army. America's support
for Diem wavered during his first year in office, however,
after successfully dealing with the religious sects, his
own army, and the Binh Xuyen, a gangster group controlling
Saigon's police, brothels, and gambling, America's support
firmed up. This firming position was stated by Secretary
Dulles in the Spring of 1955.
Diem is only means U.S. sees to save South Vietnam and
counteract (the) revolutionary movement underway in
Vietnam. U.S. sees no one else who can. Whatever U.S.
view has been in the past, today U.S. must not permit
Diem to become another Kerensky.^9
In April of 1955 Bao Dai tried to check Diem's rise in
power. He ordered Diem to come to France where it was
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believed he would be dismissed. With American backing,
Diem defied Bao Dai's orders and in October successfully
organized a referendum that led to his election as head
of state. Three days after the referendum he proclaimed
The Republic of Vietnam with himself as its President.
From the onset of his reign, Diem ruled in an unbending
autocratic fashion trusting no one except his immediate
family.
As provided for in the Geneva Accords, large numbers of
people moved north or south. Many of those coming south
were the tightly knit northern Catholics who feared
religious persecution from the Communists.
...the arrival of that tightly knit community in a
South Vietnam that is largely Taoist, spiritualist,
and Buddhist created a new political tension
there—the more so as the government of President
Ngo Dinh Diem immediately used the northern
Catholics as its major base of political power.... 60
This action by Diem led to the alienation of the southern
intellectuals
.
The United States began pouring in huge quantities of
economic and military aid designed to keep the Diem regime
on its feet. The problem was that the economic aid rarely
if ever touched the lives of South Vietnam's prepon-
derantly rural populace,
Only a small percentage of U.S. aid was devoted to
education, health, agricultural and industrial
development, and related areas that could have im-
proved the peoples living conditions . 61
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Between June and August 1956/ Diem issued a number of
decrees that abolished the elected village council, which
had been the backbone of the rural structure for a long
time, and replaced them with appointed government
officials. In a matter of days Diem had managed to break
the autonomy of the villages with government appointed
officials who were "usually out of touch with their
problems...." Diem not only eliminated the old village
council system, but also impinged on the lands that were
occupied by the Montagnards
.
iMany of the peasant tenants, who for nine years of
colonial war had worked their lands relatively freely,
were now required to not only pay taxes but were also
required to pay rent to landlords who sat safely in
Saigon.
Under pressure from the United States, Diem, between
1956 and 1958 introduced some agrarian reforms. These
reforms did not succeed in countering the widespread
resentment that had built up and were ineffective in
gaining peasant allegiance.
In mid-1955 Diem began wholesale reprisals against the
Vietminh whether they were communist, non-communists, or
were mere sympathizers. This resulted in tens of thousands
of people being jailed, killed, or forced to go underground
In essence Diem used these measures as a pretext to
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eliminate all of his foes. In January 1956 Diem issued
Ordinance No. 6 which gave his government authority to
eliminate all opposition. By 1959 the scope of the
repression had been expanded and on May 6, 1959 Law 10/59
was passed which legalized repression.
All of Diem's repressive measures combined with his
near total alienation of the South Vietnamese people
"provided insurgent groups with a major issue by which to
advance their cause." In a few short years Diem had
managed to alienate the southern intellectuals, the rural
populace, the peasant tenants, the Montagnards, and had
managed to destroy the social structure of the rural
society.
During this timeframe the United States, though
initially uncertain of Diem's ability to consolidate power,
nevertheless took the initial steps of support for his
regime in late 1954. Despite a National Intelligence
Estimate of August, 1954 which stated that
although it is possible that the French and Vietnamese,
even with firm support from the U.S. and other powers,
may be able to establish a strong regime in South
Vietnam, we believe that the chances for this develop-
ment are poor and, moreover, that the situation is
more likely to continue to deteriorate progressively
over the next years....^ 4
President Eisenhower signalled United States support in his




We have been exploring ways and means to permit our
aid to Vietnam to be more effective and to make
greater contribution to the welfare and stability
of the Government of Vietnam. I am, accordingly,
instructing the American Ambassador to Vietnam to
examine with you in your capacity as Chief of
Government:, how an intelligent program of American
aid given directly to your Government can serve to
assist Vietnam in its present hour of trial, provided
that your Government is prepared to give assurances
as to the standard of performance it would be able to
maintain (in undertaking needed reforms) in the event
such aid were supplied. 6 5
This American decision to provide economic aid, which
between 1954 and 1959 totalled $1,222.5 million, indicated
America's decision to build a sovereign South Vietnam where
none had existed before Geneva. In conjunction with this,
the United States, after the French withdrawal in 1956,
reorganized the Military Assistance Advisory Group under a
new U.S. command, and built up the Vietnamese military
establishment. The military was streamlined from 250,000
men to 150,000 men and was provided with $85 million per
year in new equipment, and a 40,000 man Self Defense Corps
and a 50,000 man Civil Guard were created. The major
problem with the reorganized South Vietnamese Army was that
it was designed along the lines of the South Korean Army,
that is, it was designed to fight a conventional war and
was not trained in anti-guerrilla tactics,. The primary
mission assigned to the South Vietnamese Army was to
maintain internal security, however, with the departure of
the French forces in 1956 it was decided that the "only
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way to attain a military balance in Vietnam was... the
development of a dual-mission South Vietnamese Army."
As a result of an NSC meeting on June 7, 1956, a new
policy statement, NSC 5612 "U.S. Policy in Mainland South-
east Asia," emerged and it remained U.S. policy for the
remainder of the Eisenhower Administration. At the
meeting of June 7, President Eisenhower stated;
...it would be desirable for appropriate U.S.
military authorities to encourage Vietnamese
military planning for defense along lines con-
sistent with U.S. planning concepts based upon
approved U.S. policy (and) to discreetly manifest
in other ways U.S. interest in assisting Free
Vietnam in accordance with the Manila Pact (SEATO)
,
to defend itself against external aggression. 67
This shift in America's support for the Diem regime
from qualified support to virtually unqualified support is
best understood in light of the political and military
developments which occurred in South Vietnam. As
mentioned earlier, the foremost reason for this shift in
policy was attributed to Diem's ability to consolidate
power by eliminating the Binh Xuyen and by breaking the
armed resistance of the religious sects. This coupled
with his victorious election over Bao Dai looked very
favorable to American policy-makers.
Other factors which created optimism was the pledge of
African and Asian leaders at the Bandung Conference to
live together in peaceful coexistence, the abatement of
the Quemoy and Matsu crisis, and in August 1955 the
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American and Chinese ambassadors to Poland began periodic
6 Q
talks. At the same time the DRV was experiencing
domestic difficulties and suffering large grain shortfalls
which were seen as diminishing the possiblity of con-
ducting aggression against the South. In 1956 there were
reports of provincial unrest in Nam Dinh and Nghe An and
69industrial growth was slow. On the other hand, the
United States felt that the formation of SEATO offered
great potential for containing Communism. All of these
factors combined produced very optimistic assessments of
the viability and survivability of the Diem regime and
these factors were credited to America's wise policies,
pursued since 1954. This optimism, displayed by American
leaders, was to be short lived as the year 1960 began to
dawn.
F. 1960
During the late 1950s the Eisenhower Administration did
not face any serious challenges in Vietnam. The optimistic
assessments of Diem's ability to meet the American con-
ditions of determination and willingness to maintain
independence and oppose external aggression continued
unabated through 1959. 70 On May 26, 1959 a National
Intelligence Estimate stated:
South Vietnam's 136,000-man army, supported by Civil
Guard, the Self-Defense Corps, and the police services
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is capable of maintaining effective internal security
except in the most remote jungle and mountain areas. 71
These and other indicators, such as decreasing military
and economic aid obligations, continued the optimism of
the Eisenhower Administration.
However, in 1960 the numbers of terrorist acts and the
numbers of Viet Cong (Vietnamese Communists) guerrillas
increased dramatically. Is it any wonder why a guerilla-
type insurrection did not evolve sooner in light of the
repressive policies of the Diem regime discussed in section
E. Two factors should be noted as to why. First, was the
"thoroughness and stringency of Diem's widespread
repression," and secondly, was "Hanoi's unwillingness to
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encourage armed resistance to Diem's regime."
American policy-makers noted three sources of anti-
Diem activity in mid-1960. These were the Viet Cong,
infiltrators from the North, and non-Communist disaffected
Southerners. The Viet Cong were considered the greatest
threat to the Diem regime. By late 1960 there was little
doubt that a serious Anti-Diem movement had emerged in
South Vietnam. As this opposition to Diem mounted, there
was some dispute in official government circles as to the
role of the North. Although some characteristics of a
civil war were present, The Pentagon Papers attributed the
insurrection to the North.
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The evidence supports the conclusion, therefore, that
whether or not the rebellion against Diem in South
Vietnam proceeded independently of, or even contrary
to directions from Hanoi through 1958, Hanoi moved
thereafter to capture the revolution. There is little
doubt that Hanoi exerted some influence over certain
insurgents in the South throughout the years following
Geneva, and there is evidence which points to its
preparing for active support or large-scale insurgency
as early as 1958. 73
Many noted Southeast Asian scholars refute this point.
George M. Kahin and John L. Lewis in their book, The
United States in Vietnam state:
. . .all available evidence shows that the revival of
the civil war in the South in 1958 was undertaken by
Southerners at their own—not Hanoi's initiative...
it rose at Southern initiative in response to
Southern demands. 7
4
In fact it was not until September 1960 that the Lao Dong
Party in North Vietnam sanctioned formation of a United
Front in the South. On December 20, 1960 a National
Liberation Front of South Vietnam was formed and on
January 29, 1961, Hanoi publicly recognized it.
Thus we see two views emerging as to the cause of the
aggravated security situation in South Vietnam. The first
view attributes the cause to Communist aggression directed
from the North and the second view attributes the cause to
Southern disaffection caused by the political weakness of
the South Vietnamese Government. In retrospect one would
have to conclude that although the North eventually gave
its backing to the Southern movement, in order not to lose
their influence in the South, the prime cause of the
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stepped up aggression was the Diem regime's political
activities. Unfortunately official Washington chose to
ignore these facts or at least refused to admit them
because to do so would have undercut the very corner-
stone of justification for United States military
involvement in the South and subsequent escalation of the
war against the North.
As the year 1960 drew to a close, the situation in
South Vietnam was the worst it had been since Geneva.
This difficult situation was going to be left to a new
Administration to handle and on January 20, 1961, John
F. Kennedy, the 35th President, took the helm.
G. CONCLUSIONS
As with the last couple of years of the Truman
Administration, the Eisenhower Administration felt that
Communism had to be contained. The spread of Communism
was seen as a threat to American security, and the
nature of this threat was best conveyed through the use
of the domino theory. The loss of Vietnam, according to
official American policy, would cause undue harm to
United States prestige and lead to Communist gains else-
where in the world.
Because of the expansionist nature of Communism, if
Vietnam fell other countries in Asia would be in danger
which, in turn, would effectively weaken America's
worldwide strategic position. Not only would America's
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worldwide strategic position be weakened but the loss of
the natural resources of Southeast Asia and the loss of
the potential markets for American goods would prove
costly to the United States and the West. Thus, as a
result Vietnam was perceived as a vital American
interest.
Using our model presented in Chapter One, the out-





Country: U.S. Issue: Vietnam
Basic Interest at Stake Intensity of Interest
Survival Vital Major Peripheral
Defense of homeland X
Economic well-being X
Favorable world order X
Ideological X
During the Eisenhower Administration the United
States, rather than send in American ground troops,
opted to build a South Vietnamese Army, supplied with
American equipment, to defend itself. Coupled with this,
the United States was the driving force behind the




The importance of Vietnam to America's interests was
succinctly stated by President Eisenhower in an address
on April 4, 1959. The President stated in part that:
Strategically South Vietnam's capture by the
Communists would bring their power several hundred
miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining
countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by a
great flanking movement. The freedom of 12 million
people would be lost immediately and that of 150
million others in adjacent lands would be endangered.
The loss of South Vietnam would set in motion a
crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have
grave consequences for us and for freedom.
Vietnam must have a reasonable degree of safety
now—both for her people and for her property.
Because of these facts, military as well as
economic help is currently needed in (South)
Vietnam.
We reach the inescapable conclusion that our own
national interests demand some help from us in
sustaining in Vietnam the morale, the economic
progress, and the military strength necessary to
its continued existence in freedom. 75
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IV. KENNEDY'S THOUSAND DAYS
A. THE EARLY JOHN F. KENNEDY
Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or
ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden,
meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any
foe, to ensure the survival and the success of
liberty. 76
These were the words spoken by the man who, on
January 20, 1961, became the 35th President of the United
States. When he came into power John F. Kennedy had some
rather definite concepts on Vietnam and the nature of
Communist guerrilla warfare. Those concepts had been
forged by his 1951 visit to Vietnam and by his years as a
senator from Massachusetts.
During his 1951 visit Kennedy was deeply impressed by
the need for the development of a nationalistic sentiment
to thwart Communism. Upon his return he stated:
To check the southern drive of Communism makes sense
but not only through reliance on the force of arms.
The task is rather to build a strong native non-
Communist sentiment within these areas and rely on
that as a spearhead of defense rather than upon the
legions of General DeLattre. To do this apart from
and in defiance of innately nationalistic aims spells
foredoomed failure.... Without the support of the
native population, there is no hope of success in any
of the countries of Southeast Asia. 7 '''
Kennedy's views on the need for a nationalistic base
of support were evidenced throughout his years in the
Senate and later in the White House.
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During the 1954 Dien Bien Phu crisis, Kennedy was an
outspoken opponent of further American military support
for the French. His reasoning dealt primarily with the
lack of support in evidence for the French from the
peoples of Vietnam, In one instance he stated:
I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American
military assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy
which is everywhere and at the same time nowhere, an
enemy of the people which has the sympathy and covert
support of the people. 78
Thus when Kennedy became President he was not
unfamiliar with Vietnam, He strongly believed in the
need to establish a base of popular nationalistic support
and also recognized that the nature of guerrilla warfare
was such that a new and different approach in combating
it was needed. This new and different approach was to
take the form of counterinsurgency which will be
addressed in section C of this chapter.
Kennedy was also imbued with the need to contain
Communism. He felt the spread of Communism was a threat
to American security believing deeply in the domino
theory. This view was reflected in an address delivered
in 1954 wherein he stated:
Vietnam represents the cornerstone of the Free World
in Southeast Asia, the keystone to the arch, the
finger in the dike. The fundamental tenants of this
nation's foreign policy (depended) in considerable
measure upon a strong and free Vietnamese nation. "79
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B. THE INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGE
...there are many people in the world who really do not
understand, or say they do not, what is the great issue
between the free world and the Communist world. Let
them come to Berlin. In the world of freedom, the
proudest boast is— ich bin ein Berliner. 80
With those words President John F. Kennedy left no
doubt as to the nature of the international challenge.
The challenge he faced weighed heavily upon him and
influenced the way he pursued his policy in Vietnam.
In April 1961, the CIA-directed effort to oust Castro
met with failure at the Bay of Pigs. This failure
embarrassed the administration and in essence sealed the
fate of Cuba for years to come. While Kennedy was
promising that the United States would not intervene
militarily in Cuba, Krushchev warned that the Soviet Union
would intervene if armed intervention were to take place
against Cuba.
In Laos, meanwhile, the Pathet Lao was making
substantial gains, threatening the regime of Phoumi
Nosavan. The significance of Laos to Vietnam emerged in
full force when it was agreed by Khrushchevand Kennedy that
Laos should be neutralized. The effect of this agreement
was viewed with apprehension by many in both the United
States and Southeast Asia. The newly created Vietnam Task




...the neutralization or loss of Laos to the Free World
will, of course, compound the problems which the GVN
faces in maintaining the security of their borders with
Laos. It will also improve the Communist capabilities
to infiltrate personnel and equipment into South
Vietnam through Cambodia. ... It requires the prompt
organization of two new GVN divisions and a vastly
accelerated U.S. training program for the entire GVN
army. ^1
This agreement of neutralization occurred at the Vienna
Summit on June 3-4, 1961. Two other aspects of the Vienna
Summit affected the international arena which, in the
perception of the President, presented an international
challenge. The first was Nikita Khrushchev ' s demand that
Berlin become a free city by December 31, 1961 and the
second was the superpower disagreement as to the meaning of
peaceful coexistence as applied to developing nations.
Had President Kennedy acquiesced on Berlin the United
States would have been required to bargain for access and
other occupation rights with East Germany.
As to the nature of the issue on the meaning of
peaceful coexistence as applied to developing nations,
President Kennedy and Premier Krushchev engaged in an
exchange that significantly influenced the President. The
issue that arose here dealt with potential Soviet support
for wars of national liberation, as stated by Khrushchev
in a speech in January 1961. Upon his return, Kennedy had
the following to say in a television address to the nation:
We have wholly different views of right and wrong, of
what is an internal affair and what is aggression, and,
above all, we have totally different concepts of where
the world is and where it is going. ^2
67

This exchange between the leaders of the United States
and the Soviet Union stemmed from two changes in the
international system. The first change was the prolifera-
tion of newly independent states and secondarily the
increased Soviet nuclear capability. This newly emerging
Soviet nuclear capability was used to threaten/influence
the contest for these newly emerging nations by under-
mining America's efforts in those regions.
Thus, with the results of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the
neutralization of Laos, Khrushchev's demands relative to
Berlin, Khrushchev's 1961 speech in which he pledged Soviet
support for wars of national liberation, coupled with the
disagreement at the Vienna Summit on the meaning of
peaceful coexistence relative to developing nations,
President Kennedy felt this was a challenge the United
States had to meet. The place to meet this challenge was
Vietnam, therefore, early on, the Administration decided
"to create a viable and increasingly democratic society in




C. KENNEDY'S VIETNAM POLICY: COUNTERINSURGENCY
Having recognized the nature of guerrilla warfare,
Kennedy sought a new and different approach to combating it
The nature of this approach lay in the President's concept
of counterinsurgency . Before looking at the President's
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views on counterinsurgency let us first define an
insurgency:
An insurgency is a condition created by a revolutionary
mass movement, demanding drastic political, economic,
and social change in a nation, and directed, specifi-
cally, toward the overthrow of that nation's government
.... The three basic counterinsurgency measures are
counterguerrilla operations environmental improvement,
and population and resource control. 84
In January 1962, Kennedy created the Special Group on
Counterinsurgency and directed it and the Defense Department
to coordinate a policy towards defeating the insurgency.
The views on counterinsurgency held by the President seemed
to include the following: (1) it is a limited war against
Communist guerrillas; (2) whose main effort and responsi-
bility fell upon native, not American, forces; (3) which is
not just military but political, economic, social and
psychological in nature; (4) whose principle objective is
to win the hearts and minds of the population; (5) the
outcome of which could be influenced by United States
8 5
expertise and material support. The key concept is that
it is their war and not ours. The evolution of this
approach to handling the Communist insurgency evolved in an
atmosphere whereby many of the President's advisors called
for the introduction of American ground troops into the
conflict. The President, wary of the French experience in




In May 1961, President Kennedy sent his Vice-President,
Lyndon B. Johnson to Southeast Asia in an effort to re-
assure our allies. It should be recalled that at this time
the situation in Laos was highly unstable. Upon his
return from the area, the Vice-President noted that time was
running out on the United States in Vietnam and that we had
to decide whether or not to face the challenge. Johnson
stated:
This decision must be made in the full realization of
the very heavy and continuing costs involved in terms of
money, of effort and of United States prestige. It must
be made with the knowledge that at some point we may be
faced with the further decision of whether we commit
major United States forces to the area or cut our losses
and withdraw should our other efforts fail. Ue must
remain masters in this decision. ^6
The Vice-President perceived the need for a clear cut
American commitment to the area and seemed to suggest the
possibility of an open-ended one, one including the
introduction of American combat forces.
Vice-President Johnson's trip was followed by an
economic mission headed up by Eugene Staley from May to
July 1961. This mission produced the Staley Plan which
called for, among other things, the establishment of
strategic hamlets. This program was envisioned as a
useful tool fitting nicely into the President's vision of
counterinsurgency. The strategic hamlet program called for
by Mr. Staley was the result of studies of the experiences
of other nations such as Greece and Malaya. The objective
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of this program was threefold: (1) protection of the
population. This was to be done by separating the people
from the guerrillas by placing them in hamlets protected by
paramilitary forces with regular forces ready to prevent a
major attack by the insurgents; (2) unite the population in
positive action on behalf of the government; and (3)
satisfy social, economic, and political needs of the
villagers
.
Aside from the strategic hamlet program, the Staley
mission also called for an acceleration of South Vietnam's
economic programs and it stated that a viable South
Vietnam was in the American national interest.
President Kennedy accepted the policy recommendations
of the Staley mission but the strategic hamlet program was
virtually a total failure because it was used by the Diem
regime to control the villagers rather than pacify them.
In October 1961, the Taylor-Rostow mission was sent to
Vietnam by the President. The Taylor-Rostow mission, as
the name indicates, was headed by General Maxwell Taylor
and White House Aid Walt Rostow.
The major thrust of the report produced by the Taylor-
Rostow mission was that the Vietnam problem was primarily
a military one which could be resolved by a larger American
commitment of power. The report felt this should include,
if necessary, American ground combat forces. The report
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in essence, was rather upbeat but it stressed the
necessity for an immediate response.
. .
.vigorous American action is needed to buy time for
Vietnam to mobilize and organize its real assets; but
the time for such turn around has nearly run out. And
if Vietnam goes, it will be exceedingly difficult if
not impossible to hold Southeast Asia. What will be
lost is not merely a crucial piece of real estate, but
the faith that the U.S. has the will and capacity to
deal with the Communist offensive in that area. 88
The report was strongly supported by President Kennedy,
however, the recommendation for a 10,000 man task force was
turned down. The President, as he had in the past,
insisted that the war could only be won if it remained a
Vietnamese war and not a "white man's war."
The actual results of the Taylor-Rostow mission were
threefold: (1) The President authorized sending in
additional advisors to South Vietnam which exceeded the
limits set by the Geneva Accords; (2) authorized equipment
designed to increase the mobility of the South Vietnamese
army; and (3) authorized sending in B-26 and T-28
8 9
squadrons. In return for these authorizations, the
President expected Ngo Dinh Diem to carry out reforms,
however, he was never pressured to do so. This was
evidenced in a letter sent by President Kennedy to
President Diem in December 1961, in which Kennedy stated:
...we are prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to
protect its people and to preserve its independence
.
We shall promptly increase our assistance to your
defense effort as well as help relieve the destruction
of the floods which you describe. I have already given
the order to get these programs underway. 90
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One can see then that the report by Vice-President
Johnson and the Taylor-Rostow report both called for the
introduction of American ground forces. The President, on
the other hand continued to resist the employment of
American ground forces. His aversion to this action was the
product of several factors. His April 1961 talks with
General Douglas MacArthur was a strong influence, his fears
of making Vietnam a 'white man's war' was another, as was
the international situation that existed wherein the
President felt the United States had to conserve America's
military resources. These factors were coupled with the
fact that Kennedy felt there was a good chance of turning
the tide through the application of the counterinsurgency
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methods he had outlined.
By the end of 1962 it was evident that the proposals
made by the Taylor-Rostow program had proven to be
militarily ineffective as well as politically ineffective.
Ironically though, pronouncements by State Department and
Pentagon officials continued to be upbeat. Defense
Secretary McNamara stated, for example, that "every
quantitative measurement we have shows we are winning this
war." In early 1963 Secretary of State Dean Rusk said that
the struggle against the Viet Cong was "turning an
important corner" and concluded that Saigon's forces






Between September 24 and October 1, 1963, Secretary of
Defense McNamara and General Taylor, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, were in Vietnam on orders from the
President. Their mission was to assess the situation in
South Vietnam and to ascertain why the counterinsurgency
program was not succeeding.
The report submitted to the President concluded that
the military situation was progressing well but that the
repressive measures of the Diem regime were the root cause
of the disaffection throughout South Vietnam.
Scantly a month before the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy, there were abundant signs that the
President was seriously considering abandoning America's
unconditional support of the Diem regime. This will be
looked at in the next section.
D. DIEM, THE BUDDHIST CRISIS AND THE COUP
The repressive measures taken by the Diem regime, as
discussed in Chapter III, continued throughout the time-
frame of the Kennedy Administration.
Although the Administration asked Diem, on many
occasions, to initiate reforms in order to build popular
support, these requests went unheeded
.
While in South Vietnam, Vice-President Johnson asked
Diem to carry out various reforms such as rural programs,
bringing opposition leaders into the government, and
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bringing an end to military appointments based on political
considerations. These, of course, were never carried out.
The strategic hamlet program, outlined by Staley,
proved to be a failure. The program was designed to settle
the peasants in secure areas and to satisfy their social,
economic and political needs. Unfortunately the Diem
regime used it as yet another means of repression.
The Taylor-Rostow report also called for reforms to go
along with an increase in America's commitment to South
Vietnam. In early 1962, the United States undertook its
major military buildup in accordance with the program
outlined by the Taylor-Rostow report, but, as always Diem
proved unwilling to implement the required reforms.
Throughout the first two years of the Kennedy
Administration, the United States did not truly pressure
Diem to carry out the needed reforms, they were wedded to
the notion that Diem was the best hope we had in South
Vietnam. The other problem was that many leaders in the
Administration felt that the situation in Vietnam was
primarily a military problem. This point is aptly stated
by Kahin and Lewis in their book, The United States in
Vietnam
.
Despite the mounting threat it (the insurgency) posed
to his regime, Diem was quite unable to appreciate
the extent to which the insurgency was a response to
his continuing repression. Authoritarian measures , he
insisted, were rendered all the more necessary by the
uprisings , which in his book were simply the result
of Communist subversion.... Wedded to the idea that
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social and political reform should await the prior
establishment of full security, Diem, like
Washington, did not perceive that the war was first
of all a political problem and could only be solved
through primary political means. 3
The stage was thus set for the events that were to
begin on May 8, 196 3 which would lead to the military coup
in early November 196 3.
On May 8, 196 3, Buddhist demonstrators were attacked by
South Vietnamese troops in the city of Hue. The protest
stemmed from the government's ban on the flying of their
religious flag in spite of the fact that the Catholics had
been permitted to do so just a few weeks earlier (One should
remember that the Ngo family was Catholic) . Nine of the
demonstrators were killed and scores of others were wounded.
Instead of admitting its mistake and diffusing the
crisis, the government took a hard attitude and used
tactics aimed at intimidating the Buddhists and their
supporters. This government stance led to the spreading of
the demonstrations.
By the end of May the United States was in a bind.
Because of unswerving support to Diem for over nine years,
the only alternative was to withdraw the unconditional
support and attempt to force them to adopt reforms. The
dilemma, though, was that this would "signal U.S. approval
for an anti-Diem coup, with all its potential for
94political instability and erosion of the war effort."
The Administration exerted behind the scenes pressure on
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Diem and on June 16 he issued a joint communique with the
Buddhists, agreeing to meet their demands.
It soon became evident that this was simply a delaying
tactic and on August 21, Diem and his brother Nhu ordered
all out assaults on Buddhist pagodas in Saigon, Hue, and
other cities. This action precipitated even further
widespread demonstrations.
Three days later Ambassador Lodge received a cable from
the State Department. He was directed to inform Diem to
remove his brother Nhu or the United States would seek an
alternative regime. He was further directed to inform
South Vietnamese generals, plotting a coup, that they
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could expect American support in such an eventuality.
When President Kennedy was briefed on the contents of the
cable, he immediately ordered a clarification of its
contents. He sought to ensure that no American armed
involvement occurred and also directed that no ultimatum
be proferred Diem similar to the one indicated in the
cable.
After a series of NSC meetings, in which questions of
the importance of Vietnam to the United States and the
usefulness of Diem were bitterly discussed, President
Kennedy decided to exert pressure on Diem. The initial
pressure took the form of public disapproval of Diem's
actions against the Buddhists. On September 2, in an
interview with CBS's Walter Cronkite, the President stated:
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I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by
the government to win popular support that the war can
be won out there.... The repressions against the
Buddhists, we felt were very unwise. Now all we can do
is to make it very clear that we don't think this is the
way to win. 96
The United States, simultaneously, used other methods
of pressuring Diem such as the suspension of subsidies
handled by the Commodity Imports Program, suspension of
funding for Ngo Dinh Nhu ' s Special Forces, and the
expressed intention of withdrawing 1000 military personnel
by the end of 196 3, which, although previously approved for
other reasons, was seen as a useful means of pressure.
Diem's reaction to this toughened American policy was
hostile, while, predictably the South Vietnamese generals
perceived this new policy as a green light for their
planned coup. According to The Pentagon Papers , America's
policy, based on the results of the McNamara-Taylor report,
was that,
...we do not wish to stimulate a coup, we also do not
wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart
a change of government or deny economic and military
assistance to a new regime if it appeared capable of
increasing effectiveness of the military effort, en-
suring popular support to win the war and improving
relations with the U.S 97
In early October a CIA operative met with General
Duong Van Minh who gave him detailed plans of the upcoming-
coup. This data was relayed to the White House who in turn
told Ambassador Lodge that if he
...thought that any South Vietnamese plan was likely to
fail, he was ordered to communicate this to the
Generals and persuade them to wait until their chances
were better. 9 8
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On October 24 the U.S. mission received word from one
of the Vietnamese Generals that the coup was on and that it
would occur before November 2.
On November 1, 196 3, the Presidential Palace was
surrounded by the coup units and several key installations
were taken. On the morning of November 2, the
Presidential Palace fell and shortly thereafter Diem and
Nhu were captured and then murdered enroute to the
Vietnamese Joint General Staff Headquarters.
Although it is impossible to know hov; Kennedy would
have reacted to subsequent international events and in
Vietnam, he probably would have pursued the counter-
insurgent methods he had adopted as long as he felt they
had a reasonable chance of success.
We in this country, in this generation are--by destiny
rather than choice—the watchmen on the walls of
freedom. We ask, therefore, that we may be worthy of
our power and responsibility, that we may exercise our
strength with wisdom and restraint, and that we may
achieve in our time the ancient vision of 'peace on
earth, good will toward men*. That must always be our
goal, and the righteousness of our cause must always
underlie our strength. For as was written long ago:
'except for the Lord keep the city, the watchman
waketh but in vain'. 99
These words were prepared for delivery in Dallas on
November 22, suggesting that our efforts would be con-
tinued in Vietnam with restraint i.e., counterinsurgency
.
E. CONCLUSIONS
With the death of President Kennedy, another chapter in
America's involvement in Southeast Asia came to an end.
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The problem of Vietnam was one that Kennedy had
inherited from his predecessor. Eisenhower's pledged
support to Ngo Dinh Diem was a fait accompli. Even if the
Kennedy Administration had felt Diem were not worth
supporting, which initially was not generally questioned,
Vietnam could not be treated as an isolated problem.
President Kennedy felt challenged by Khrushchev's speech in
January 1961, in which he supported wars on national
liberation, by the Soviet threat to Berlin, and by the
exchanges that took place at the Vienna Summit Conference.
He was further concerned with America's image after the
events at the Bay of Pigs and by the American compromise
in Laos, In this light, Kennedy felt that if we did not
stand firm in Vietnam, Khrushchev and the other leaders of
the world would be convinced that we never would.
The President, like his predecessor, was also a firm
believer in the domino theory. In an interview late in his
Administration he was asked if he felt the rest of South-
east Asia would fall if Vietnam did. He stated:
I believe it. I believe it. I think that the struggle
is close enough. China is so large, looms so high just
beyond the frontiers, that if South Vietnam went, it
would not only give them an improved geographic
position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya but would
also give the impression that the wave of the future in
Southeast Asia was China and the Communists. So I
believe it. 100
Also like his predecessor, Kennedy committed American
power to preventing the fall of South Vietnam without
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really having a strong political base with which to work
from under the auspices of the Diem regime. Diem was
continuously seen as America's only hope in Vietnam.
Perhaps the root cause of this was that most of the
Administration felt that the problem in South Vietnam was
primarily a military one. Thus without developing a
strategy that struck at the root cause of the problem, the
political situation, was doomed to failure. The strategic
hamlet program was a good strategy, but unfortunately it
was never properly implemented.
When President Kennedy died, he was convinced that
Vietnam was a vital American interest. Using our model
presented in Chapter One, the outlook of his Administration
would look like Chart 4.1 as shown on the next page.
During the Kennedy Administration the United States,
rather than use American combat forces, continued to build
and supply the South Vietnamese army and opted for a new
kind of strategy, counterinsurgency , as a vehicle towards
handling the problem in Vietnam. The President was adamant
about turning Vietnam into a 'white man's war. 1
This approach did not suggest that Vietnam was not
perceived as a vital American interest. Quite the contrary,
President Kennedy felt very strongly that it was and stated
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V. JOHNSON: OPEN-ENDED COMMITMENT AND RETREAT
A. THE BEGINNING
Just four days after the assassination of John F.
Kennedy, National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 273 was
adopted as an interim document. It essentially restated the
Kennedy commitment to assist South Vietnam through counter-
insurgency programs. It further emphasized America's
subsidiary role. It stated in part that "this is a
Vietnamese war and the country and the war must in the end
be run solely by the Vietnamese."
In light of what eventually evolved during his
Administration, a quick look at statements by Johnson, while
he was the Vice-President, are in order.
In May 1961, in a confidential memo to President
Kennedy, Johnson made a statement that, in retrospect,
portented greater United States involvement in Southeast
Asia. He stated:
The battle against Communism must be joined in South-
east Asia with strength and determination to achieve
success there—or the United States, inevitably, must
surrender the Pacific and take up our defenses on our
own shores.... The struggle is far from lost in South-
east Asia and it is by no means inevitable that it
must be lost.... There is no alternative to United
States leadership in Southeast Asia .^u^
Further on in his memorandum, Johnson indicated his belief
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The basic decision in Southeast Asia is here. We must
decide whether to help these countries to the best of
our ability or throw in the towel in the area and pull
back our defenses to San Francsico and 'Fortress
America' concept. More important, we would say to the
world in this case that we don't live up to treaties
and don't stand by our friends. This is not my
concept. 103
On the question of using American ground troops in Southeast
Asia, Johnson stated:
Asian leaders—at this time—do not want American
troops.... This does not minimize or disregard the
probability that open attack would bring calls for
U.S. combat troops. But the present probability of
open attack seems scant, and we might gain much
needed flexibility in our policies if the spectre of
combat troop commitment could be lessened
domestically . *-"^
From these statements by LBJ in 1961, two conclusions
emerge: first, Johnson firmly believed that a non-Communist
South Vietnam was in the national interest, and secondly
the United States had not only the responsiblity, but also
the capability of influencing events in Asia, and specifi-
cally so in South Vietnam.
With this in mind, let us now return our attention to
President Johnson's first year in office.
Shortly after the evolution of NSAM 273, reports began
to filter back to Washington that the military situation
was rapidly deteriorating. These reports were the result of
the near total disintegration of the strategic hamlet
program in the provinces near Saigon. The hamlets were
being overrun by the Viet Cong on a nearly daily basis and
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was not

providing timely support. As a result, LBJ ordered
Secretary of Defense McNamara to Saigon (18-20 Dec, 1963).
McNamara indeed found that the situation in Vietnam had
deteriorated and ordered certain immediate corrective
actions to stem the tide. Another thing McNamara discovered
was, that since the death of Diem a neutralist sentiment
had gained force under the advocacy of the Buddhists and
the supporting student groups. McNamara used his visit as
a statement of U.S. opposition to a neutralist settlement,
and prior to his departure he and General Minh exchanged
promises to oppose the neutralization of South Vietnam.
In his report to the President, McNamara was deeply
concerned with the military situation. He stated:
Viet Cong progress has been great during the period
since the coup, with my best guess being that the
situation has in fact been deteriorating in the
countryside since July to a far greater extent than
we realized because of undue dependence on distorted
Vietnamese reporting the Viet Cong now control very
high proportions of the people in certain key provinces,
particularly those directly South and West of Saigon. 105
McNamara also expressed concern over the neutralist
sentiment and over the indecision that permeated the Minh
government.
In an effort to strengthen the Minh government and to
stem the neutralist sentiment in Vietnam, President
Johnson, in a New Years message to General Minh stated, in
part:
...neutralization would only be another name for a
Communist takeover.... The United States will con-
tinue to furnish you and your people with the
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fullest measure of support in this bitter fight....
We shall maintain in Vietnam American personnel and
material as needed to assist you in-achieving
victory. 106
In spite of LBJ's message, the neutralist sentiment
continued to grow. This fact, among others, led to a
bloodless coup whereby on January 30, 1964, General Khanh
repudiated neutralism and aligned his government with the
United States on this issue. Almost immediately the
United States declared its willingness to work with his
government.
In spite of the new government and continued U.S. aid,
the situation in Vietnam continued to deteriorate. Special
National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 50-64 entitled
"Short Term Prospects in SEA" of February 12, 1964,
concluded the following:
...the situation in Vietnam is very serious and
prospects uncertain. Even with U.S. assistance as it
is now, we believe that, unless there is a marked
improvement in the effectiveness of the South
Vietnamese government and armed forces, South Vietnam
has, at best, an even chance of withstanding the ,
~
7insurgency menace during the next few weeks or months.
This SNIE coupled with an assessment by Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) , which stated that the
root cause of the increased Viet Cong attacks was the
political instability that resulted from the Diem coup,
led President Johnson to send McNamara and General Taylor
(CJCS) to Vietnam on March 8, 1964. Out of this trip




This document was an explicit statement of the domino
theory. It stated categorically that if South Vietnam fell,
twelve other countries would follow suit. It led one to
believe that Vietnam was the West's last hope in Asia. The
document further brought out, for the first time, that
America's prestige was at stake. A failure to meet this
Communist war of liberation would in essence weaken
10 8America's worldwide strategic position.
The JCS, on several occasions, argued that NSAM 288 was
not strong enough. What they were seeking was expressed by
General Taylor in the following Joint Chiefs of Staff
Memorandum. (JCSM)
:
The JCS do not believe that the recommended program in
itself will be sufficient to turn the tide against the
Viet Cong in South Vietnam without positive action
against the Hanoi government at an early date.... 10 9
What they called for was an unlimited bombing campaign
against the North in order to dissuade their support for the
Viet Cong.
By this time the President, the Secretary of Defense,
the JCS and others had come to believe that Hanoi was
playing a decisive role in the insurgency. As early as
February 1964, the President, in an address, indicated a
large North Vietnamese role:
Those engaged in external direction and supply would do
well to be reminded and to remember that this type of
aggression is a deeply dangerous game. HO
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Just one month later, Secretary McNamara was much more
explicit in a public statement of U.S. policy in Vietnam.
Who is the responsible party—the prime aggressor?
First and foremost, without doubt, the prime aggressor
is North Vietnam, whose leadership has explicitly
undertaken to destroy the independence of the South. HI
With these statements and others throughout the spring
and summer, President Johnson left no doubt that the United
States would take whatever action was necessary in the
defense of South Vietnam. At this point, though, he truly
hoped that American ground combat troops would not be
necessary.
One must remember that 1964 was an election year and the
President most certainly had this on his mind. Throughout
his campaign he sought to give the impression of restraint
on the part of his Administration which contrasted sharply
with the hawkish attitudes of his opponent, Senator Barry
Goldwater. To prevent any drastic moves until after the
election, the President ordered his Administration to take
whatever interim measures were necessary to boost the
morale of the South Vietnamese and to ensure that the
Communists were convinced of America's determination. Also
during this time frame the Administration was devising
contingency plans that would subsequently be transformed
into greater U.S. involvement in the year following the




Not all of the President's advisors were of the opinion
that North Vietnam was the primary aggressor in the South.
For example, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs, Roger Kilsman felt that the problem in South
Vietnam was first and foremost an internal problem.
Rather than chasing the Viet Cong, the military must
put primary emphasis on clear-and-hold operations and
on rapid reinforcement of villages under attack. It
is also important, of course, to keep the Viet Cong
regular units off balance by conventional offensive
operations, but these should be secondary to the major
task of extending security ... H2
Hilsman's approach was flatly rejected which led to his
resignation from office. From that date on talks of
military action against the North increased. What was
needed now was a Congressional resolution supporting such
action.
B. THE TONKIN GULF INCIDENT
On April 2, 1964 the destroyer U.S.S. Maddox was
attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin by three North Vietnamese
torpedo boats. Under orders from President Johnson, the
Maddox continued to steam in the Gulf and was reinforced
with a second destroyer, the Turner Joy. Two nights later,
with nervous tension running high on the ships on patrol
and coupled with poor visibility, an incident occurred




Subsequent to the alleged second attack, the President
approved a military response at an NSC meeting. That same
night he went on national television and informed the
American public that retaliatory action was already
underway. "Air action is now in execution against gunboats
and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which
113have been used in these hostile operations." against
American forces.
On August 7, the Congess of the United States passed
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (for full text see Appendix B)
.
The Resolution read in part:
The United States regards as vital to its national
interest and to world peace the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security in Southeast Asia.
Consonant with the Constitution of the United States
and the charter of the United Nations and in accordance
with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collec-
tive Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore,
preprared, as the President determines, to assist any
member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in
defense of its freedom.
The support from Congress, spelled out in the Resolution,
gave the President a free hand in whatever action he deemed
necessary.
Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, in their book, The
Irony of Vietnam: The System VJorked
,
placed a great deal
of significance on the American retaliatory air strike
against the North, code-named Pierce Arrow. They state:
It represented both a culmination and a prologue:
Pierce Arrow capped the period of strategy-making that
focused on restricting American involvement in
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Indochina to aid, assistance, and covert pressure
against the DRV
,
and it foreshadowed the final turning
of strategy toward acceptance of the inevitability of
more direct U.S. participation in the war.^5
For three years prior to the Tonkin Gulf incident many
minor and ill-fated covert operations were being taken
against the North. However, in February 1964, President
Johnson authorized OPLAN 34-A. It was envisioned to be a
two-phase program of intelligence collection, psychological
operations, and sub rosa escalating "destructive under-
takings" against North Vietnam. The rationale behind 34-A
was to "convince the DRV leadership that they should cease
to support insurgent activities in the RVN (South Vietnam)
116
and Laos." When the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was passed
by votes of 88-2 in the Senate and 416-0 in the House, the
Congress was not aware of the fact that 34-A operations
were going on in the vicinity when the North Vietnamese
attacked the Maddox.
C. DECISION TO BOMB THE NORTH
America's unconditional bombing campaign against North
Vietnam commenced on March 2, 196 5 and was to continue,
with occasional halts, until November 1, 1968, when the
President ordered a total halt in order to get the Paris
Peace Talks off the ground.
Throughout 1964, President Johnson clung to the hope
that direct and sustained use of American force might be
averted, however, he did not equivocate on the goals
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behind U.S. policy. He was convinced that America's
credibility was on the line and that if the United States
failed, all would be lost.
As the situation in the South continued to deteriorate,
the President came under increasing pressure to authorize
the bombing of the North. As mentioned in section A of
this chapter, contingency plans were in the works. These
had been authorized by the President in an NSC meeting on
March 17, 1964. The JCS , who were the strongest advocates
of bombing, developed extensive contingency plans. A
committee, formed by General Krulak, had developed a plan
for graduated escalation against the DRV. This plan was
firmly supported by the JCS.
In early June 1964, the President's principle advisors
on Vietnam met in Honolulu. Both Rusk, representing the
State Department, and Taylor, from the JCS, discussed
questions as to the objectives of the proposed bombing
campaign. The Secretary of State viewed the bombing as
a means of containing Asian Communism: "our point of
departure is and must be that we cannot accept the over-
running of Southeast Asia by Hanoi and Peiping
117(Beijing)." The JCS position was that "the United
States should seek through military actions to accomplish
the destruction of the North Vietnamese will and capability
as necessary to compel the DRV to cease providing support
to the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos." The JCS
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added that limited military action designed to change
Hanoi's will would probably only achieve a temporary
lessening of North Vietnamese aggression, and strongly
argued for a more forceful and immediate strike against the
DRV. The Conference ended with agreement to execute
specific military preparations for a rapid and powerful
113
air campaign against the North.
The next major event that occurred was the Tonkin Gulf
incident which was discussed in section B, and by September
1964, there was a consensus in the government on additional
pressure against the North. This consensus was further
strengthened by a North Vietnamese PT boat attack on
American destroyers in the Gulf on September 18.
In spite of the increasing pressure on the President and
the consensus of State and Defense, LBJ still deferred on
carrying out bombing attacks against the North. The primary
reason appears to be the close proximity of the elections.
After his stunning victory in the 1964 elections,
President Johnson initiated a month-long policy review
which culminated in a consensus for a two-phase expansion
of the war. Phase I would intensify air strikes in Laos
and covert actions agaist the DRV; Phase II would be a
sustained, escalating air campaign against the North. The
President approved Phase I for December and approved Phase
II in principle. The two-phase plan had emerged from an
NSC working group that had developed three options. Option
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A was a continuation of limited operations; Option B would
augment the current policy with heavy and systematic
pressures on the North; and Option C was a more modest
119
campaign against the DRV. The JCS favored Option E.
Under Secretary of State George Eall rejected this
policy. He stated:
If the political situation in Saigon should continue to
crumble, air action against North Vietnam could at best
bring a Phyrric victory. Even with diminished North
Vietnamese support for the Viet Cong, a disorganized
South Vietnamese Government would be unable to eliminate
the insurgency . 120
Ball foresaw that bombing would probably be countered by
increased North Vietnamese usage of ground forces and if
they and the Viet Cong were successful, there would be
tremendous pressure on the United States to introduce ground
combat troops. His warning went unheeded.
On November 1, the American air base at Bien Hoa came
under mortar attack in which five Americans were killed and
a squadron of B-57 bombers was destroyed, and on December
24, a U.S. officer's billet in Saigon was bombed resulting
in two more deaths. Although outraged, the President
refused to approve reprisal raids. By February 1965
Johnson's views had changed.
In a memo from McGeorge Bundy and McNamara, he was
presented with two alternatives that were perceived to be
the only options left to prevent a debacle. The first
called for the employment of American air power in order to
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force a change in the Communists '.. policy or to negotiate.
Secretary.. Rusk objected because he felt either alternative
had devastating consequences. He felt the United States
should redirect its efforts to making the current policy
work. His views went unheeded and now all that was needed
was a provocation for the commencement of Phase II, the
bombing of the North.
On February 6, 1965, the new Soviet Premier, Aleksei
Kosygin arrived in Hanoi. On February 7, the Viet Cong
attacked American barracks at Pleiku and the U.S. heli-
copter base at Camp Kolloway. McGeorge Bundy was in Saigon
at the time, and he immediately recommended the
execution of a policy of sustained reprisal against
North Vietnam—a policy in which air and naval action
against the North is justified by and in retaliation
to the whole Viet Cong campaign of terror and violence
in the South.... In practice, we may wish at the outset
to relate our reprisals to those acts of relatively
high visibility such as the Pleiku incident.... Once a
program of reprisals is underway, it should not be
necessary to connect each specific act against North
Vietnam to a particular outrage in the South. . . . This
reprisal policy should begin at a low level. Its level
of force and pressure should be increased only
gradually ... it should be decreased if VC terror
gradually decreased. The object would not be to 'win'
any air war against Hanoi, but rather to influence the
course of the struggle in the South. 121
All of Johnson's principle advisors concurred with the
Bundy proposals and on February 8 the first Flaming Dart
reprisal raid was carried out. The air war was on.
In connection with the Pleiku attack, a VJhite House
Statement was issued. It expressed the hope that a wider
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war would not ensue, but the American response was totally
dependent on Hanoi's actions.
The key to the situation remains the cessation of
infiltration from North Vietnam and the clear indica-
tion by the Hanoi regime that it is prepared to cease
aggression against its neighbor. 122
By February 13, there was no response from Hanoi that
it was prepared to cease its aggression, so LBJ approved
the Rolling Thunder program which was publicly announced
on February 28. On March 2, the first strikes under this
program were launched and the bombing continued almost
continuously, until November 1, 196 8.
In the early 1960's, the term escalation gained
popularization, it referred to a process of increasing
violence set in motion by miscalculation and reflected a
fundamental concern with the problems relating to the use
of force in the nuclear era. A real quick look at this
notion is in order.
"Escalation" was defined as "the unpremeditated increase
or spread of a limited operation," in which any military
reaction was considered escalatory if it led to the
expansion of a conflict. It was accepted that if one side
took a course of action, the other side would respond with
a stronger action ultimately leading the opponents on to





To prevent such an occurrence, a nation must place clear
limits on operations and must have a "general ceiling" on
the goals of a nation. President Kennedy strove to avoid
"unrealistic objectives that could be regarded as threaten-
ing (to) other nations." With clearly defined and limited
goals, he sought to relieve "the pressures toward
escalation." Conversely, "the Johnson Administration (had)
been following a policy in Vietnam of escalation that (was)
graduated, but open-ended." No upper limit was set to the
amount of force to be employed that could realistically
describe the "ultimate political aims in Vietnam that this
application of force (was) meant to secure." This was so
because
the rationale for projecting this military power now
bears little relation to the target area against which
it is physically focused. The use of force had, in
fact, become ever more concerned with a global image
and the wish to demonstrate to an international
audience that the Administration is resolute and that
America's allies can rely upon its power for their
protection. More and more the weight of American power
in Vietnam has been increased because of considerations
transcending that country and even Southeast Asia as a
whole. .. insofar as escalation involves a relationship
between ends and means, in its involvement in Vietnam
the United States is concerned with ends that go far
beyond that country itself. 124
With this notion in mind let us next look at the




D. COMMITMENT OF U.S. GROUND TROOPS
Throughout the spring of 1965, America's top leaders
were debating the bombing strategy which unfolded on March
2, 1965, with virtually no discussion on troops. Once
American air power was deployed against the North from
bases in South Vietnam, General Westmoreland became con-
cerned with base security. He felt it imperative that
American troops provide this security against Viet Cong
retaliation. Thus, on March 8, 3500 Marines landed at
Da Nang. JCS instructed CINCPAC that the Marines "will
not, repeat not, engage in day to day actions against the
125Viet Cong." By the end of April additional troops had
been introduced bringing the total number of military
personnel in Vietnam to 3 3,500.
These troops, designed to raise South Vietnamese
morale, free South Vietnamese troops for combat, and to
demonstrate American determination to meet its
commitment, proved insufficient. The situation in
Vietnam continued its rapid pace of deterioration.
Politically, Vietnam, by June 1965, had its seventh
government since the Tonkin Gulf incident. Militarily,
America's bombing campaign had not broken the North's will,
in fact the Hanoi government was more resolute. Infiltra-
tion of North Vietnamese combat units was on the rise as
was the Viet Cong strength. Conversely,
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By late spring of 1965 the South Vietnamese Army was
losing almost one infantry battalion a week to enemy
action. Additionally, the enemy was gaining control
of at least one district capital town each week....
The Government of Vietnam could not survive this
mounting. . .offensive for more than six months unless
the United States chose to increase its military
commitment. Substantial numbers of U.S. ground
combat forces were required. 127
The President was faced with a major decision, one he
did not hesitate to make. On June 27, 196 5, he authorized
the first Search and Destroy mission and in July approved
100,000 additional U.S. combat troops, bringing the
projected year-end total to 175,000 men. The United States
was at war.
It is ironic that the decision to bomb the North had
taken a great deal of time to be approved and was done with
great trepidation, and yet the commitment of ground troops,
a decision that would appear to have been far more difficult
to approve, came relatively easily.
By the end of 1965 the United States had 184,300 men
committed in Vietnam and by the time LBJ left office the
total was to reach 536,100. America's incremental commit-
ment of forces in Vietnam was met by a stronger action from
the North Vietnamese/Viet Cong, the United States was on
the "escalation ladder."
Once he authorized the Search and Destroy missions and
after approving the additional troop commitment to Vietnam,
President Johnson, in a White House news conference,
spelled out the American interests in Vietnam as follows:
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There are great stakes in the balance.
Most of the non-Communist nations of Asia cannot, by
themselves and alone, resist the growing might and the
grasping ambition of Asian Communism.
Our power therefore, is a very vital shield. If we
are driven from the field in Vietnam, then no nation
can ever again have the same confidence in American
promise or in American protection.
In each land, the forces of independence would be
considerably weakened and an Asia so threatened by
Communist domination would certainly imperil the
security of the United States itself.
We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but
there is no one else.
Nor would surrender in Vietnam bring peace, because we
learned from Hitler at Munich that success only feeds
the appetite of the aggressor. The battle would be
renewed in one country and then in another country,
bringing with it perhaps even larger and crueler
conflict, as we have learned from the lessons of
history.
Moreover we are in Vietnam to fulfill one of the most
solemn pledges of the American nation. Three Presidents
—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your
present President—over eleven years have committed
themselves and have promised to help defend this small
and valiant nation.
Strengthened by that promise, the people of South
Vietnam have fought for many long years. We just
cannot now dishonor our word, or abandon our commitment,
or leave those who believed in us and who trusted us to
the terror and represssion and murder that would follow.
This, then, my fellow Americans, is why we are in
Vietnam. 12 8
This statement coupled with others by leading policymakers
attempted to spell out America's interests in Vietnam, that
is, the resistance of Communist aggression. Why, though,
did America move so quickly to introduce U.S. combat
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forces? What was the world situation in 196 5 that
impacted on this decision?
President Johnson saw that the alternatives to war in
Vietnam would have invariably led to an imbalance in the
Asian power structure, and would have caused a marked
decline in the credibility of American commitments. His
rationale for this belief was explained as follows:
This is what I could foresee: First, from all the
evidence available to me it seemed likely that all of
Southeast Asia would pass under Communist control,
slowly or quickly, but inevitably, at least down to
Singapore but almost certainly to Djakarta. I realize
that some Americans , through talking with one another,
repealed the domino theory. In 196 5 there was no
indication in Asia, or from Asians, that this was so. 129
Was there a possibility "that all of Southeast Asia would
pass under Communist control," in 1965? History has not
shown this to be true, however, in 1965, the political
evolution of Southeast Asia was by no means assured!
Indonesia, the most populous and most endowed Southeast
Asian state in terms of natural resources, was experiencing
the rise in political power of the PKI, its Communist Party
The nation had been embarked on foreign confrontations
designed to legitimize Sukarno's "guided democracy," which
130
also served to enhance the influence of the PKI. While
the mutual Sukarno-PKI anti-imperialist posture justified
the confrontations, first Soviet and then Chinese material
support was deemed necessary for their successful prosecu-
tion. Thus there existed a strong ideologic and material
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basis for Sukarno's support of the PKI, which became more
manifest in late 1964 and 1965 as he dropped two leading
anti-Communists and added the third-ranking PKI official to
his Cabinet. In May 1965 Sukarno declared: "It is not
strange that I embrace the PKI. The PKI has always stood
in the forefront of the implementation of the policies of
131the Indonesian revolution. " He later announced at an
Independence Day Celebration, "I am a friend of the
Communists because the Communists are a revolutionary
people." On the same occasion he announced the formation
of the Djakarta—Phnom Penh—Hanoi—Peiking (Beijing)
—
Pyongyang axis," a nucleus of the New Emerging Forces he
had proclaimed in juxtaposition to the U.N. the preceding
April.
The purpose of the New Emerging Forces appeared to be
expansive in nature. This showed itself in the rise of
Communist guerrilla activities in the Northern part of
Malaysia coupled with similar activities in the south
supported by Indonesia. At the same time, the Voice of
Free Thailand began to broadcast from mainland China and
shortly thereafter it announced the formation of the
Thailand Patriotic Front designed to oppose American
133influence in the region. In Cambodia, Sihanouk
reflected the mood of the times as he predicted the
inevitable triumph of Communism in his country.
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Besides the aforementioned New Emerging Force's
activities in the summer of 1965, there was a Beijing
—
Djakarta arms deal being arranged, and planning for the use
of Sihanoukville to supply the National Liberation Front
134
of South Vietnam. Looking back at his perception of
Southeast Asia at the time, JLBJ remarked:
Thus, what we saw taking shape rapidly was a Djakarta
—
Hanoi—Beijing—Pyongyang axis, with Cambodia probably
to be brought in as a junior partner and Laos to be
merely absorbed by the North Vietnamese and Chinese.
The members of this new axis were undoubtedly counting
on South Vietnam's collapse and an ignominious American
withdrawal. Under such circumstances Britain, already
facing financial troubles and moving toward a reduction
in its involvement in Asia, would undoubtedly have been
even less eager to support Malaysia and Singapore. The
entire region would then have been ripe for the
plucking. ^35
Seeing Southeast Asia in this vein, the introduction of
U.S. combat forces into Vietnam took on a different light.
These considerations must have weighed heavily in the
President's mid-1965 decision to increase strength levels
to 175,000 men. A year later, after the abortive PKI
uprising and the attendant fall of Sukarno and his programs
coupled with the Cultural Revolution in which China
directed her energies inward, the reason for resisting
aggression as laid out above should have deserved
reconsideration. However, by this time, the U.S. had
"crossed the Rubicon," and the growing weight of American





Prior to the opening of the Paris Peace Talks in 1968
and as early as late 196 3, several attempts were made to
bring a peaceful solution to the emerging conflict in
Vietnam. The objective of this section is to briefly
mention some of these initiatives.
Shortly after the death of Ngo Dinh Diem, U. Thant,
Secretary General of the United Nations, sought the
neutralization of South Vietnam through the formation of
a coalition government in Saigon. In a meeting with
President Johnson and through a message to Ho Chi Minn, he
proposed talks for a settlement. Simultaneously, Cambodian
Chief of State Sihanouk invited South Vietnam to join
Cambodia in a neutral confederation. These proposals were
137
rejected outright by the United States.
In July 1964, U. Thant once again tried to arrange a
peaceful solution to the conflict in Vietnam. He called for
a reconvening of the Geneva Conference. French President
Charles DeGaulle immediately threw his weight behind the
proposal. Communications were sent out to the fourteen
nations that had participated in the 1961-1962 Geneva
Conference on Laos. China, the National Liberation Front
and Cambodia indicated prompt support for this approach,
however, the United States rejected this proposal.
Just prior to the 1964 elections, U. Thant again tried
to reach a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. He proposed that
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Hanoi and Washington secretly send emissaries to Rangoon
to discuss the conflict. This proposal was accepted by
Hanoi, but the United States wanted to postpone the talks
until after the election. After the election, U. Thant
again proposed the talks. Again Hanoi agreed, however, the
United States flatly refused to meet with the North
Vietnamese.
Shortly after the United States launched its reprisal
attacks against North Vietnam on February 7, 1965,
Secretary General U. Thant, the Soviet Union and France
"each sought to divert the United States away from this
course, and onto one of negotiation and compromise....
The White House's response to U. Thant ' s proposals was
138
sharp and negative."
In an April 7, 1965 speech at Johns Hopkins University
President Johnson said the United States was ready to
139
engage in "unconditional discussions." The Hanoi
140Government responded with its Four Points the next day.
In order to keep the initiative alive and under pressure
to make another move to bring about negotiations, the
President called for a bombing halt which went into effect
on May 12. The President, in a message to Ambassador
Lodge, stated his purpose in ordering the bombing pause.
You should understand that my purpose in this plan is
to begin to clear a path either toward restoration of
peace or toward increased military action, depending
upon the reaction of the Communists . 141
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With no positive response from the North Vietnamese
leaders, the bombing was resumed on May 18.
In November 1965, the Italian Government tried to
mediate the struggle, however, when the initiative was made
public the North Vietnamese said the peace feeler was a
sheer fabrication. The Administration, under pressure,
called for a thirty-six hour Christmas truce and agreed to
extend the bombing halt through the end of January 196 6.
On January 7, the United States proposed a list of
fourteen principles that included a discussion of Hanoi's
four points. This proposal was rejected by Ho Chi Minh
because "of its failure to grant the NLF the status of a
principle combatent in the war. Ke also questioned the
United States' sincerity, as Washington had increased its
142troop commitment during the bombing pause."
In October 1966, a promising mediation effort was
underway at the hands of the Polish representative to the
International Control Commission in Vietnam. This effort
held out the promise of face-to-face talks with North
Vietnamese representatives without requiring a bombing
halt on the part of the United States, which had previously
been a North Vietnamese prerequisite. The path appeared to
be clear for the beginning of talks on December 6, however,
on December 2 the United States carried out massive raid
against strategic targets in and around Hanoi.
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These and other peace initiatives led to no solution
of the Vietnam conflict. That solution was going to have
to await a significant event that would untrack one side or
the other. The significant event that accomplished just
that was the TET offensive of 1968.
F. TET
When the year 1968 dawned, no one in the Administration
expected it to be the year that many established policies
would be stood on their head, but, as we well know, such
was the case.
In early 1967 the Viet Cong were being deprived of
their source of recruits, supplies and tax revenue due to
the continual exodus of South Vietnamese villagers to the
comparative safety of the towns and cities. Therefore,
the North Vietnamese and the NLF began plans for a general
offensive designed to increase anti-war feelings in the
United States and to ignite a general uprising in the South
with the ultimate goal of reunification.
By late 1967 it was becoming apparent to the U.S.
that something big was in the works in South Vietnam. In
order to place the United States in a dilemma, on December
30, North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh
announced that, "if the United States halted its bombing
unconditionally, North Vietnam would hold talks with the
143United States on relevant questions." The United
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placed Hanoi and Haiphong off limits to bombing while
seeking some clarification of the North's position.
However, on the night of January 30, 1968, seven
cities in the northern half of South Vietnam were attacked.
The TET offensive was on.
The general uprising that was hoped for by the Viet
Cong never materialized. In fact the offensive turned out
to be a military debacle for both the Viet Cong and the
North Veitnamese, however, the TET offensive hit the
144bulls eye of American public opinion.
G. TET: POSTSCRIPT
LBJ's reaction to the impact of the TET offensive on
America's thinking was one of disbelief.
I did not expect the enemy effort to have the impact on
American thinking that it achieved. I was not sur-
prised that elements of the press, the academic comm-
unity, and the Congress reacted as they did. I was
surprised and disappointed that the enemy's efforts
produced such a dismal effect on various people
inside government and others outside whom I had always
regarded as staunch and unflappable. Hanoi must have
been delighted; it was exactly the reaction they
sought. 145
General Wheeler was ordered to Vietnam on February 21,
and five days later cabled back a request for an
additional 205,000 combat troops by the end of the year.
This request triggered a complete reappraisal of our
Vietnam policy within the Administration. On February 28,
the President named an Ad Hoc Task Force on Vietnam to be
headed by Clark Clifford. The Task Force's recommendations
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were presented to Johnson on March 4 . The Task Force
recommended sending an additional 2 3,000 troops
immediately, a reserve call-up of around 245,000 men,
reserving judgment on the total request of 205,000 men and
examining the situation week by week, action to improve the
effectiveness of the South Vietnamese army, and no new
. ... .. 146peace initiative.
By March 8 the President had decided against sending
the additional 205,000 men requested by Westmoreland and a
week later rejected Ambassador Goldberg's suggestion for a
complete bombing halt, although he had agreed on March 5
to Secretary Rusk's suggestion of a bombing halt north of
the 2 0th parallel.
Meanwhile, on the domestic front, on March 12 Senator
McCarthy made a strong showing in the New Hampshire
primary. On March 16 Robert F. Kennedy threw his hat into
the ring and public opinion over the war was exacerbated
by a leak over the request for 205,000 more troops.
On March 18, 139 members of the House sponsored a
resolution calling for an immediate Congressional review
147
of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia.
On March 26, the President met with a group of advisors
known as the Wise Men. This group included former
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, former Under Secretary,
George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Arthur Dean, Douglas Dillon,
Henry Cabot Lodge, Robert Murphy, former Chiefs of Staff,
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General Bradley, General Ridgeway, and General Taylor, and
former Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance. This group
of non-governmental advisors concurred with Johnson's
refusal to dispatch the additional forces requested by
General Westmoreland.
On March 31, 1968, Lyndon B. Johnson went before the
nation to announce a policy shift and his decision not to
seek re-election. He announced the bombing halt north of
the 20th parallel, he signified a rejection of the 205,000
man request by announcing the dispatch of 13,500 support
troops, and he concluded, "I shall not seek, and I will not
accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your
148President." Three days later Hanoi responded to LBJ's
initiative.
H. PARIS PEACE TALKS
After a month of haggling over the site for commence-
ment of the peace talks, North Vietnam finally suggested
Paris on May 3, and the United States accepted. Finally,
the talks began in Paris on May 13, 1968.
The talks immediately ground to a standstill as North
Vietnam insisted on a complete bombing halt before any
further discussions could take place. The United States'
position was that no bombing halt could be agreed upon if
it precluded the United States from carrying out
reconnaissance flights over the North. In the middle of
the summer the United States informed the North Vietnamese
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delegation that South Vietnam would have to be included in
the talks and that the bombing pause would not continue if
there were large-scale attacks by the enemy on South
Vietnam's cities.
On September 17, the leading U.S. negotiator, Harriman
proposed to LBJ that a complete bombing halt be considered
on Hanoi's implicit acceptance of America's conditions.
The President was pressured by Harriman and Cyrus Vance to
accept this implicit understanding because they doubted
whether it was politically feasible for Hanoi to make an
explicit statement.
On October 11, the North Vietnamese asked whether the
United States would halt the bombing if Hanoi agreed to
South Vietnam's participation in the next stage of the
talks. The U.S. agreed provided serious talks began
within twenty-four hours. After some give and take, it
was agreed that the United States and the DRV would
announce the bombing halt and other terms of the understand'
ing on October 31.
On the evening of October 31, 1968, President Johnson
went on the air and announced that he had ordered the
cessation of U.S. air, naval, and artillery bombardment of





After further delays, the Paris Peace Talks began on
January 25, 1969, five days after the inauguration of
Richard M. Nixon.
I. CONCLUSIONS
Within four months of taking office, Lyndon Johnson
had defined American interests as requiring that South
Vietnam remain a non-Communist state. This requirement led
to the introduction of over a half-million American ground
troops, and resulted in a widespread bombing program
throughout all of Vietnam.
In large part, the President's actions were predicated
on his perception of the global situation in late 1964 and
early 1965. The evolution of events in Indonesia certainly
concerned him as did the events that were occurring in
China. He truly feared the evolution of a Beijing
—
Djakarta axis and the effects it would have on the newly
formed Malaysian federation. Sihanouk's flirtation with
both China and Indonesia coupled with the use of
Sihanoukville as a supply port to support the Viet Cong
added to his concerns. The situation in Laos was such
that he feared its demise at the hands of the Chinese and
Vietnamese, and he felt that if the United States were




If South Vietnam collapsed and the United States
withdrew, there would be nothing to stop the alignment of
149these Communist powers.
The Administration failed to recognize the realities of
the problem in South Vietnam. The war in South Vietnam was
an insurgency supported from the outside, not an invasion
supported by an insurgency. The southern rooted insurgency
had always been the most important factor in the war.
Therefore, that which made the insurgency possible, the
infrastructure of the Viet Cong, had to be neutralized.
President Kennedy recognized this important factor as did
Roger Hilsman. In Hilsman's case, however, he was but one
voice in an ocean of cold war warriors.
Whether Hilsman's approach would have been successful,
no one will ever know, however, it would have probably
resulted in a lower level of violence and it would have
struck more directly at the root cause of the insurgency.
Another factor that was not taken into account by the
Johnson Administration, or for that matter, the
Administrations of his predecessors, was the strong
nationalistic bent of the Vietnamese cause. This factor
coupled with the historical animosity that has existed
between the Chinese and the Vietnamese could well have
resulted in Vietnam's evolving as the Yugoslavia of Asian
Communism. It is, of course, receognized that the
historical events of 1949 and 1950 and the attendant Cold
War atmosphere made this well-nigh impossible.
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Looking at our model outlined in Chapter One, President




Country: U.S. Issue: Vietnam
Basic Interest at Stake Intensity of Interest
Survival Vital Major Peripheral
Defense of homeland X
Economic well-being X
Favorable world order X
Ideological X
President Johnson considered Vietnam a vital interest
in every sense of the word. He committed the United
States to a long and costly war in Vietnam. In his
memoirs he listed various reasons for his actions, which
give us an indication of the national interests he sought
to defend.
World order interest:
From all the evidence available to me it seemed likely
that all of Southeast Asia would pass under Communist
control, slowly or quickly, but inevitably, at least
down to Singapore but almost certainly to Djakarta....
The evidence before me as President confirmed the





I knew our people well enough to realize that if we
walked away from Vietnam and let Southeast Asia fall,
there would follow a divisive and destructive debate
in our country. This had happened when the
Communists took power in China. 152
World order and ideological interest:
Our allies not just in Asia but throughout the world
would conclude that our word was worth little or
nothing. Those who had counted so long for their
security on American commitments would be deeply
shaken and vulnerable . 15 3
World order interest:
Knowing what I did of the policies and actions of
Moscow and Beijing, I was sure as a man could be that,
if we did not live up to our commitments in Southeast
Asia and elsewhere, they would move to exploit the
disarray in the United States and in the alliances of
the Free World. 154
Defense interest:
As we faced the implications of what we had done as a
nation, I was sure the United States would not then
passively submit to the consequences. With Moscow and
Beijing and perhaps others moving forward we would
return to a world role to prevent their full takeover
of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East—after they had
committed themselves . 155
If President Johsnon had had a method of determining
the national interest comparable to the one outlined in
Chapter One, he may have come to realize that only two
value factors were at stake: (1) the balance of power in
Asia and (2) national prestige. However, when weighed
against such cost/risk factors as economic costs,
estimated casualties, risk of protracted conflict, cost of
defeat or stalemate, and risk of public opposition, he
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may well have concluded that the cost/risk factors far
outweighed the value of factors.
To reinforce this possible conclusion, had the
Administration used a matrix, similar to the one in
Chapter One, to compare American and North Vietnamese
interests, our policies may well have been quite different
An example is shown below.
Chart 5.3
NATIONAL INTEREST MATRIX-U.S. AND NORTH VIETNAM
Country: U.S . /N . V . N . Issue : Vietnam
Basic Interest at Stake Intensity of Interest
Survival Vital Major Peripheral
Defense of homeland NVN US
Economic well-being NVN US
Favorable world order US/NVN
Ideological NVN US
This type of analysis is not very scientific, however,
its usage or usage of a method similar to it may well have
changed the course of action the Johnson Administration
pursued and may well have changed the course of history.
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VI. NIXON'S WAR AND PEACE
A. NIXON AT THE HELM
In the years before becoming President, Richard ;M.
Nixon had defended the American commitment in Vietnam and
had led the right-wing Republican attack on President
Truman for "losing" China to the Communists.
During the domestic debate over Vietnam in 1967,
Nixon had argued that the presence of American combat
forces in Southeast Asia had been instrumental in checking
Chinese expansion by allowing the other nations in that
region to develop stable government institutions.
"Whatever one may think of the domino theory, " he asserted,
"it is beyond question that without the American commitment
in Vietnam, Asia would be a far different place today."
Thus, to Nixon the fate of non-Communist Vietnam was
important, and an American commitment to see the struggle
through was essential for United States security.
However, after the TET offensive of January 196 8, the
American leadership was faced with a much different
situation: the loss of domestic support for the war.
Thus, as a Presidential candidate, Richard M. Nixon
suggested that the thrust of American diplomacy be directed
against Moscow, who he felt had a great deal of leverage
with the North Vietnamese leadership. In a draft speech
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he intended to deliver in an evening radio address
scheduled for March 31, 1968, Mr. Nixon observed:
Today, the Soviet Union and the Communist states of
Eastern Europe are providing fully 85 percent of the
sophisticated weapons for North Vietnam and 100 per-
cent of the oil. It is Soviet SAM'S and Soviet anti-
aircraft guns that are shooting down American planes.
It is Soviet artillery that is pounding the Marine
fortress at Khe Sanh. Without Soviet military
assistance, the North Vietnamese war machine would
grind to a halt.
The Johnson Administration has made a fundamental error
in basing its policies toward the Soviet Union on the
wishful assumption that the Soviets want an early end
to the war in Vietnam. Not the small, primitive state
of North Vietnam, but its great Soviet ally and protec-
tor inhibits the full exercise of America's military
power. Not even the proximity of Red China's massive
armies is as powerful a deterrent to U.S. actions as
the presence of Soviet freighters in the port of
Haiphong. North Vietnam can hold out stubbornly for
total victory because it believes it has total Soviet
backing. Yet Washington's desire for a broad political
accommodation with the Soviet Union - for detente -
arouses a will to ignore or to minimize that backing.
Hanoi is not Moscow's puppet, but it must remain a
respectful client in order to keep Soviet aid flowing
and to balance the influence of nearby Beijing. If the
Soviets were disposed to see the war ended and a
compromise settlement negotiated, they have the means
to move Ho Chi Minh to the conference table. 157
Later in the campaign, candidate Nixon expounded on his
intended course of action by explicitly stating that he
would aggressively move on a number of fronts to increase
the chances of meaningful negotiations and the survival of
South Vietnam. In September of 1968, Mr. Nixon declared
he had a plan to end the conflict and in the following
month he stated: "what is needed now is not further
military escalation, but rather a dramatic escalation of
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our efforts in the often-neglected nonmilitary aspects of
the struggle
—
political, economic, psychological and
diplomatic
.
While Nixon was justifying America's involvement in
the war and calling for a negotiated settlement, Henry
Kissinger was also calling for a negotiated conclusion to
the conflict.
However we got into Vietnam, whatever the judgment of
our action, ending the war honorably is essential for
the peace of the world. Any other solution may un-
loose forces that would complicate the prospects of
international order. 159
By an honorable settlement, several essential
conditions had to be met. The American withdrawal from
Vietnam had to be conducted in a way that avoided even the
slightest appearance of defeat, there was not to be any
face-saving political settlement designed merely to permit
a graceful U.S. exit from Vietnam. Kissinger explicitly
rejected the idea of a coalition government, which he said
would "destroy the existing political structure and thus
lead to a Communist takeover." Nixon and Kissinger set as
their optimum goal a "fair negotiated settlement that
would preserve the independence of South Vietnam. " At a
minimum, they insisted on a settlement that would give
1 fid
South Vietnam a reasonable chance to survive.
Once in the White House, President Nixon ordered a
complete reevaluation of the political and military
situation in South Vietnam, While he hoped that
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diplomacy could end the war, he did not reject the
possibility of using military power to achieve his objec-
tive of 'peace with honor. 1 His diplomatic efforts were
envisioned to be a transformation from confrontation to
cooperation and detente in America's relations with Moscow
and Beijing. Through these efforts he hoped to be able to
pressure Hanoi to seek a negotiated settlement.
Through French intermediaries, Nixon sent a message to
the North Vietnamese leadership expressing his sincere
desire to conclude a peace. He proposed a mutual with-
drawal of American and North Vietnamese troops from South
Vietnam and the restoration of the DMZ as a boundary
between north and south. At the same time, Kissinger was
briefing Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on America's
position and expressing the Administration's desire for
negotiations with the Russians on such topics as detente,
SALT and other important issues, however, he warned that
a settlement had to be achieved in Vietnam first. In an
effort to put teeth in the American position of using
power if need be, Nixon ordered the bombing of Viet Cong/
North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia.
In an effort to develop unity on the domestic front,
the President pursued a parallel public strategy to his
secret diplomatic efforts. In May 1969 he unveiled the
peace plan he had privately made to the North Vietnamese
and he made plain his intention to terminate America's
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involvement in the war. In June he met with South
Vietnamese President Thieu on Midway Island and immediately
thereafter announced the withdrawal of 25,000 American
combat troops.
The President's peace initiatives failed to elicit any
concessions from the North Vietnamese, and his parallel
policy to contain opposition at home likewise failed.
In July 1969, two events took place. The first was the
enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine on Guam on 26 July 1969.
Setting forth the doctrine as principles guiding future
American policy toward Asia, Nixon declared:
First, the United States will keep all of its treaty
commitments
.
Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power
threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of
a nation whose survival we consider vital to our
security.
Third, in cases involving other types of aggression,
we shall furnish military and economic assistance when
requested in accordance with our treaty commitments.
But we shall look to the nation directly threatened
to assume the primary responsibility for its own
defense. 161
The second event was the improvisation of a go-for-broke
strategy by the President. It was to be an all-out
attempt to "end the war one way or the other—either by
negotiated agreement or by force." Again through French
intermediaries, Nixon sent a personal message to Ho Chi
Minh, reiterating his desire for a "just peace," but
adding an ultimatum: unless some progress toward a
settlement were made by November 1 he would have no choice
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but to resort to "measures of great consequence and
force." Kissinger again spoke wtih Dobrynin, warning that
"as far as Vietnam is concerned, the train has just left
16 2
the station and is now headed down the track."
The President, at this time, also ordered Kissinger
and an NSC group to draw up contingency plans for use of
American military power.
The President's ultimatum to North Vietnam fell on
deaf ears. The only result was the North Vietnamese agreed
to secret talks between Kissinger and Xuan Thuy.
Unable to extract any concessions from the North
Vietnamese and faced with choosing between a military
escalation and an embarrassing retreat, the President was
persuaded not to use military power because Kissinger's
study group had concluded that air strikes and blockade
would probably not have forced concessions from Hanoi, and
Secretary of Defense Laird and Secretary of State Rogers
felt it would have further inflamed opposition on the
domestic front.
In late October British counterinsurgency expert, Sir
Robert Thompson told President Nixon that the South
Vietnamese were daily growing stronger and that within two
years could bear the burden of the war if they were
abundantly supplied with American arms, training, and
economic aid. President Nixon eagerly embraced Thompson's





In a major radio and television address to the nation
on November 3, 196 9, President Nixon defended the American
commitment in Vietnam, warning that a pull-out would
produce a bloodbath in South Vietnam and a crisis of
confidence in American leadership at home and abroad. He
openly appealed for the support of those he labeled the
"great silent majority, " and he concluded with a dramatic
warning: "North Vietnam cannot humiliate the United
States. Only Americans can do that." In the speech he
elaborated on the Vietnamization policy stating in part:
We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in
cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete
withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their
replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly
scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made
from strength and not from weakness. As South Viet-
namese forces become stronger, the rate of American
withdrawal can become greater . -LOJ
President Nixon's speech was a very shrewd and
successful pronouncement . By offering a solution to a
difficult situation whereby an honorable peace could be
achieved with a decreasing American sacrifice, he managed
to stabilize the domestic front. His call on the nation.' s
patriotism and dislike to anything resembling defeat
coupled with his identifiication of a silent majority,
enabled him to mobilize a bloc of support where none had
existed before. By the end of November the President's
popular support had risen dramatically and numerous Nixon
rallies were held in several cities.
124

In response to Nixon's Veitnamization speech, Saigon
established a national goal entitled Ba Tu . which translated
roughly to "Three Selves"—self-recovery , self-powering,
,. . . . 164
self-sustaining
.
Vietnamization, as envisioned by the Administration,
consisted of two principal components. President Nixon
concisely summarized the new American policy:
We thus developed the Vietnamization program in close
cooperation with the government of the Republic of
Vietnam (GVN) . This policy was designed to strengthen
the armed forces and the people of South Vietnam so
that they could defend themselves. As their forces
increased in numbers, equipment, combat skills, and
leadership, they progressively assumed responsibility
for their own defense. The process also involved the
extension of governmental authority in the countryside
through the pacification program, the growth of
economic capacities, the development of political
institutions—all the elements that would allow South
Vietnam to stand on its own. 165
The first component of Vietnamization, strengthening
the armed forces of the South Vietnamese, proved to be
relatively easy to achieve. With proper funding and
transportation, a large-scale arms transfer took place.
This was coupled with a vigorous training program that had
been designed to develop the necessary skills and techni-
ques for fighting a war. The biggest constraint on this
component of Vietnamization was time. The two year time-
frame suggested by Sir Robert Thompson proved to be quite
accurate.
Pacification, the second component of Vietnamization,
posed a real challenge. The basic objective of
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pacification was to remove the reasons for revolution. In
order to accomplish this, what was needed was the develop-
ment of a stronger economy, the removal of corruption, the
providing of security and essential services, creation of
a spirit of national unity and promotion of better health
standards. Pacification was something that had to be
accomplished by the South Vietnamese, it was their
responsibility to nation-build. It was their responsibility
to win the hearts and minds of the people. This task was
difficult, at best, however for Vietnamization to work it
was as essential as the strengthening of their armed
forces.
Vietnamization had both positive and a negative aspect
to it. The positive aspect was summed up by Douglas Pike:
"The pacification program, which previously had not been
taken seriously, gradually assumed major significance for
the Communists. A full-scale attack on it is now under
way.... By the end of 1971, Hanoi's leadership
concluded that its primary task was to frustrate the
Vietnamization plan. The negative aspect of Vietnamization
was that as America began drawing down its combat forces
from Vietnam without any progress in the Paris peace talks,
the less incentive Hanoi had to reach any agreement at all.
However, the more U.S. troop presence diminished, the more
intensely President Nixon insisted that the war end through
a negotiated settlement. The President's hoped for
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breakthrough in Paris as a result of his November 3 speech
never materialized. Ke became increasingly impatient for
some concrete results and further convinced that he could
end the war by a dramatic show of force. Once again the
President began looking for "initiatives" that might be
undertaken to "show the enemy that we were still serious
1 6 7
about our commitments in Vietnam." The President's
opportunity to do just that emerged in early 1970.
C. CAMBODIAN INCURSION AND LAM SON 719
InJCune 1969 , the United States and Cambodia had agreed
to resume diplomatic relations after a four year rupture.
In late 1969, an internal crisis emerged between
Sihanouk and Prime Minister Lon Nol over the presence of
North Vietnamese/Viet Cong sanctuaries in Cambodia.
VThile Sihanouk was on an extended trip abroad, Lon Nol
issued an ultimatum giving the Communist forces in the
sanctuaries three days to get out. Angry crowds, in Phnom
Penh, sacked the North Vietnamese embassy and during this
turmoil, on March 18, 1970, Sihanouk was ousted in a
bloodless coup.
The North Vietnamese/Viet Cong almost immediately set
out to secure a strip of land along the South Vietnamese
border quickly eliminating virtually all Cambodian
opposition.
From Washington, General Abrams was directed to out-
line several contingency plans for military action in
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Cambodia by ARVN forces alone and with U.S. forces.
Kissinger was given the task of assembling the plans and
assessing the consequences.
In mid April, Defense Secretary Laird expressed his
opposition to any cross-border operations involving
American forces because of the chance of increased U.S.
casualties, loss of support for Vietnamization, and a
deepening of political division in the United States.
Secretary of State Rogers also opposed such a move, he
felt it would have destroyed a number of diplomatic
efforts that were underway.
A crucial NSC meeting took place on April 26. In
attendance were Nixon, Kissinger, Laird, Rogers, Attorney
General Mitchell, CIA Director Helms, and General Wheeler.
Secretary Rogers opposed any incursion, however, he
knew the President was determined to do something, so he
proposed using only ARVN forces. Secretary Laird and
General Wheeler felt the Communist forces were determined
to overthrow Lon Nol and establish a safe sea supply route
through Eastern Cambodia. Furthermore, they pointed out
that if only ARVN ground forces were used, they would need
U.S. air and logistics support. When President Thieu was
apprised of the situation, he said his ARVN troops must
have U.S. advisors.
On the morning of April 28, President Nixon gave the
order authorizing U.S. forces to attack the Fish Hook area
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and authorized advisors to accompany ARVN forces into the
Parrot's Beak (See map on the next page for the location
of these two areas) . In addition to these incursions into
Cambodia, Nixon ordered air strikes against the enemy
sanctuaries as well as four bombing raids against the
North.
President Nixon ordered these actions in an effort to
strike a crippling blow at the North Vietnamese/Viet Cong
ability to launch an offensive against the Saigon
government which in turn would buy time for Vietnamization,
he also hoped these forces would be successful in
capturing COSVN, the National Liberation Front's Central
Office for South Vietnam, and he hoped to induce the North
Vietnamese to offer some concessions which could lead to a
negotiated settlement of the conflict.
Domestic reaction to the Cambodian incursion was fast
and furious. Demonstrations on campuses throughout the
country erupted and at Kent State and Jackson State
Colleges six students were killed. Congress began to exert
pressure on the President who on May 6, said all U.S.
forces would be withdrawn from Cambodia by June 30 . On
June 30, the Cooper-Church Amendment was passed, 75-20,
169
cutting off all funding for Cambodian operations.
In an effort to quell foreign and domestic dissent, the
President, in October, launched what he described as a
170
"major new peace initiative." The President offered
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Source: Richard Solomon, ed . , Asian Security in
the 1980 's: Problems and Policies for a
Time of Transition
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no new concessions on fundamental issues, and Hanoi
promptly rejected the initiative.
Politically, the President was in a precarious situation
There was a total deadlock at the Paris peace talks and the
NSC
concluded that the United States could neither persuade
nor force Hanoi to remove its troops from the south. . .
.
By the end of the year. .. intelligence reported a sharp
increase in the infiltration of men and supplies into
Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, posing an ominous
threat to the northern provinces and Hue where
sizeable American forces had been withdraw. 171
The President sped up the withdrawal of American
forces from Vietnam in an effort to appease critics at
home and once again, as he had done before, he stepped up
military pressure against North Vietnam. Heavy air
strikes were launched against enemy supply lines and
staging areas in Laos and Cambodia as well as against
bridges, base camps, and trails across the DMZ and in the
Hanoi-Haiphong area.
In February 1971, Nixon again expanded the war,
authorizing LAM SON 719—a major ground operation into
Laos. This operation was to be conducted only with ARVN
forces backed up by American air and logistics support.
The operation was at best a draw, at worst an unmitigated
disaster
.
The operation had been designed to accomplish similar
objectives to the Cambodian incursion, i.e., buy time for
Vietnamization and to disrupt enemy supply lines enough to
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preclude a Communist offensive during the coming dry
season. General Giap, leader of the North Vietnamese
forces, threw virtually all the forces he had available
into the battle in order to discredit Vietnamization.
Although the operation had apparently succeeded in up-
setting North Vietnamese plans for a dry season offensive,
heavy casualties were inflicted on the ARVN forces.
Domestic reaction was once again strong and negative.
Following LAM SON 719, Kissinger again began a new
round of secret talks. At this meeting he offered two new
inducements to the American position. The U.S. would
settle for a.cease-f ire-in-place and would withdraw all
American forces from Vietnam within six months of signing
an agreement. The second inducement was that President
Thieu would resign thirty days prior to a national
plebiscite to determine the political future of South
Vietnam. Le Due Tho, who had joined the secret negotia-
tions in February 1970, rejected the American proposal.
A month later Le Due Tho secretly offered a nine point
plan to end the war. Although Kissinger rejected this plan
he felt that a breakthrough might be in the offing.
However, on July 1, 1971, the PRG publicly offered a seven
172point plan on a settlement in South Vietnam.
To those privy to the secret negotiations, however,
the PRG proposal was not so much a negotiating document
as it was a tactic to encourage doubts about the Nixon
Administration's sincerity in seeking an end to the war.
When Kissinger called Le Due Tho to clarify which of the
two proposals now on the table should serve as the basis
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for future secret discussions, Tho replied that the
secret proposal was the basis for future discussions.
This confirmed the fears of Kissinger's aides that
Hanoi would leapfrog its public and private positions
and that a breakthrough in the negotiations had not
occurred. 173
By November, the talks again collapsed when the North
Vietnamese refused to continue the Kissinger-Tho dialogue.
This was an ominous development because it meant that
American strategy had once again failed, and because
intelligence showed a North Vietnamese build-up for a new
offensive.
D. MARCH 19 72 OFFENSIVE
After the breakdown of the secret talks in November
1971, President Nixon once again went on national tele-
vision and radio to announce that there had been secret
negotiations. The President discussed the secret
negotiation being carried on with Hanoi and believed that if
Americans showed unity it would enable the negotiations to
174
resume.
A day after the President's speech, Kissinger proposed
another secret meeting with the North Vietnamese, which they
accepted several weeks later by suggesting a mid-March date
to meet.
In the meantime the Politburo in Hanoi was making the
final preparations for an invasion of the South, a decision
they apparently had reached in early 1971. The North
Vietnamese objective was to hold off the attack until the
133

majority of U.S. ground forces had been removed from
Vietnam and to strike before the ARVN forces were strong
enough to resist unaided.
Intelligence sources estimated that the North Vietnamese
would be recovered enough from the losses suffered during
LAM SON 719 by the end of 1971. On the other hand the North
Vietnamese estimated that American domestic constraints
would preclude the reintroduction of American ground forces.
One final consideration that apparently went into the North
Vietnamese thinking was the timing of the upcoming
offensive. It was scheduled for March 1972 in order to
coincide with the American presidential election in hopes
of producing an effect similar to that of the TET offensive
of 1968.
The offensive itself was aimed at the ARVN forces
directly in order to achieve total victory or at least dis-
credit Vietnamization, to tie down regular South Vietnamese
troops, to free the Viet Cong to renew its offensive and
disrupt the pacification program, and to strengthen its
position for the final negotiations based on a cease-fire-
in-place.
On 29 March, the North Vietnamese launched their
offensive. In the initial stages, the offensive was an
unqualified success. Attaining near total surprise with
the scope and swiftness of the attack, the NVA quickly
routed the ARVN defense lines near Quang Tri in the north,
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Kontum in the highlands, and An Loc just sixty miles north
of Saigon (See map on following page)
.
America's response to the invasion was swift and
devastating. President Nixon ordered B-52 strikes across
the DMZ and air strikes on fuel depots in the Hanoi-
Haiphong area. While these attacks were being carried out,
Kissinger met privately with Soviet Premier Leonid
Brezhnev. "He stated emphatically that the United States
held the Soviet Union responsible for the invasion, and he
warned that a continuation of the war could severely
damage Soviet-American relations and have grave conse-
175quences for North Vietnam." This message was also
relayed to Le Due Tho a few days later.
Sensing victory in their grasp, the North Vietnamese
flatly rejected the American ultimatum. On May 8, 1972,
the President announced the mining of Haiphong Harbor, the
naval blockade of North Vietnam, and the massive,
176
sustained bombing attacks . ' The Russian reaction was
mild. They did not cancel the Brezhnev-Nixon summit
scheduled for May, as anticipated by Laird and Rogers, but
continued to aid the North Vietnamese while sending a
delegation to pressure Hanoi to sue for peace. The
Chinese protested Nixon's escalation of the war but also
sent a delegation to pressure Hanoi.
Domestic reaction was relatively mild in comparison to
the Cambodian issue. Apparently the American public
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troops. Polls showed that the North Vietnamese invasion
justified Nixon's response and public approval ratings rose
markedly.
The American response to the North Vietnamese attack
was by far the most concentrated and devastating attack, to
date, against the North. Although the NVA and the ARVN
forces suffered heavy casualty rates, intelligence reports
indicated that the NVA had the capacity to fight for two
177
more years.
Frustrated in their hopes of breaking the diplomatic
stalemate by military means, by the fall of 1972 each
side found compelling reasons to attempt to break the
military deadlock by diplomacy. 178
E. PEACE? WAR? PEACE?
The secret Kissinger-Tho talks were resumed in late
July 1972. The talks inched along slowly throughout late
summer towards a compromise while the United States
continued its military pressure against Hanoi, although at
a substantially lower level than during the North Vietnamese
March offensive.
The United States, having already shown a willingness to
allow the NVA to remain in the South, took a major step away
from its absolute support for Thieu by agreeing to accept a
tripartite electoral commission. This body was to consist
of the Saigon government, the People ' s Revolutionary
Government (Viet Cong), and the neutralists. The North
Vietnamese, on the other hand, appeared to withdraw their
insistence on the removal of Thieu.
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On September 11, the People's Revolutionary Government
(PRG) released an important statement that portended an
179
end to the war. At a secret meeting with Tho four days
later, Kissinger said that one important aspect of the PRG
statement, the implied removal of Thieu by the United
States government, was unacceptable to President Nixon.
Kissinger urged the North Vietnamese to be flexible on this
180point which in turn could lead to a settlement.
On September 26, 1972, at the next secret meeting Le
Due Tho broke the deadlock. He proposed a tripartite
National Council of Reconciliation and Concord that would
have three equal segments but not be considered a
government. On October 8, what appeared to be a major
breakthrough in the Paris talks was achieved when Le Due
Tho presented Kissinger with an english version draft
agreement that the North Vietnamese were ready to sign.
Within three days all but two issues were resolved and the
two negotiators agreed to leave these until later, and
that after consultations with Nixon and Thieu, Kissinger
would proceed to hanoi on October 22 to initial the treaty.
On October 17, Kissinger returned to Paris and held a
session of talks with Xuan Thuy before proceeding to
Saigon to discuss the agreement with Thieu. Three days
later, President Nixon informed Hanoi that the draft
agreement was acceptable to the United States provided
Saigon's acceptance was obtained. Meanwhile, between
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October 19 and October 23, Kissinger was in Saigon going
over the agreement item by item with President Thieu.
Thieu and his advisors noted over 100 textual changes
"that were essential before the document could be signed
181by the GVN." By October 23, Kissinger and Thieu had
narrowed the discrepancies down to six. It appeared as if
President Thieu was leaning towards initialing the agree-
ment. However, after an interview of North Vietnam's
premier Pham Van Dong by Newsweek in which the premier
referred to the tripartite National Council of Reconcilia-
tion and Concord as an "arrangement for a three-sided
182
coalition of transition...," Thieu flatly refused to
sign the agreement because he was told by Kissinger that no
coalition government had been agreed to.
Kissinger urged President Nixon to go ahead with the
agreement without Saigon's approval. However, Nixon
apparently shared in some of Thieu 's reservations about the
October draft. By this time Nixon was assured of victory
in the election and decided a short delay could strengthen
the American position once he was duly re-elected.
In an effort to keep the talks alive, on October 26
Kissinger declared that peace was at hand.
On November 20, the Kissinger-Tho talks resumed. At
the first meeting Kissinger brought up some sixty points
for renegotiation. Angrily the North Vietnamese rejected
Kissinger's proposals and revived the issue of the ouster
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of Thieu. Kissinger and Tho sparred back and forth,
throughout the remainder of November and into early
December.
On December 13, Tho returned to Hanoi via Moscow and
Beijing. The next day Nixon issued an ultimatum that if
serious negotiations were not renewed within seventy-two
hours, Hanoi would have to face the consequences. VJhen
the ultimatum expired, President Nixon ordered the
beginning of operation Linebacker II, which lasted from
December 18 to December 30.
Linebacker II was the single most devastating military
operation of the Vietnam war. Hanoi and Haiphong were
ravaged and Gia Lam airport was totally destroyed. The
Soviets and the Chinese reacted angrily to the bombing,
18 3
and domestic reaction was "one of shock and anger."
All President Nixon required from Hanoi to stop the
bombing was the resumption of the peace talks, Hanoi
complied.
Between January 8 and January 13 Kissinger and Tho
hammered out a final agreement. On the 15th the bombing
of the North was completely halted and on January 23, 1973,
Kissinger and Tho initialed the final agreement.
On January 27, the Agreement on Ending the War and
184Restoring Peace in Vietnam was formally signed.
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F. THE BEGINNING OF THE END
The reality of the January 1973 agreement was that it
did not end the war. All it did was enable the United
States to withdraw its ground forces and extract its POW's
America's involvement in the war, however, continued in
the form of air strikes against sanctuaries and the Ho Chi
Minh trail in Cambodia.
President Nixon made firm commitments to Saigon in
terms of military equipment, economic aid and the use of
American air power in the event of North Vietnamese overt
aggression.
The Administration attempted to use every bit of
leverage at its disposal to check any North Vietnamese
attempt to upset the delicate balance of power in the
South. Nixon warned that unless Hanoi lived up to the
letter of the agreement, the United States would withhold
the over four billion dollar aid and reconstruction
package earmarked for North Vietnam.
The Hanoi government ignored the President's warning
and by the middle of the summer Congress severely
curtailed the President's ability to threaten, denouncing
the aid to North Vietnam as reparations and by cutting off
funding for air operations in Cambodia. Most of this
Congressional action was as a result of mounting evidence
of White House involvement in the Watergate scandal.
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As the Watergate investigations began to reveal abuses
of presidential power, Congress took on the President
directly. Congress passed a bill terminating funding for
all military operation in Indochina. Although the House
upheld Nixon's veto, he was forced to accept an August 15,
1973 cut-off date.
By the end of 1973 President Nixon was all but power-
less. Congress, in November, had over-ridden his veto
on the War Powers Act and when coupled with the Watergate
scandal and the vote terminating operations in Indochina,
direct American involvement in Vietnam came to a virtual
end.
The military situation in South Vietnam, by the fall of
1974, had decidedly shifted in favor of North Vietnam.
ARVN forces had been forced into a defensive posture by
severe cut backs in American aid from $2.3 billion in 1973
to $1.0 billion in 1974, while the NVA and PRG had
mobilized large units in the South. Vast quantities of
supplies were stockpiled in preparation for a new
offensive in 1975 or 1976.
On August 9, 1974 President Nixon was forced to
resign leaving it up to his successor to preside over the
demise of South Vietnam.
G. CONCLUSIONS
To Richard Nixon the fate of a non-Communist South
Vietnam was important. He felt America's commitment had
142

enabled the rest of Southeast Asia to develop stable
governments which otherwise would not have had time to form,
and he felt it was imperative for American credibility and
prestige to see the war through to a successful conclusion.
When we assumed the burden of helping defend South
Vietnam millions of South Vietnamese .. .placed their
trust in us. To abandon them now would risk a massacre
that would shock and dismay everyone in the world who
values human life.
Abandoning the South Vietnamese people .. .would
jeopardize more than lives in South Vietnam. It would
threaten our longer term hopes for peace in the world.
A great nation cannot renege on its pledges. A great
nation must be worthy of trust.
When it comes to maintaining peace, prestige is not an
empty word. I am not talking of false pride or
bravado—they should have no place in our policies. I
speak rather of the respect that one nation has for
another's integrity in defending its principles and
meeting its obligations . 185
He hoped the war could be concluded through negotiations.
Once he realized the intransigience of Hanoi, and
desirous to withdraw American forces due to domestic
considerations, Nixon opted for a two-tier system under
the title of Vietnamization.
The program appeared to be rather successful, at least
on the surface. Nixon was encouraged by Sir Robert
Thompson's assessment of the political situation that was
developing as the program progressed. However, the
President was concerned with the continued lack of progress
in the negotiations and the supply build-up by the
Communist forces in Cambodia and later in Laos.
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A policy he pursued in order to attempt to maintain
domestic support was to publicly announce private
negotiations when they became deadlocked. Shortly after
these announcements he generally took overt military
action to get the negotiations back on track. The problem
lay in the fact that Hanoi knew America would continue its
withdrawal regardless of the results of negotiation. Once
American ground forces were removed, Hanoi would only have
to deal with the Saigon government.
The military actions in Cambodia and Laos caused
domestic unrest. This factor further encouraged North
Vietnam to drag its feet on any agreement while preparing
for yet another offensive. After each of the two military
operations the U.S. offered further inducements to get the
Hanoi leadership to negotiate a 'just' peace. Each time
America conceded something and received nothing in return.
After the talks broke down late in 1971 the President
again went before the nation and described the lack of
progress. Once the March 1972 offensive was launched the
President responded with strong military force. North
Vietnam had apparently guessed wrong because unlike the
196 8 reaction to TET, the American people supported the
President's response to North Vietnamese aggression.
The severity of the response in all likelihood led to
the October breakthrough in the peace talks. But, as
these talks ground to a halt, Nixon issued an ultimatum
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which went unheeded. The American military response was
by far the most severe of the entire Vietnam war.
Domestic reaction to the Linebacker II operation
backed the President into a precarious corner, however,
Hanoi's agreement to renew the talks in early January 1973
took the President off the hook.
After the agreement was signed the President, in his
May 3, 1973 report to Congress, stated: "(1) The agreement
corresponded to our overall approach..., (2) the agreement
included the basic features of our earlier peace plans...,




In reality, a look at the evolution of the peace talks
clearly shows that the United States continually conceded
on one point after another without inducing the North
Vietnamese to respond. A good in depth analysis of the
peace talks can be found in Allen E. Goodman's The Lost
Peace .
Shortly after the agreement v/as signed, the Nixon
Administration began to become unraveled. Watergate broke,
Congress became hostile towards any continuation of
American involvement in the war and the American people
wanted to put the whole affair out of sight and out of
mind.
More than any other single issue, Vietnam brought a
premature end to the Nixon Presidency. The extreme
measures he took to defend his Vietnam policy against
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enemies real and imagined led directly to the Watergate
scandals which eventually forced his resignation. Thus,
when the final Vietnam crisis came in 1975, the archi-
tect of 'peace with honor' was no longer in the White
House and the nation was in no mood to defend the peace
he had constructed at such great cost. 187
In looking at our national interest matrix and asses-
sing Nixon's views on Vietnam, the outlook during his
Administration would probably have looked like this.
Chart 6.3
NATIONAL INTEREST MATRIX-NIXON
Country: U.S. Issue: Vietnam
Basic Interest at Stake Intensity of Interest
Survival Vital Major Peripheral
Defense of homeland X
Economic well-being X
Favorable world order X
Ideological X
To the President, South Vietnam's survival was a vital
interest of the United States. Time and again he rejected
a precipitous withdrawal of American forces. He continually
insisted on allowing time for Vietnamization to take hold
and was not remiss in using American air and ground power
when needed to achieve his goal of 'peace with honor.'
Through his efforts of world diplomacy vis-a-vis Russia
and China, defense of the American homeland was downgraded
from a major interest to a peripheral interest. This was
accomplished primarily by the opening of relations with the
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People's Republic of China (PRC) , and the pursuit of
detente with not only the PRC but also the Soviet Union.
Economically, Vietnam had long ago fallen by the way-
side as even a major interest. The drain on the American
economy, particularly since the Johnson Administration,
had led to an inflationary trend in the United States that
exists even today.
In terms of an ideological interest, again the pursuit
of detente coupled with the acceptance, in Washington
circles, of the reality of the Sino-Soviet rift, the war
was no longer perceived in bi-polar terms, i.e., East
against West.
To Nixon, Vietnam was indeed a vital interest, although
perhaps in somewhat personal terms. "He emphatically told
a group of Congressmen that he would not be the first




A. THE FIRST SIX MONTHS
On August 6, the United States Senate cut the military
aid package to South Vietnam from $1 billion to $700
million. Three days later came the resignation of Richard
M. Nixon and the swearing in of Gerald Ford.
With the resignation of Richard Nixon, North Vietnam
hoped that the United States would carry out its obliga-
18 9tions under Article 21 of the Agreement on Ending the
War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. This article stated,
in part: "...the United States will contribute to healing
the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the
190Democratic Republic of Vietnam. ..." These hopes were
soon dashed however when President Ford, in an address
delivered before a Joint Session of the Congress, on
August 12, stated:
Over the past 5^/2 years in Congress and as Vice-
President, I have fully supported the outstanding
foreign policy of President Nixon. This policy I
intend to continue.... To our allies and friends in
Asia, I pledge a continuity in our support for their
security, independence, and economic development . 191
The economic situation in South Vietnam when President
Ford was sworn in was difficult at best. There was a
sustained business recession coupled with reduced foreign
aid from abroad and increased unemployment which had
begun in 1973 and continued on throughout 1974.
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Worldwide shortages of grains, petroleum, fertilizer,
soybeans, plastics , machinery, and iron and steel products
continued to impact heavily on the economy. Domestic
inflation skyrocketed 100 percent from the time of the
cease-fire to the end of 1974 and foreign exchange
reserves declined leading to a decline in non-defensive
expenditures. These economic factors along with con-
tinuing security problems throughout 1974 led to a marked
decline in the morale of the people.
With the widespread inflation there was a reduction in
the real value of American assistance to Vietnam which
produced serious effects on the fighting capability of the
ARVN forces. 192
The general decline of the economy, morale, and
fighting capabilities of the ARVN forces led to political
unrest similar to that which had emerged against President
Diem during his years in office. In September 1974, an
alliance of Buddhists and Catholics against President
Thieu emerged. This alliance was known as the National
Reconciliation Front. Also in the same month two other
events occurred: (1) on September 8, a group of Catholics
led by Father Tran Huu Thanh staged a mass demonstration
in the city of Hue. This movement, known as the People's
Anti Corruption and Peace Building Movement, accused
President Thieu and his wife of corruption. (2) The
following day, in the lower House of the South Vietnamese
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Parliament, the opposition Popular Movement for Struggle
against Corruption released a document called Indictment 1.
It accused President Thieu of using his presidential
powers to acquire several residences and lands in Saigon
and in other cities and provinces in the country.
The following month, on October 6, a Catholic-led
anti-corruption movement in South Vietnam held the biggest
public rally yet in Saigon in the anti-government
193
campaign.
In response to the corruption allegations of these
various groups, President Thieu was forced to demote three
of his top four Army Corps commanders plus various other
officials in his government. However, these moves were not
seen as sufficient by the South Vietnamese legislature and
on November 2, more than thirty South Vietnamese Congress-
men and Senators called for President Thieu 's immediate
resignation. This was followed up six days later by forty-
four opposition leaders appealing to the American Congress
to help end alleged government repression and corruption.
As has been shown, the political and economic situation
in South Vietnam, between the swearing in of Ford and the
end of November 1974, was not good. However, during this
time-frame the Administration continued its support for





I know you must be concerned by the initial steps taken
by Congress on the current fiscal year appropriations
(£300 million cut) for both economic and military
assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. Our legislative
process is a complicated one and it is not yet completed.
Although it may take a little time I do want to assure
you of my confidence that in the end our support will be
adequate on both counts. 194
From mid-August on the Administration continued to
lobby hard for the reinstatement of the $300 million cut the
Congress had made. However, in late September, the
Congress voted definitively to reduce the Administration's
military aid bill to $700 million.
Throughout the remainder of the year, the Administra-
tion continued to request Congress to reinstate the cut
funds but to no avail. Kissinger insisted that the United
States had a moral obligation to South Vietnam and warned
that failure to uphold it would have a "corrosive effect on
195
our interests beyond Indochina."
On the military front, the North Vietnamese were well
aware of the economic woes of the Thieu government as well
as the debate going on in the United States over military
and economic aid for the Saigon government. However, a
debate appeared to be brewing in the Politburo as well as
to priorities i.e., reconstruction versus revolution. The
apparent turning point in the internal debate was the wide-
196
spread demonstrations that emerged in September.
In October 1974, a Politburo policy document surfaced
known as The Resolution of 1975 . This document, taken by
the South Vietnamese off the body of a Communist soldier,
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called for moving cautiously and gradually on the battle-
field, with negotiations as an interim objective. In
essence this document was designed to test American
reaction to a limited offensive.
In mid-December 1974, General Viktor Kulikov, Chief of
the Soviet Armed Forces visited Hanoi. The last time such
a high-ranking Soviet officer had visited Hanoi was just
before the 1972 offensive and "in the weeks following the
general's visit, seaborne shipments of Soviet war material
to North Vietnam increased fourfold in volume, as Moscow
gave full aid and comfort to Hanoi in its final
1 97
offensive. "-Ly/
Shortly after Kulikov left Hanoi, North Vietnam
launched its limited offensive. Objective: capture Phuoc
Long province. On January 7, 1975, Phuoc Binh city, the
capital of Phuoc Long province fell to the North Vietnamese
and with it went the entire province (See map on following
page) . To the Politburo this had been the test of
American reflexes. America's reaction, according to a
communist commander, was that "the Americans had lost the
19 8
will, if not the capability, to intervene militarily."
Thus, in early January 1975, the stage was set for what
























B. EXIT SAIGON, ENTER HO CHI MINH CITY
The day following the fall of Phuoc Long Province, the
Administration again went before Congress to request the
$300 million they had earlier requested. Although it
seemed unlikely that Congress would approve these funds,
the Administration went to work on public opinion. In an
interview on NBC on January 27, 1975, President Ford
stated:
The best estimates of the experts out there, both
military and civilian, tell me that $300 million in
this fiscal year is the minimum. A year ago when the
budget was submitted for military assistance for South
Vietnam, it was $1.4 billion. Congress cut it in half,
which meant the South Vietnamese rangers going out on
patrol instead of having an adequate supply of hand
grenades and weapons were cut in half, which of course
has undercut their military capability and has made
them conserve and not be as strong.
Now, $300 million does not take them back up to where
they were or where it is proposed they should be. But
the experts say who are on the scene, who have seen the
fighting and have looked at the stocks and the reserves,
tell me that that would be adequate for the current
circumstances .199
On the very next day the President once again requested
these funds from Congress.
In mid-January Senator Nunn paid a visit to Ambassador
Martin in Saigon. The Ambassador felt that with massive
American aid, South Vietnam would be independent of the
United States in three years. When queried, a member of
the Ambassador's staff suggested that for Vietnam to be
indpendent of American aid, would depend entirely on how
much aid the Soviet Union and China provided Hanoi. If it




On January 28, President Ford again stated the need for
$300 million to prevent serious reversals in South Vietnam.
Vice-President Rockefeller said that "further aid reduction
would lead to the loss of the country and a bloodbath
there, the responsibility for which, would have to be borne
U n ..201by Congress. "
By early February, the Communist forces were beginning
to threaten Military Region (MR) 2. At about this time
Ambassador Martin returned to Washington to lobby for his
plan to make South Vietnam independent within three years.
All he came away with was a Congressional agreement to send
a fact-finding mission to South Vietnam.
Meanwhile, on February 3, Father Tran Huu Thanh issued
another public indictment against the Thieu government.
Those newspapers that carried the indictment were closed
down and many of the reporters involved were arrested on
trumped up charges.
As the economic, political and military situation in
the South continued to deteriorate, President Ford, in a
news conference in Atlanta, warned:
If the Congress does not respond to the requested
additional military assistance for the current fiscal
year, an amount which the Congress last year previously
authorized, it will certainly complicate the military
situation from the point of view of the South
Vietnamese. 202
In late February the Congressional fact-finding tour
arrived in Saigon. On the day of their departure, many of
the Congressional members went to Tan Son Mhut air base to
155

meet with the North Vietnamese and PRG delegates of the
Joint Military Team. At the time of their arrival many of
them appeared to be unconvinced of the need for the
additional moneys requested by the Administration, however,
the attempt by the North Vietnamese and PRG delegates to win
propaganda points at the meeting backfired leading many of
the Congressional people to believe that the additional
money was in fact needed. "Their conversion, of course,
was to prove a Phyrrhic victory for the Administration, for
within a few weeks the rapid deterioration of the South
Vietnamese army would render all aid proposals virtually
,,203irrelevant.
"
On March 1, Communist forces moved to cut off the main
highway into Ban Me Thuot city (See map on page 153) . On
March 10, they launched their main attack and two days
later the city fell. Another province was now in the hands
of the Communist forces. On the same day that Ban Me Thuot
fell, Congress again rejected President Ford's request for
an additional ?300 million in military aid for South
Vietnam. It was now quite obvious that the United States
was definitively disinclined in involving itself further in
South Vietnam.
The day following these two important events,
President Thieu told his cabinet of his new strategic
204policy: "Light at the Top, Heavy at the Bottom. " In
essence this meant he would abandon Kontum and Gia Lai
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provinces in the highlands as well as all of MR 1 except
the cities of Hue and Danang.
However, during the battle for Ban Me Thuot, the NVA
forces captured the ARVN deputy commander. He apparently
informed the NVA commander, General Dung, of what President
Thieu would do. After quick consultation with the
Politburo, General Dung was authorized to surround the
provinces of Kontum and Gia Lai and to attack MR 1 (See map
on page 15 3)
.
On March 13, President Thieu flew to Cam Ranh Bay to
brief the military commander of MR 2 of his new strategy.
On the next day the strategic retreat of the highland
provinces in MR 2 and MR 1 was begun and only then did the
American embassy in Saigon become aware of Thieu' s plans.
The North Vietnamese launched their attack against the
imperial city of Hue on March 23. The next day the
Politburo in Hanoi authorized General Dung to go for total
205
victory before the setting in of the monsoon season.
On March 25 Hue fell and the city of Danang was attacked.
Four days later the fall of Danang came and with it all of
MR 1 was in communist hands as well as the western half of
MR 2.
Meanwhile, back in Uashington, The National Security
Council met on March 25 to discuss the situation in
Vietnam. Two plans were outlined. The first called for a
continual request to Congress for the $300 million
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military aid package and the second suggested waiting for
General Weyand ' s report on his return from assessing the
situation in Vietnam and then requesting additional aid
from Congress. The decision was made to go with the
, , 206
second plan.
The next day Secretary of State Kissinger told the
press
:
We understand that peace is indivisible. The United
States cannot pursue a policy of selective reliability.
We cannot abandon friends in one part of the world
(Vietnam) without jeopardizing the security of friends
everywhere.... The problem we face in Indochina is an
elementary question of what kind of people we are. For
fifteen years we have been involved in encouraging the
people of Vietnam to defend themselves against what we
conceive as external danger. 207
He was apparently setting the stage for the stepped up
military aid requests that would be sought when General
Weyand returned from Vietnam.
On April 10, President Ford went before Congress and
after briefly sketching the military situation as
described to him by General Weyand, who had since returned
from Vietnam, he went on to say:
The situation in South Vietnam. . .has reached a critical
phase requiring immediate and positive decisions by
this government. The options before us are few, and
the time is very short. On the one hand the United
States could do nothing more.... On the other hand, I
could ask the Congress for authority to enforce the
Paris Accords with our troops and our tanks and our
aircraft and our artillery and carry the war to the
enemy. There are two narrower options: First, stick
with my January request that Congress appropriate $300
million for military assistance for South Vietnam and
seek additional funds for economic and humanitarian
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purposes; or increase my requests ... to levels which
. . .might enable the South Vietnamese to stem the on-
rushing aggression. ... 20°
The increased military request the President sought was
$722 million.
By the time of the President's speech, the military
situation was all but lost. All of MR 1 and MR 2 were now
in Communist hands and NVA forces were poised for the final
assault on Saigon and MR 3
.
Politically, President Thieu was almost completely
isolated. His political opponents joined forces with
Air Vice-Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky and with Father Thanh they
formed the Action Committee for National Salvation. They
called on Thieu "to delegate full powers to a new govern-
ment of new personalities with new policies and effective
209for national salvation." Thieu responded by arresting
seven of its members and accusing them of plotting a coup.
However, on two occasions Thieu tried to form new cabinets
in an effort to placate his opposition. These attempts
resulted in failure.
By early April even Thieu ' s supporters had turned
against him and calls for his departure began to emerge.
The pressure to get him to resign mounted as the battle for
Xuan Loc, a major provincial capitol east of Saigon,
continued. On the day it fell, April 21, Thieu resigned.
In his resignation speech he stated:
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The reason I resign today is the fact that today the
U.S. Congress is going to scrutinize the problem of
aid. I think that after my resignation today, maybe
tomorrow the $300 million will be raised to $722
million or to more than $1,000 million, and then a
continuous airlift will bring in tanks and heavy
artillery ... let us wait and see whether the U.S.
Congress will do so. 210
On the day Thieu resigned the Chairman of the House
Appropriations Committee, Representative Mahon of Texas,
opened the hearings on President Ford's request for
additional aid by stating, "The question of aid to South
Vietnam is of course, and this is an understatement,
211highly controversial." In the end, Congress did
appropriate $300 million, however, it was earmarked for
carrying out the evacuation of American and some
Vietnamese personnel. The end of the road in Vietnam was
at hand.
On April 30, 1975, the North Vietnamese forces took
Saigon and raised the flag of the People's Revolutionary
Government at the Presidential Palace. That same day the
BBC informed the world that the NVA had taken Saigon and
renamed it Ho Chi Minh city.
C. POSTWAR EVENTS
In the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle, the United
States chose a wait and see policy geared toward looking
towards the future rather than the past, gearing American
actions to the behavior of Vietnam towards her neighbors,
and also stressing the need to account for those U.S.
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servicemen still listed as missing in action (MIA) . The
policy was clearly stated by President Ford on December 7
,
1975, when he enunciated The Pacific Doctrine (For full
text see Appendix B)
:
In Indochina the healing effects of time are required.
Our policies toward the new regimes of the peninsula will
be determined by their conduct toward us. We are
prepared to reciprocate gestures of good will
—
particu-
larly the return of remains of Americans killed or
missing in action or information about them. If they
exhibit restraint toward their neighbors and construc-
tive approaches to international problems, we will look
to the future rather than to the past. 212
At the end of the war there were four major questions
that were at issue between the United States and the
states of Indochina, particularly Vietnam. These questions
were: (1) the admission of Vietnam to the United Nations;
(2) Americans missing in action in Indochina; (3)
normalization of relations; and (4) reconstruction aid to
213Indochina. During the remainder of the Ford Administra-
tion not one of these issues was ever resolved.
1. The Admission of Vietnam to the United Nations
In August 1975, both North and South Vietnam sought
to join the United Nations (UN) . The United States cast a
solitary veto stating that since the Soviet Union had done
the same thing when South Korea had applied, the United
States had no alternative but to do likewise and would
214
"have nothing to do with a selective universality."
After the reunification of Vietnam on July 2, 1976,
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) , as it was now
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called, once again sought membership in the United Nations.
On September 11, Kissinger, when asked if the U.S. intended
to block the admission of the SRV to the U.N., stated:
The President stated publicly this week that we
considered the gesture of releasing the names of twelve
Americans missing in action as insufficient. And what
we are considering is whether a government that is not
fulfilling one of its basic obligations under an
international agreement would be able to fulfill its
obligations under the U.N. Charter, and this is—we
will make our decision when the case actually comes
before the Security Council. 215
Two days later U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.,
Scranton said the United States would veto the SRV's
application, so under a French initiative the issue was
postponed until November.
When the issue came before the Security Council in
November, the U.S. cast its veto against the SRV because of
inadequate accounting of the MIA's.
The issue of SRV membership in the U.N. was thus
left to the next administration.
2 . Americans Missing in Action in Indochina
The House Select Committee on Missing Persons in
Southeast Asia concluded, after fifteen months investiga-
tion, that there was no credible evidence that any
Americans were still being held captive in Vietnam as a
216
result of the war. Since the MIA issue is directly
linked to the next issue, normalization of relations, they
will be discussed together.
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3 . Normalization of Relations
In an interview on the "Today" show a month after
the fall of Saigon, Secretary Kissinger was asked if the
United States would recognize Vietnam. In response he
stated: "We want to observe the conduct of the Vietnamese
217Government for a while before we make this decision."
On June 4, 1975, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham
Van Dong noted that the Vietnamese Communists were prepared
to establish diplomatic relations with the United States on
the basis of the Paris Peace Agreement. This implied a
requirement on the United States to carry out the
provisions of reconstruction aid, however, on September 2
the Prime Minister apparently softened the Vietnamese
position by repeating his call for the normalization of
relations without specifically tying it to the question of
reconstruction aid.
President Ford and Secretary Kissinger on the other
hand called for full accounting of the MIA's and for
observing the Vietnamese actions toward its neighbors just
as the President was to state three months later in his
address in Honolulu on December 7.
In early 1976, the Vietnamese returned the remains
of five U.S. servicemen killed in Vietnam followed
shortly thereafter by two more. The American position,
however, continued to call for a full accounting of the
MIA. In a news conference on April 22, 1976, Secretary
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Kissinger responded to a question on the prospects of
normalization with the Vietnamese by saying:
We have stated publicly that we are, in principle,
prepared to have talks with Hanoi in which each side
will be free to raise any issue that it wishes and
that then the outcome of these talks can determine
whether there is sufficient basis for normalizing
relations. As far as we are concerned, the absolute
precondition is a complete accounting for the missing
in action. ^18
In July 1976, the SRV launched an initiative aimed
at normalizing relations with its neighbor nations. This
proved quite successful resulting in the establishment of
diplomatic relations wtih all members of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) , consisting of Thailand,
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Republic of the
Philippines. By this initiative, Hanoi removed one of the
obstacles towards normalization of relations with the U.S.
Hanoi's behavior toward its neighbors.
On July 22, Secretary Kissinger again stated the
Administration's position:
We have said on many occasions that for us the Indo-
china war is over. We are prepared to look to the
future, we are willing to discuss outstanding issues;
we stand ready to reciprocate gestures of good will.
We have conveyed our willingness to open discussions
with the Vietnamese authorities with both sides free
to raise any issue they wish.
For us the American missing in action remains the
principle concern. Let there by no mistake: There
can be no progress toward improved relations with
Hanoi without a wholly satisfactory accounting for
these men . Nor will we yield to cynical efforts to




If the Vietnamese meet our concerns for the missing in
action .. .they will find us ready to reciprocate and to
join in the search for ways to turn a new page in our
relations. 219
On the same day as Kissinger's address Hanoi agreed to
allow all Americans stranded in the country to leave with
their Vietnamese families beginning on August 9. On that
day 4 9 Americans and their dependents arrived in Bangkok
from the SRV. Subsequent to this gesture, on September 7,
the Hanoi government released the names of twelve U.S.
servicemen killed in Vietnam. However, in response to this
President Ford stated, "Normalization of relations cannot




Following the election of Jimmy Carter, Vietnamese
and U.S. officials met in Paris on November 12 and held
talks designed to bring about friendlier relations. The
following day the Vietnamese announced that Vietnam was
disposed "to fully fulfill" its obligation on the return of
221
war personnel. Their communique also skirted the issue
of reconstruction aid by referring to it as "what had been
agreed in the mixed economic commission in Paris in
2221973." Thus, when the Carter Administration took office,
the process of normalization of relations appeared to be on
the move
.
4 . Reconstruction Aid to Indochina
As mentioned previously, Article 21 of the Paris
Agreement obligated the United States "to contribute to
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healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (as North Vietnam was
called in 1973) and throughout Indochina."
A figure of $3.25 billion was promised by President
Nixon in a secret letter to Pham Van Dong. "The Joint
Economic Commission" as established by the Paris Agreement,
"worked out a program for grant aid to be provided and
commodities to be purchased in the United States .. .over a
223five year period." However, no agreement was ever
formally reached and the issue was never brought before
Congress.
As the war dragged on, after the American with-
drawal, the U.S. tried to use the issue of reconstruction
aid as leverage to stem NVA and VC activities but to no
avail. It soon became apparent, in the aftermath of
Watergate and the Nixon resignation, that the U.S. Congress
would have no part of "reparations."
After the fall of Saigon, the Ford Administration
felt that Hanoi's actions leading to total victory had made
Article 21 a dead issue.
In January 1976, Senator George McGovern went to
Vietnam and through him Hanoi said that it was ready to put
these legal contentions (Article 21) behind and accept a
new format and amount with which the United States would
play "some part" in the rebuilding of the country, as "a
224
matter of honor, responsibility and conscience." In May
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Senator Kennedy called for reconciliation and normalization
of relations by contributions to the international relief
and rehabilitation efforts then underway but, as in the
past, the issue of reconstruction aid only generated
hostile attention in Washington.
In November 1976, a new President was elected and,
as in the case of the other three issues, a new Administra-
tion would have to tackle them.
D. CONCLUSIONS
When Gerald Ford was sworn in as President, the
economic, political and military situation in South Vietnam
was precarious.
After having avowed to carry out the "outstanding
foreign policy" of his predecessor, he proceeded to
attempt to influence Congress into reappropriating the $300
million that had been cut from the Vietnamese package three
days before he assumed office. The attitude of Congress
and the American people, for that matter, was such that it
proved to be an impossible task. Congress was concerned,
not only with continued U.S. involvement in Indochina, but
also with domestic economic problems such as inflation and
creeping unemployment. The American people were of the
opinion that they wanted to forget our involvement in
Vietnam.
Once the North Vietnamese had tested the waters of
American response to a limited offensive, and after
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becoming aware of President Thieu ' s new strategic policy of
"Light at the Top, Heavy at the Bottom, " coupled with the
domestic pressures leveled against his regime, the decision
was reached to go for total victory in 1975. This victory
came with a swiftness that clearly showed the disintegration
of the South Vietnamese society culminating in the April 30,
1975 fall of Saigon.
In the postwar phase of the ford Administration four
questions were at issue between the United States and
Vietnam. They were: (1) admission of Vietnam to the U.N.;
(2) Americans missing in action; (3) normalization of
relations, and (4) reconstruction aid. As discussed
earlier, none of these issues was ever resolved. Vietnam
was not admitted to the U.N. because of inadequate account-
ing of MIA's. The MIA issue and normalization of
relations were linked such that to the Ford Administration
"the absolute precondition (of normalization) is a complete
accounting for the missing in action." With this pre-
condition, Vietnam was required to accomplish an impossible
task. The secondary issue for normalization was Hanoi's
behavior toward its neighbors. This issue was essentially
resolved with the establishment of diplomatic relations
between Hanoi and the nations of ASEAN. The issue of
reconstruction aid never bore fruit for Hanoi because of
their "violations" of the Paris Agreement leading to their
takeover of all of Vietnam. Since none of the issues of
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the postwar era were ever resolved, they were passed on to
the Carter Administration.
Before the fall of Saigon, the Ford Administration's
outlook, in terms of our national interest model, is
difficult to assess. However, to understand that interest,
a look at the world situation would be required. During
Ford's time in office the other major international event
going on was Kissinger's Middle East shuttle diplomacy that
would eventually lead to the Camp David Agreement. Because
of the importance of this issue Secretary Kissinger made
his acrimonious statement: "The United States cannot
pursue a policy of selective reliability. We cannot abandon
friends in one part of the world (Vietnam) without
jeopardizing the security of friends everywhere...." This
would lead one to believe that the Secretary of State was
deeply concerned with the image that was being projected by
American inaction in Vietnam. In this light, then,
Vietnam would have to be perceived as a vital ideological
and world order interest.
President Ford's various statements also reflected this
point of view. Just after taking office he pledged
support for the security, independence and economic
development "to our allies and friends in Asia."
In his April 10, 1975 speech to Congress President Ford




I am. . .mindful of our posture toward the rest of the
world, and particularly of our future relations with
the free nations of Asia. These nations must not think
for a minute that the United States is pulling out on
them or intends to abandon them to aggression.
I have, therefore, concluded that the national interest
of the United States and the cause of world stability
require that we continue to give both military and^_
humanitarian assistance to the South Vietnamese. 225
Thus the matrix during the first half of the Ford
Administration would probably look like this:
Chart 7.2
NATIONAL INTEREST MATRIX-FORD
Country: U.S Issue: Vietnam 1974-75
Basic Interest at Stake Intensity of Interest
Survival Vital Major Peripheral
Defense of homeland X
Economic well-being X
Favorable world order X
Ideological X
In the postwar timeframe of the Ford Administration the
United States' vital interests in Indochina evaporated.
However, Ford and Kissinger were concerned with the reaction
of the nations of the world toward the loss of Vietnam.
In their comments on the Vietnam debacle, the President
and Secretary Kissinger did not fail to express their
concern about the way in which America's allies and
friends, in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, would view
the destruction of a longstanding American protege by
hostile forces which the United States itself appeared
unwilling to oppose either by force of arms or by
timely material aid. Conceding that little if anything
could now be done toward saving the Republic of
Vietnam in light of the restrictions imposed by Congress
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the two American spokesmen had nevertheless insisted
that the Vietnam experience must not be thought to set
a precedent for American inaction in other situations
that might arise in the future. 226
This attitude, of not seeing Vietnam as a precedent, was
shown to the world during the Mayaguez incident of mid-May
1975. When the container ship Mayaguez. was seized by
Cambodian patrol boats on May 12, the President moved
swiftly to retake it by using American military force. This
action was taken to dispel any notions of American inability
to respond to international events.
Thus, the Administration's position was that, although
Southeast Asia was not a vital interest to the United
States, it certainly was a major interest and this is the
reason for the American response to the Mayaguez takeover
by Cambodia and for the initial linking of normalization of
relations with Hanoi's to its conduct toward its ASEAN
neighbors.
As for the Administration's policy on the MIA issue, it
appears as if the hard stance taken by Ford and Kissinger
was an attempt to gain a moral victory over the Hanoi
government and even perhaps a reason to v/ithold diplomatic
recognition. The witholding of diplomatic relations and
the waging of "economic and political warfare against
other countries simply because we disagree with their
ideology" is not the way to conduct foreign relations.
"Especially in the case of smaller countries, it is clearly
not in our national interest to force a heavy dependence
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on a corapetetive power." 227 In effect this appears to be
exactly what the United States ultimately did.
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VIII. THE CARTER TERM
A. THE FIRST YEAR
When the Carter Administration took office in January
1977, they faced the same four issues that had faced the
ford Administration after the fall of the Saigon regime.
These four issues were: (1) the admission of Vietnam to
the United Nations; (2) Americans missing in action in
Indochina; (3) normalization of relations; and (4)
reconstruction aid to Indochina.
The first issue, admission of Vietnam to the United
Nations, was resolved early on. At his confirmation
hearings, Carter's ambassador-designate to the United
Nations, Andrew Young "expressed his hope that the United
States would permit Vietnam's entry into the UN at its next
application and indicated that the administration intended
to move forthrightly . . . .
"
228
When the Carter Administration took office it moved
definitively to abandon the U.N. membership question as an
issue between the United States and Vietnam. During the
formal talks with their Vietnamese counterparts, which
opened on May 3-4, 1977, the U.S. negotiators pledged that
the United States would no longer veto a Vietnamese
application for U.N. membership. This pledge was
reinforced on May 4 when Secretary of State Vance stated:
"We indicated to the Vietnamese that we are prepared not to
229
oppose their admission to the United Nations."
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Thus, on July 20, 1977, Vietnam's application to the
U.N. was approved by the Security Council without a formal
vote and on September 20, the General Assembly formalized
Vietnam's membership.
The remaining three issues, the MIA's, normalization of
relations, and reconstruction aid will be addressed
together as they evolved during the Carter Presidency.
A short month after moving into office, Secretary of
State Vance was asked, at a news conference, about his
attitude toward bilateral relations between the United
States and Vietnam. Ke responded: "I stated in my
confirmation hearings that I thought it was in the
interests of both countries to proceed toward normalization
of relations, and I hope that we will be able to start the
230process in the near future." A few days later, President
Carter announced that he was sending a five man team to
Hanoi in March to seek information on the 1,900 or so
Americans still listed as MIA in Vietnam.
The President's announcement was followed up by
Secretary Vance's statement: "I have also indicated that
we would consider it important to try and come to grips
with the missing in action question in Vietnam, so that we
231
could then begin to move toward normalization...."
A few days before the U.S. mission left for Hanoi, the
U.S. Select Committee on the Missing Persons in Southeast
Asia concluded that a full accounting of all MIA's so
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sternly demanded by former President Ford and Secretary
"
> 32Kissinger "is not possible and should not be expected.
"
Thus, when the mission, led by Leonard Woodcock,
arrived in Hanoi on March 16, the American position on the
MIA issue had shifted from a full accounting for the MIA's
to one of coming "to grips with the missing in action
question.
"
When the five man team returned to the United States,
it brought back with it the remains of twelve servicemen
and a pledge from Hanoi that a "formal undertaking to give
the U.S. all available information on the missing men as it
is found and to return remains as they are recovered and
233
exhumed." However, as successful as this mission may
have appeared, there were subtle indications that the
Vietnamese were still linking information on MIA's to the
matter of reconstruction aid. "The. .. subtle Vietnamese
approach had pointed to three key areas of discussion with
the United States: the MIA's, normalization of relations,
234
and aid. "
One positive aspect of the Woodcock mission was Hanoi's
suggestion that talks take place in Paris without any
preconditions. This apparent shift in Hanoi's position
was seized upon by President Carter. In a news conference
on March 24, he stated:
They have also suggested, and we have agreed, that we
go to Paris to negotiate further without any pre-
conditions. In the past, the Vietnamese have said that
they would not negotiate with us nor give us additional
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information about the MIA's until we had agreed to pay
reparations. They did not bring this up, which I
thought was an act of reticence on their part.235
However, on the issue of reconstruction aid, the President
left no doubt as to the position of his Administration on
that issue:
They had claimed previously that President Nixon had
agreed to pay large sums of money to Vietnam because
of damage done to their country. Our position had
been, whether or not that agreement had been made,
that the Vietnamese had violated that agreement by
intruding beyond the demilitarized zone during the
war. 236
In order to soften the firm administration stance on the
aid issue, President Carter affirmed his desire for
normalization
:
If we are convinced, as a result of the Paris negotia-
tions and other actions on the part of the Vietnamese
that they are acting in good faith, that they are
trying to help us account for our MIA's, then I would
aggressively move to. . .normalize relations with them. 237
On May 3-4, 1977, talks were held in Paris between
Richard C. Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, and Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister
Phan Hien. This first round of talks produced no joint
communique, however, a second round of talks was set up
for some time in June.
It appears as if the disagreement over how to reach the
mutual objective of normalizing relations was narrowed down
to three tangible elements:
1. the U.S. insistence on a full accounting (within
reason) for MIA's versus the Vietnamese promise that
they would try harder.
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2. the Vietnamese insistence that the United States
fulfill an obligation to contribute to the postwar
reconstruction of Vietnam versus the U.S. denial of
any legal or moral obligation.
3. the Vietnamese desire for an immediate removal of
the U.S. trade embargo versus the U.S. pledge to lift
it once embassies were established . 238
On the first issue, if the United States were convinced
of Vietnam's good faith it could be overcome. The third
issue could possibly be resolved by an acceptance by the
Vietnamese to a few months delay in the lifting of the U.S.
trade embargo. The second issue, dealing with reconstruc-
tion aid, was the main sticking point, however, an
agreement to funnel acceptable amounts of "humanitarian"
aid through secondary sources may have possibly broken
the deadlock.
Shortly after the May meeting, the House of
Representatives voted an amendment to the Foreign Aid
Appropriation Bill which prevented th Carter Administration
from negotiating "reparation, aid or any other form of
239payment" to Vietnam. This was followed up by Secretary
of State Vance, who reiterated American policy on no
reparation aid to Hanoi.
On June 2-3, the second round of talks were held in
Paris between Holbrooke and Hien. The Vietnamese
negotiator informed Holbrooke that twenty more cases of
U.S. remains had been located and were in the process of
being recovered, however, due to the issue of reconstruction
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aid, no further progress was achieved except an agreement
to meet again at a later date.
Later in the month, Congress took yet another step on
the issue of reconstruction aid when the House of
Representatives voted to formally renounce former President
Nixon's offer of $3.25 billion in postwar reconstruction
aid. This Congressional action was again followed up by
Secretary Vance a few days later when he stated: We have
240
made it very clear that no aid can be forthcoming."
However, a Congressional effort to block aid to
Vietnam by prohibiting such institutions as the World Bank,
the Asian Development Bank and others from using U.S.
funds for development in Vietnam was defeated. This gave
the Carter Administration a certain degree of flexiblility
in its efforts towards normalization of relations with
Hanoi.
Once this Congressional effort was thwarted, it was
revealed that Holbrooke had mentioned to Hein the
possibility of U.S. assistance through international
agencies. Hien was reported to have encouraged this idea
and to have stated: "As to the form of contribution, we
are flexible. We are realistic. You can give us money
in any way you want. If you think that the figure
(promised by President Nixon) is too high, we can
* ,,241discuss . "
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On December 19, Holbrooke and Kien net again in Paris
for the third round of talks on normalization. These talks
bore no fruit and it was agreed to meet again at a later
date. The Vietnamese also agreed to send a team of experts
to America's MIA identification facilities in Hawaii.
The major reasons for the lack of results during the
December talks were: (1) it would have been imprudent for
the President to expend important political capital on
Vietnam while he was pushing for passage of the highly
controversial Panama Canal Treaty; (2) working on a
possible peace conference on Israel; (3) exploring the
normalization of relations with the PRC; and (4) striving
towards an arms limitation with the Soviet Union.
As the year 1977 drew to a close, the Vietnamese and
American positions on the process for normalization looked
like this.
The Vietnamese apparently wanted to see normalization
accomplished in three phases; first, a stepped-up
search for American MIA's; second, a U.S. contribution
to Vietnamese reconstruction with further efforts to
find the missing in action; and third, the establish-
ment of normal diplomatic relations. The United
States, by contrast, preferred the establishment of
an embassy in Hanoi without conceding a specific level
of economic assistance, and with a lifting of the trade
embargo following the exchange of ambassadors . 242
B. THE SECOND YEAR
The second year of the Carter Administration saw the
undoing of any chance of the normalization of relations
between the United States and Vietnam in the near term.
179

The events that caused this undoing were the worsening of
relations between Kampuchea (Cambodia) and Vietnam
coupled with a deterioration of relations between the PRC
and Vietnam, the refugee exodus from Vietnam, Vietnam's
entrance into COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance) on June 29, 1978, the Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Vietnam of
November 3, and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea on
Christmas day. Two other events of significance in the
unravelling of the normalization process between the
United States and Vietnam took place in early 1979. They
were the normalization of relations between Washington and
Beijing on January 1, and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam
on February 17.
Since the Pol Pot regime came to power in April 1975,
it had been at odds with Hanoi. On several occasions his
regime had instigated border skirmishes and carried out
one major military thrust into Vietnam in October 1977.
Three months later, on December 31, Cambodia severed all
ties with Vietnam. Vietnam called for a cease-fire and
the establishment of a demilitarized zone along the
border. This and other calls for a resolution to the
crisis went unheeded.
The most likely reason for Cambodia's actions was its
support from Beijing which immediately brings up the
issue of the deterioration of relations between China and
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Vietnam. Many events of 1978 were symptomatic of the
hostilites between these two Communist nations , such as
the expulsion of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam, China's
termination of all aid to Vietnam, and the increase in the
number of border incidents between them, however, the
reality of the deterioration of relations was that,
China was trying to maintain a Balkanized, superpower
—
free Southeast Asia as part of its security on the
southern flank, and Vietnam had ambitions of emerging
as a powerful vanguard nation in the region. 24
3
When Vietnam became a member of COMECON in June, this
further exacerbated relations between Beijing and Hanoi.
For Beijing because it squarely placed the possibility of
a Soviet military threat on its southern flank and for
Hanoi because of its economic and military needs for a
counterbalance to the encircling threat it perceived from
China and Kampuchea.
When the Russo-Vietnamese treaty was signed in
November, Sino-Vietnamese relations neared the breaking
point. To Beijing the treaty was a military alliance
directed against China. To Vietnam it was, and still is,
a significant counterbalance to the substantial threat it
perceives directed against it from its Communist neighbor
to the north.
When Vietnam invaded Cambodia on December 2 5 and
captured the capital, Phnom Penh on January 7, 1979, China
was forced to react or face international humiliation at
the hands of Hanoi.
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Shortly after his return from touring the United
States, Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Politburo decided
to retaliate and on February 17, 1979, China launched an
attack against Vietnam.
With this brief historical sketch of 1978 and early
1979 let us now return to the evolution of events between
the United States and Vietnam.
In January 1978 the Vietnamese Ambassador to the U.N.
was indicted as a coconspirator in an espionage case. The
Ambassador was asked to leave the United States and "there
was a considerable pause in communications from the
244Vietnamese. " In May the January espionage case was
resolved and shortly thereafter Hanoi expressed its
willingness to come to Hawaii and tour the MIA idenifica-
tion facility.
Following the successful visit in July (to Hawaii)
,
the Vietnamese again began to indicate a desire to
meet with U.S. representatives and hinted publicly
and to other governments that they might be on the
verge of dropping their demand that U.S. economic
assistance be part of an agreement to normalize
relations. 24 5
Faced with the conflict with Cambodia and the growing
tension with the PRC, it appears as if Vietnam had
decided that diplomatic relations with the United States
had become too important to be left to a future date.
These two factors coupled with the poor economic develop-
ments of 1977 and early 1978, and a genuine desire to
diversify its economic dependence, Vietnam "put the ball
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in the American court by announcing Hanoi's desire to
. . 246
normalize without preconditions." However, when a
Congressional delegation visited Hanoi in August it "was
unable to elicit a direct statement that the Vietnamese
247
were no longer demanding an advance commitment on aid."
Also in August, the Hanoi government began allowing
American dependents of Vietnamese descent to leave
Vietnam for the United States. This move was taken to
further pave the way towards normalization.
In September 1978, several rounds of informal talks
were held between the United States and Vietnam.
Initially, the Vietnamese appeared reluctant to
abandon their position on aid but eventually stated
flatly that they would no longer demand a U.S. commit-
ment on bilateral economic assistance as a quid pro
quo for normalization. In addition, the Vietnamese
indicated they would continue to make efforts to
provide us with an MIA accounting . 248
After this major concession from Vietnam, Holbrooke
and Vietnamese Vice-Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach
turned to the practical problems of embassy buildings and
other facilities that would be needed for American
diplomats in Hanoi.
It was quite obvious now that Vietnam wanted
normalization with the United States in order to maintain
the regional balance of power in the region. Vietnam
certainly feared the threat posed to it from China and in
an effort to preclude its total dependence on Russia,
Hanoi withdrew the one obstacle that had been at the
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heart of the deadlock on the normalization process with
the United States. The stage now appeared set for the
normalization of relations on January 1, 1979, in
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conjunction with the US-PRC normalization.
However, in the next two months three significant
events occurred that were a precursor to the end of the
normalization process in the near term. These three
events were the dramatic increase in the refugee exodus,
the escalating Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict, and the
Russo-Vietnamese treaty.
"We requested that the Vietnamese inform us of their
intentions toward Kampuchea. . .We also asked for clarifica-




and "we expressed deep concern over the growing refugee
250
exodus from Vietnam."
The Vietnamese felt that these American questions
were being raised "before allowing normalization" in order
251to extract further concessions from Hanoi. On the
American side, the Administration was displeased with
Hanoi's responses and in this light "movement toward
normalization came to a halt as we awaited further
252developments .
"
On December 25, Vietnam invaded Kampuchea and
installed a puppet regime in Phnom Penh.
The Carter White House repeatedly called on Hanoi to
withdraw its troops, seeking the establishment of a
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neutral regime in Kampuchea. These and other calls, both
from the U.S. and the international community, went
unheeded. Thus, "our caution in not moving further
253(towards normalization) last fall was justified."
C. THE FINAL TWO YEARS
Since the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, America's
position on the normalization of relations with Vietnam
has been the withdrawal of its combat forces from
Kampuchea and a change in its policy which is generating
a large number of refugees.
When the U.S. trade embargo on Vietnam came up for
review in 1979, President Carter renewed it as a signal to
hanoi that at present normalization was out of the
question.
In June 1979, Hanoi made an overture on the
Kampuchean issue in an effort to get a resumption of the
steps towards normalization. This overture stipulated
that Vietnam would withdraw its forces from Kampuchea and
establish a coalition government, even with Prince
Norodom Sihanouk at its head, provided "that the steering
of the government would. . .remain essentially in the hands
254
of the Communist Party of Kampuchea."
To many Western leaders this overture was seen merely
as another Vietnamese maneuver. A senior Western
diplomat stated "They keep making vague proposals and
flying trial balloons to create confusion but they have
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shown no indication of abandoning their desire to
255dominate Indochina." This statement seemed to reflect
Washington's view of the situation in Indochina.
The only other significant event in US-Vietnamese
relations in 1979, was the visit of three Congressional
delegations to Hanoi. These delegations were urged by the
Vietnamese to seek normalization of relations but in each
instance the delegations called on Hanoi to first resolve
the Kampuchean and refugee issues.
In April 1980, Assistant Secretary Holbrooke stated
the Administration's view on Indochina in an address
before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He
stated:
...the greatest single threat to peace in East Asia
in the 1980 's still remains the unresolved situation
in Indochina. .. .The root cause of this situation
remains Vietnamese actions: First, Hanoi's long-
standing dream of dominating all of Indochina; second,
their increasing dependence on the Soviet Union and
the growing Soviet use of Vietnamese territory as a
strategic foothold in Southeast Asia...; Third, the
continuing Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, and
the creation of the refugees along the Thai border;
Fourth, the threat that the Vietnamese hold over
their neighbors that they will unleash a new wave of
boat refugees. 2 56
Later in this address, Holbrooke held out an olive
branch to the Vietnamese for future relations with the
United States. He noted that "if they choose the path of
cooperation (in resolving the Indochina crisis) , then the
ASEAN countries, Japan, the United States, and other
nations are ready to work with them in a peaceful
forward-looking Southeast Asia," however, he cautioned
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that "we are not interested in producing a negotiated
257
acceptance of the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea."
In June of 1980, Hanoi took a further step away from
seeking a resolution to the Indochina crisis and thus
getting the normalization process with the United States
back on track when Vietnamese troops crossed into Thai
territory after suspected pockets of Kampuchean resis-
tance forces. The Carter Administration reacted to this
Vietnamese action by stating "The United States strongly
condemns Vietnam's military attack on Thai territory
2 5 3beginning June 23," and by stepping-up deliveries of
military equipment to the Bangkok government.
In October, Hanoi allowed two American officials to
travel to Vietnam to discuss MIA's. However, Hanoi
stated very clearly "that so long as the U.S. continued to
play the China card little progress could be expected on
259finding MIA's in Vietnam."
In the same month, the United States successfully
opposed Moscow's and Hanoi's attempt to seat the puppet
regime of Heng Samrin in the UN in place of the Pol Pot
government
.
As the Carter Administration drew to a close, the
normalization of relations between the United States and
Vietnam was further away than it had been on the day that




When President Carter came into office he faced the
same four issues that his predecessor had faced after April
30, 1975. One of these issues, Vietnam's admittance to the
UN, was resolved early on.
During the first year in office, the Carter
Administration moved methodically on the other three
issues, the MIA's normalization of relations, and
reconstruction aid, culminating in what appeared to be a
final solution.
The United States got everything it sought from
Vietnam. Hanoi finally agreed to continue its efforts in
searching for MIA's and dropped its insistence on some
form of aid prior to recognition. In spite of this,
normalization did not take place as the long process of
negotiations was overtaken by events.
Many people have blamed the Carter Administration for
the failure to achieve normalized relations with Vietnam.
On some counts there is a degree of truth in the matter.
When the Congressional attempt to block aid to Vietnam
through international institutions was narrowly defeated,
an opportunity to work out a deal was lost. However, part
of the reason for the missed opportunity was other
international interests of the Administration, such as the
Panama Canal Treaty, the evolving Middle East peace
process, US-PRC relations, and the SALT II process, which
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at that point in time were of greater importance to the
President.
Major domestic considerations at the time were adverse
public opinion and the upcoming Congressional elections the
following fall.
In mid-1978, when Vietnam appeared on the verge of
lifting its demand for reconstruction aid, another
opportunity was lost. The Administration could have used
three methods to entice Vietnam. The first could have been
the offer of "humanitarian" aid channeled through
international institutions, the second could have been a
partial lifting of the American embargo on Vietnam, or a
combination of the two. However, the U.S. wanted a cut and
dried yes or no from Vietnam on its position on the
linkage of the aid issue to normalization.
By the time Vietnam gave its response in September
1978, international events were about to overtake the
normalization process.
From at least mid-1978 on, the Hanoi regime was
desperately seeking normalization with the United States.
Vietnam hoped to be able to balance Soviet influence with
that of the United States and in turn work with both of
these nations against its number one threat: the PRC.
The slowness of the American response coupled with
Vietnam's increasingly serious rift with China left Hanoi




The reasons for the failure to reach normalization,
according to Washington, were Vietnam's military build-up
along its border with Kampuchea, the increasing tempo of
refugees, and Hanoi's treaty with the Soviet Union,
However, by this time US-PRC relations were very close to
a complete normalization which may well have caused what
appeared to be a delay in Washington's reaction to Hanoi's
initiative. This factor, if true, proved to be the
undoing of the normalization process between Hanoi and
Washington.
After Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea the normalization
process was back at square one. The United States took the
position that Hanoi had to remove its troops from Kampuchea,
and the establishment of a sovereign coalition government
and resolve the refugee problem before the normalization
process could be resumed. Vietnam on the other hand took
the position that no further progress on the MIA question
could be expected as long as the United States played the
China card.
Thus, when President Carter left office in January 1981,
the situation in Indochina was the worst it had been since
the fall of Saigon.
In turning to our national interest matrix, the Carter
Administration outlook on Vietnam would probably look like





Country: U.S. Issue: Vi etnam








Defense of homeland X
Economic well-being X
Favorable world order X
Ideological X
To President Carter, the stability of Southeast Asia
was a major interest. In order to satisfy this interest he
sought to normalize relations with Vietnam within the
constraints of Congressional legislation and public
opinion.
The Administration recognized the importance of
normalization. In a news conference Secretary Vance noted
that "we believe in a return toward normalization of
relations between Vietnam and the United States is in the
2 6interest of both countries..." In the interest of the
United States as a measure of influence in the stability
of the entire region, and in the interest of Vietnam as a
way to "balance their freindship with us with their
2 61friendship with the Soviet Union."
Had the United States and Vietnam pursued the
normalization process a little bit more aggressively, it is
possible that the events of late 1978 and early 1979, the
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Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the subsequent
Chinese attack against Vietnam, may have been averted
192

IX. A STRATEGY FOR INDOCHINA
A. THE OBJECTIVES
The climax of this study is to set forth a strategy
based on the political, economic and military needs of all
the regional actors: the United States, Vietnam, China,
ASEAN (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the
Republic of the Philippines) , Japan, and the Soviet Union.
In order to do this it seems appropriate to examine
the interests of these nations vis-a-vis Indochina in
order to add depth and perspective to those interests
which will condition the policies of both the US and
Vietnam.
In conclusion a strategy will be proposed which takes
into account the interests of the regional actors. It will
cite the objectives of all the actors and a means to
resolve the outstanding issues leading to regional peace
and stability.
For the United States, the primary objective is to
counter Soviet military presence in the states of
Indochina (SRV, Laos, and Kampuchea) and to diminish
Russian political and economic influence. A corollary
objective of the United States to the minimization of
Soviet military influence in the region is the development
of regional stability. According to Richard Holbrooke,
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We have explored with all how we might proceed toward
a political settlement which at a minimum would promote
the key goals of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops
from Kampuchea, the emergence of a genuinely indepen-
dent and neutral Kampuchea at peace with its neighbors
and with a government which represents its people and
respects their rights, and the return to regional
stability and balance by the elimination of the Soviet
military intrusion in the region. 262
The third objective of the United States vis-a-vis the
region is the economic development of all of Southeast
Asia for the benefit, not only of the American economic
sector, but also for the economies of the region.
For the SRV, the primary objective is to have and
maintain a relationship or a group of relationships as a
counterweight to the primary threat: the PRC. As is well
known, at present the SRV has a Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation with the Soviet Union. It is believed that,
given the right set of circumstances, the SRV would opt
for a different set of relationships which involved the
United States, Japan, ASEAN, and Western Europe as a
counterweight to the Chinese threat, with the long term
goal of diminishing the present total reliance on the
Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc nations. In addition
this would permit the SRV flexibility to play the USSR
and the PRC off against one another.
Another objective of the SRV is to consolidate its
sphere of influence in Indochina. A sphere of influence is
a term which has a wide spectrum going from the satelliza-
tion of Kampuchea and Laos to a sovereign Kampuchea and
194

Laos that are subject to Vietnamese influence in foreign
policy matters affecting the security of the SRV
(Finlandization)
.
A third objective the SRV seeks deals with its
relations with the PRC. It entails the resolution of the
differences betwen these two nations in areas such as
territorial disputes, the overseas Chinese issue, and
China's recognition of the SRV's form of communist
revolution (ideology as a function of the legitimacy
issue) . Vietnam also seeks tacit recognition of its
influence in Laos and Kampuchea.
The final objective of Vietnam is the economic re-
construction and development of its country through the
support of the West and various international organizations
It should be recognized that the SRV cannot and will not
give up its autonomy for assistance. Herein lies the
greatest weakness of the Soviet Union and potentially the
greatest strength of the United States, ASEAN, the West and
Japan.
For the PRC, the major objective is to remove all
Soviet influence from the region. In terms of Indochina,
the PRC seeks to preclude any one state from dominating
all of that region and in reference to military alliances
and basing rights within the three Indochinese nations,
Zhou Enlai once stated,
We note that... the three states of Indochina will
refrain from joining any military alliance, and that
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the establishment of military bases on their perspec-
tive territories by any foreign country will not be
allowed. 263
All of the above objectives reflect China's goal of a
"Balkanized superpower-free Southeast Asia as part of its
264
security on the southern flank."
Other objectives of the PRC include the normalization
of relations with those ASEAN states with which it does not
have such relations, Indonesia, and Singapore, and the
economic development of its vast territory along the line
of its "Four Modernizations."
As for the nations of ASEAN, their primary objective
in the region entails stability based on the principle of
ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace Friendship and Neutrality) . They
seek to remove the Russian presence from the region,
increase American influence as a counterweight to the PRC,
and incorporate Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea into ZOPFAN
which in turn will hopefully end Vietnamese exportation of
revolutionary support to the communist parties in the
region.
The second major objective of ASEAN falls under the
heading of economic development. They seek expanded
economic assistance for development from Japan, the United
States, and Western Europe. Furthermore, they seek
expanded economic ties between the PRC and ASEAN, the
Indochinese states and ASEAN and the PRC and Indochinese
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states. One area of economic concern for ASEAN is its
competition and balance of payments deficit with the PRC.
A corollary objective of the first two is the
resolution of the refugee problems within the region which,
if the first two objectives could be achieved, would in all
likelihood be resolved.
For the Japanese, the primary objective is in fact a
combination of its three main objectives in the region.
They are the removal of Soviet presence in Southeast Asia,
the ability to secure sources of raw materials for their
industrial base, and the development of regional peace
and stability by the resolution of the Indochinese
conflict. The conclusion of the three interrelated
objectives would then give Japan the opportunity to play
a large economic role in the region as a benefit, not only
to the Japanese nation, but also to the nations comprising
the Southeast Asian region.
Soviet objectives in the region include the maintenance
of its foothold in Southeast Asia in order to: (1) pose a
threat to China's southern flank; (2) counterbalance U.S.
presence in the region; (3) in conjunction with its
military buildup in Northeast Asia, be in a position to
threaten Japan's access to raw materials in order to
attempt to isolate the Japanese nation in the event of
hostilities; and (4) to exert pressure on ASEAN resulting
in effects on their position in the Sino/Soviet split,
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US-USSR competition, their relations with Japan, and
possibly their stance on issues in the United Nations.
Russia's position in Southeast Asia must also be
looked at in terms not only of the Sino/Soviet rivalry but
also in terms of Moscow's goal of worldwide influence.
Having looked at the objectives, there is the
commonality of views between the United States, the PRC,
ASEAN, and Japan that: (1) the Soviet influence in the
region must not become preponderant; (2) economic develop-
ment is essential; and (3) peace and stability in the
region is necessary.
Certain commonalities also exist between the SRV and
the above nations. These are: (1) economic development;
and (2) regional peace and stability. Of course for
Vietnam, regional peace and stability requires a form of
security that stands opposed to the PRC and Hanoi also
wants to maintain its influence in Laos and Kampuchea.
On the other hand, unlike the numerous common interests
of the other nations in the region, the Soviet Union almost
stands alone in terms of its lack of common interests in
the region. Moscow is seeking to maintain or increase its
influence in the region in terms of the Sino/Soviet conflict
and in terms of its worldwide goals. The Soviet Union does
not wish to see the evolution of a region of peace and




The plan for Southeast Asia envisions the withdrawal of
Vietnamese military forces from Kampuchea with a mutual
easing of tensions between the PRC and the SRV and the
establishment of a coalition government in Phnom Penh. It
also reflects the need for the economic integration of
sovereign Indochinese states into a regional economic
order with ASEAN and China with economic support from
Japan and the West.
The withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea, the
easing of SRV-PRC tensions, and the establishment of a
coalition government in Phnom Penh must occur more or less
simultaneously
.
The coalition government will have a nominal head in
the person of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and will consist of
three major elements: the Khmer Serai (non-communist
Kampuchean elements) , the Khmer Rouge (communist elements
of the Pol Pot regime) , and elements of the present Heng
Samrin government which will "ensure a degree of
2 6 5Kampuchean independence vis-a-vis the Vietnamese."
One recognizable aspect of a Kampuchean state is that
it will have to demonstrate a certain degree of deference
to the Hanoi government on issues which affect the
security of Vietnam. An example of the kind of issue
inferred would be Kampuchea's relationship with the PRC.
The deference perceived in Kampuchea-Vietnamese relations
199

is that similar to Russo-Finish relations. This could be
formalized by a Peace, Friendship, and Non-Aggression
treaty that agrees to 'consultations on issues affecting
the region 1 and 'is not directed against any other nation.'
The easing of tensions between Hanoi and Beijing is an
important aspect of the overall plan. That this fact is an
important point was clearly stated recently by an
Indonesian official:
Our concern is that the continued conflict between
ASEAN and Hanoi and the Chinese threat are going to
make Vietnam more and more dependent on Moscow....
I
would like to see Vietnam develop into a Yugoslavia.
I am sure they (the Vietnamese) would become one if
they are given an alternative source of support. 266
The effort to ease tensions between the PRC and the SRV
should result after the opening of a series of bi-lateral
talks dealing with the entire region. The common goal of
these two nations should be the decrease of Soviet
influence in the region, although for different reasons.
For the Chinese as an effort to safeguard their southern
flank from the Russian threat and for the Vietnamese as a
means towards detaching itself from total dependence on the
Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. This is important to
the SRV so that it does not eventually have to give in
unconditionally to Soviet demands as Cuba eventually did.
However, for Vietnam this will necessitate the normali-
zation of relations with the United States and Western
Europe and the improvement in relations with the Japanese
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in order to have a viable alternative to its security and
economic needs
.
During these series of bi-lateral talks, the formation
of the coalition government should be resolved with the
acceptance by all sides that countrywide elections be held
under the auspices of the regional nations or some other
body agreeable to all sides.
The issue of economic integration of the Indochinese
nations into some mutually agreeable form with ASEAN and
China should be resolved.
Economic integration should be resolved on three levels
:
First, within Indochina itself to resolve transportation
problems, water resource problems, development of the
I4ekong River project, rice to market problems, and so on.
The aid for this level should come from various national
and international sources in order to present mutli-
national overtones, and should be directed into an
Indochinese Development Project.
Second, as the Indochinese Development Project gets off
the ground, a multi-lateral approach between it and ASEAN
should be developed. Again in this instance multi-national
aid should be sought to preclude charges of single nation
influence. This level would be a natural spinoff from the
first level due to ASEAN ' s proximity to Indochina, as a
counterbalance to the PRC, and because of the mutual
benefits which could be derived such as food from Indochina
for manufactured goods from ASEAN.
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Third, with the inclusion of the PRC. This level would
be more along the lines of trade rather than integration
although in the long term could result in integration along
the lines of OPTAD (Organization for Pacific Trade and
Development)
.
During the first level and second level of economic
integration, the United States, Japan, and Western Europe
should be kept apprized and should make whatever reasonable
contributions necessary for the successful conclusion of
this part of the bi-lateral talks.
Thus, we have a series of bi-lateral talks that
progressively propose the resolution of the Indochinese
conflict by the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from
Kampuchea, the easing of PRC-SRV tensions, the establishment
of a coalition government in Phnom Penh, and the economic
integration of the regional actors.
C. TEE IMPLEMENTATION
One of the primary prerequisites of the plan is that it
be carried out with as little publicity as possible. It
must not become an overt issue in the Sino/Soviet split nor
should it become an issue in US-USSR competition or be
presented in terms that appear as overt US-PRC competition.
If any of the three eventualities should materialize then
the plan will ultimately fail to bear fruit.
To get Japan into a more assertive and independent
foreign policy role, the Japanese, keeping the US informed,
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should conduct continuous consultations with the Chinese
at every level to work out an agenda.
This is to be followed up by Japanese discussions with
Hanoi on an agenda in an effort to produce a format
acceptable to both China and the SRV.
A short time later a spokesman for ASEAN would proceed
to Tokyo to present those agenda items of major concern to
these nations. ASEAN must be perceived as acting
independently of US influence which will strengthen the
position of this regional body vis-a-vis not only the US
but also the USSR, the PRC, and the Third World non-
aligned movement.
Once these steps have been carefully carried out,
intermediaries consisting perhaps of Burma, Yugoslavia, and
Australia would work behind the scenes to develop an
agreement that resolves the majority of the issues for all
nations concerned.
Some indicative gestures from the SRV, the PRC, the
United States, Japan, and ASEAN would be made to demon-
strate intent. The SRV could decrease the flow of refugees,
withdraw some of its forces from the Thai-Kampuchean border,
and issue a favorable message on any given number of
Chinese events.
The PRC could tone down its ideological attacks on the
SRV, pull some of its forces back from the Sino-Vietnamese
border, agree to a genuine change of leadership in the
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Khmer Rouge, and issue a positive message on the
anniversary of the Lao Dong Party (the SRV ' s communist
party) , which implies recognition of the legitimacy of
Vietnam's form of communist revolution.
As Vietnam began to decrease the flow of refugees and
through its withdrawal of its troops from the Thai-
Kampuchean border, the United States, based on an SRV
initiative, could then agree to initiate secret bi-lateral
talks at an agreeable location with the ultimate goal of
normalizing relations with the SRV.
Inherent problems in this discourse would be the MIA
issue and possibly a renewed SRV demand for economic aid.
A Vietnamese gesture of returning the remains of any MIA's
coupled with an agreement by the United States to favor
some form of aid through international organizations
could go a long way towards resolving these issues.
The greatest gesture Japan could make during this period
would be to agree to provide a nominal amount of aid to
Vietnam with the concurrence of Washington.
During this timeframe, the nations of ASEAN could
privately signal a recognition of Vietnam's security
requirements in Indochina through the Burmese intermedi-
aries, Indonesia and Singapore could normalize relations
with the PRC, and these nations could propose long term
economic ties between themselves and the states of
Indochina. The ties could be of mutual benefit with the
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rice basket of Southeast Asia producing food in exchange
for light technology items and technical assistance in
light industry.
Once these gestures are set in motion, and the inter-
mediaries have worked out most of the problems of the
agreed agenda, a regional conference could be held in
Rangoon
.
Out of the conference would come the formalization of
the agenda worked out by the intermediaries resulting in
Vietnam's withdrawal of its forces from Kampuchea and a
coalition government that is acceptable to both Hanoi and
Beijing. This coalition government would need to
demonstrate a correct deference to the security require-
ments of the SRV. China would have to tacitly recognize
Vietnam's sphere of influence, as described earlier, in
the Indochina area and Vietnam would likewise need to
tacitly recognize China's security needs on its southern
flank. The improvement of relations between the PRC and
the SRV through the resolution of their border dispute
and the ethnic Chinese issue would also result.
Economic relations would be established linking the
regional actors in a drive towards modernization and most
importantly the decrease of Soviet influence in the
region would result.
As the conference is nearing a successful conclusion,
the United States and the SRV would then normalize
20 5

relations culminating in a basis for regional peace and
stability.
Undoubtedly this whole process is in the American
national interest. By diminishing the Soviet influence
and decreasing the Russian military threat to this
geostrategically important region, the United States and
all the regional actors protect their interests in a





JOINT RESOLUTION, U.S. CONGRESS
["Tonkin Gulf Resolution"] August 7, 196 4
TO PROMOTE TEE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam,
in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and of international law, have deliberately and
repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully
present in international waters, and have thereby created
a serious threat to international peace; and
Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and
systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime
in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and
the nations joined with them in the collective defense of
their freedom; and
Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of
southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no
territorial, military or political ambitions in that area,
but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace
to work out their destinies in their own way: Now, there-
fore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of




That the Congress approves and supports the determination
of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all
necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the
forces of the United States and to prevent further
aggression.
SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its
national interest and to world peace the maintenance of
international peace and security in southeast Asia.
Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the
Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its
obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the
President determines, to take all necessary steps,
including the use of armed force, to assist any member or
protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.
SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when the
President shall determine that the peace and security of the
area is reasonably assured by international conditions
created by action of the United Nations or otherwise,
except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent





Address by President Ford at the East-West Center, Honolulu,
at the conclusion of his Pacific journey, December 7, 1975.
...It is good to be home again in the United States. I
have just completed, as many of you know, a 7-day trip to
the State of Alaska, to the People's Republic of China, to
our good friends, Indonesia and the Philippines, and now I
am obviously happy to be home in our 50th State, Hawaii.
This morning I reflected on the past at the shrine of
Americans who died on Sunday morning 34 years ago. I came
away with a new spirit of dedication to the ideals that
emerged from Pearl Harbor in World War II—dedication to
America's bipartisan policy of pursuing peace through
strength and dedication to a new future of interdependence
and cooperation with all peoples of the Pacific.
I subscribe to a Pacific doctrine of peace with all and
hostility towards none. The way I would like to remember
or recollect Pearl Harbor is by preserving the power of
the past to build the future. Let us join with new and old
countries of that great Pacific area in creating the
greatest civilization on the shores of the greatest of our
oceans
.
My visit here to the East-West Center holds another
kind of meaning. Your center is a catalyst of America's
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positive concern for Asia, its people and its rich
diversity of cultures. You advance our hope that Asia will
gain a better understanding of the United States.
Last year we were pleased to receive and to welcome
nearly 54,000 Asian students to the United States while
thousands upon thousands of American students went to Asian
countries. I applaud your contribution to partnership in
education. Your efforts represent America's vision of an
open world of understanding, freedom, and peace.
In Hawaii, the crossroads of the Pacific, our past and
our future join.
I was deeply moved when I visited Japan last year and
when I recently had the honor of welcoming the Emperor and
the Empress of Japan to America. The gracious welcome that
I received and the warmth of the welcome the American
people bestowed upon the Emperor and the Empress testify to
a growing friendship and partnership between our two great
countries. This is a tribute to what is best in man—his
capacity to grow from fear to trust and from a tragedy of
the past to a hopeful future. It is a superb example of
what can be achieved in human progress. It inspires our
new efforts in Asia to improve relations.
America, a nation of the Pacific Basin, has a very
vital stake in Asia and a responsibility to take a leading
part in lessening tensions, preventing hostilities, and
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preserving peace. World stability and our own security
depend upon our Asian commitments.
In 1941, 34 years ago today, we were militarily
unprepared. Our trade in the Pacific was very limited. We
exercised jurisdiction over the Philippines. We were pre-
occupied with Western Europe. Our instincts were
isolationist.
We have transcended that age. We are now the world's
strongest nation. Our great commercial involvement in Asia
is expanding. We led the way in conferring independence
upon the Philippines. Now we are working out new
associations and arrangements with the trust territories of
the Pacific.
The center of political power in the United States has
shifted westward. Our Pacific interests and concerns have
increased. We have exchanged the freedom of actions of an
isolationist state for the responsibilities of a great
global power. As I return from this trip to three major
Asian countries, I am even more aware of our interests in
this part of the world.
The security concerns of great world powers intersect
in Asia. The United States, the Soviet Union, China, and
Japan are all Pacific powers. Western Europe has historic
and economic ties with Asia. Equilibrium in the Pacific is
absolutely essential to the United States and to the other
countries in the Pacific.
211

The first premise of a new Pacific Doctrine is that
American strength is basic to any stable balance of power
in the Pacific. We must reach beyond our concern for
security. But without security , there can be neither peace
nor progress. The preservation of the sovereignty and the
independence of our Asian friends and allies remain a
paramount objective of American policy.
We recognize that force alone is insufficient to assure
security. Popular legitimacy and social justice are vital
prerequisites of resistance against subversion or aggres-
sion. Nevertheless, we owe it to ourselves and to those
whose independence depends upon our continued support to
preserve a flexible and balanced position of strength
throughout the Pacific.
The second basic premise of a new Pacific Doctrine is
that partnership with Japan is a pillar of our strategy.
There is not relationship to which I have devoted more
attention, nor is there any greater success story in the
history of American efforts to relate to distant cultures
and to people. The Japanese-American relationship can be a
source of great, great pride to every American and to
every Japanese. Cur bilateral relations have never been
better. The recent exchange of visits symbolized a basic
political partnership. We have begun to develop with the
Japanese and other advanced industrial democracies better
means of harmonizing our economic policy. We are joining
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with Japan, our European friends, and representatives of the
developing nations this month to begin shaping a more
efficient and more equitable pattern of North-South economic
relations
.
The third premise of a new Pacific Doctrine is the
normalization of relations with the People's Republic of
China, the strengthening of our new ties with this great
nation representing nearly one-quarter of mankind. This is
another recent achievement of American foreign policy. It
transcends 25 years of hostility.
I visited China to build on the dialogue started nearly
4 years ago. My wide-ranging exchanges with the leaders of
the People's Republic of China—with Chairman Mao Zedong
and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping—enhanced our understanding
of each other's views and each other's policies.
There were, as expected, differences of perspective.
Our societies, our philosophies, our varying positions in
the world give us differing perceptions of our respective
national interests.
But we did find a common ground. We reaffirmed that we
share very important areas of concern and agreement. They
say and we say that the countries of Asia should be free
to develop in a world where there is mutual respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states; where
people are free from the threat of foreign aggression;
where there is noninterference in the internal affairs of
others; and where the principles of equality, mutual
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benefit, and coexistence shape the development of peaceful
international order. We share opposition to any form of
hegemony in Asia or in any other part of the world.
I reaffirmed the determination of the United States to
complete the normalization of relations with the People's
Republic of China on the basis of the Shanghai communique.
Both sides regarded our discussion as significant, useful,
and constructive. Our relationship is becoming a permanent
feature of the international political landscape. It
benefits not only our two peoples but all peoples of the
region and the entire world.
A fourth principle of our Pacific policy is our
continuing stake in stability and security in Southeast Asia,
After leaving China, I visited Indonesia and the
Philippines. Indonesia is a nation of 140 million people,
the fifth largest population in the world today. It is one
of our important new friends and a major country in that
area of the world. The Republic of the Philippines is one
of our oldest and dearest allies. Our friendship demonstra-
tes America's longstanding interest in Asia.
I spent 3 days in Djakarta and Manila. I would have
liked to have had time to visit our friends in Thailand,
Singapore, and Malaysia. We share important political and
economic concerns with these five nations who make up the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
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I can assure you that Americans will be hearing much
more about the ASEAN organization. All of its members are
friends of the United States. Their total population
equals our own. While they are developing countries, they
possess many, many assets—vital peoples, abundant natural
resources, and well-managed agricultures. They have skilled
leaders and the determination to develop themselves and to
solve their own problems.
Each of these countries protects its independence by
relying on its own national resilience and diplomacy. We
must continue to assist them. I learned during my visit
that our friends want us to remain actively engaged in the
affairs of the region. We intend to do so.
We retain close and valuable ties with our old friends
and allies in the Southwest Pacific—Australia on the one
hand and New Zealand on the other.
A fifth tenet of our new Pacific policy is our belief
that peace in Asia depends upon a resolution of outstanding
political conflicts. In Korea, tension persists. We have
close ties with the Republic of Korea. And we remain
committed to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, as
the presence of our forces there attests.
Responding to the heightened tension last spring, we
reaffirmed our support of the Republic of Korea. Today, the
United States is ready to consider constructive ways of
easing tensions on the peninsula. But we will continue to
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resist any moves which attempt to exclude the Republic of
Korea from discussion of its own future. ,
In Indochina, the healing effects of time are required.
Our policies toward the new regimes of the peninsula will
be determined by their conduct toward us. We are prepared
to reciprocate gestures of good will
—
particularly the
return of remains of Americans killed or missing in action
or information about them. If they exhibit restraint
toward their neighbors and constructive approaches to
international problems, we will look to the future rather
than to the past.
The sixth point of our new policy in the Pacific is that
peace in Asia requires a structure of economic cooperation
reflecting the aspiration of all the peoples in the region.
The Asian-Pacific economy has recently achieved more
rapid growth than any other region in the world. Our trade
with East Asia now exceeds our transactions with the
European community. America's jobs, currency, and raw
materials depend upon economic ties with the Pacific Basin.
Our trade with the region is now increasing by more than
30 percent annually, reaching some $46 billion last year.
Our economies are increasingly interdependent as cooperation
grows between developed and developing nations.
Our relations with the five ASEAN countries are marked
by growing maturity and by more modest and more realistic
expectations on both sides. We no longer approach them as
donor to dependent. These proud people look to us less for
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outright aid than for new trading opportunities and more
equitable arrangements for the transfer of science and
technology.
There is one common theme which was expressed to me by
the leaders of every Asian country that I visited. They all
advocate the continuity of steady and responsible American
leadership. They seek self-reliance in their own future and
in their own relations with us.
Our military assistance to allies and friends is a
modest responsibility, but its political significance far
surpasses the small cost involved. We serve our highest
national interests by strengthening their self-reliance
,
their relations with us, their solidarity with each other,
and their regional security.
I emphasized to every leader I met that the United
States is a Pacific nation. I pledged, as President, I will
continue America's active concern for Asia and our presence
in the Asian-Pacific region.
Asia is entering a new era. We can contribute to a new
structure of stability founded on a balance among the major
powers, strong ties to our allies in the region, and easing
of tension between adversaries, the self-reliance and
regional solidarity of smaller nations, and expanding
economic ties and cultural exchanges. These components of
peace are already evident. Our foreign policy in recent
years and in recent days encourages their growth.
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If we can remain steadfast, historians will look back
and view the 1970s as the beginning of a period of peaceful
cooperation and progress, a time of growing community for
all the nations touched by this great ocean.
Here in the Pacific crossroads of Hawaii, we envision
hope for a wider community of man. Vie see the promise of a
unique republic which includes all the world's races. No
other country has been so truly a free, multiracial society
America's Pacific heritage emerged from this remarkable
State. I am proud to visit Hawaii—the island star in the
American firmament which radiates the universal magic of
Aloha
.
Let there flow from Hawaii—and from all of the States
in our Union—to all peoples, East and West, a new spirit
of interchange to build human brotherhood.















Kissinger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State William Sullivan, and State Depart-
ment Legal Advisor George Aldrich return
to Paris to meet with Xuan Thuy. Le Due
Tho is in Hanoi.
Nixon informs Hanoi that the draft agree-
ment is acceptable to the U.S.
Kissinger and Sullivan visit Saigon:
meetings are held with Thieu.
five
Thieu briefs political party and govern-
ment officials on the objectionable
provisions of the draft agreement.
Hanoi radio broadcasts details of the
draft agreement.
GVN Senate votes to reject a tripartite
government of national concord as part
of an overall settlement. Similar action
is taken in the lower house on October 27,
1972.
Kissinger declares peace is at hand,
explaining that one more negotiating
session with Hanoi is required.
DRV releases additional details about the
negotiating process, contradicting
Kissinger's account, and accusing the U.S.
of reneging on its pledge to sign the
agreement.
Nixon reelected.
General Alexander Haig visits Saigon to
reassure Thieu of full U.S. support and



















Saigon proposes that additional negotia-
tion tracks be created so it could deal
directly with the PRG.
Kissinger-Tho talks resume.
Le Due Tho returns to Hanoi.
Nixon meets with Thieu's personal
emissary, Nguyen Phu Due.
The JCS approve the terms of the draft
agreement
.
Kissinger-Tho talks resume: experts held
technical talks on the protocols December
10-12
Technical talks resume.
Le Due Tho visits Peking.
Kissinger reviews the status of the
negotiations: the "agreement is 99 per-
cent completed."
Le Due Tho visits Peking.
Linebacker 2: the Christmas bombing of
Hanoi.
General Haig visits Indochina and
Thailand to win support for the draft
agreement and to begin discussions on
what U.S. aviation will remain in South-
east Asia.
Technical talks adjourned by DRV repre-
sentatives protesting the Christmas
bombing.
Xuan Thuy (on ABC's "Issues and Answers")
declares DRV will not resume talks until
air strikes north of twentieth parallel
are halted.
Technical talks scheduled for this date













Linebacker 2 ended with announcement that
technical talks would resume on January 2,
1973.
Technical talks between Sullivan and DRV
Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen Co. Thach.




Bombing of North Vietnam completely
halted.
General Haig briefs allies in Indochina
and Asia on the agreement.
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